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Malware3 associated actors

Industroyer2

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Platforms
Windows

Industroyer2 is industrial-control-system malware designed to disrupt electricity operations by manipulating substation equipment through the IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC-104) protocol. It is associated with Sandworm, linked to Russia’s GRU Unit 74455. Deployed against a Ukrainian electricity provider in April 2022, the attack was thwarted before it caused an electricity-service disruption. CERT-UA and ESET publicly disclosed the operation on April 12, 2022.

A standalone Windows executable, Industroyer2 evolves the IEC-104 component of Industroyer, which was used in the 2016 Ukrainian power-grid attack. Unlike its predecessor’s multiprotocol toolkit, Industroyer2 implements only IEC-104. It embeds victim-specific station configurations and information object addresses, enabling precisely ordered single and double commands intended to manipulate circuit breakers and interrupt power delivery. It can communicate with multiple configured stations concurrently and supports both predefined object lists and configured object ranges.

Before interacting with substation devices, Industroyer2 can terminate selected control-system processes and rename associated executables to prevent their normal operation. It also supports delayed execution and execution logging. The April 2022 operation included separate destructive malware, including CaddyWiper and wipers targeting Linux and Solaris systems; those wiping capabilities are distinct from Industroyer2’s industrial-protocol manipulation functionality.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

In April 2022, CERT-UA thwarted an attack against an energy company in Ukraine where the Sandworm group tried to deploy a new variant of this malware, Industroyer2.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
UAC-0082

2022-04-12 ⋅ Cert-UA ⋅ Cyberattack of Sandworm Group (UAC-0082) on energy facilities of Ukraine using malicious programs INDUSTROYER2 and CADDYWIPER

APT28

Notable attacks included the deployment of Industroyer2 against energy facilities and widespread use of CaddyWiper malware.

via medium mrtiepolomrtiepolo.medium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

The attack used ICS-capable malware and regular disk wipers for Windows, Linux and Solaris operating systems.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Schtasks Run Task On Demand ... T1053 ... Scheduled Tasks

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter ... This command line parameter can be abused by malware like Industroyer2, adversaries, and red teamers to add a crontab entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings ... A scheduled task was created to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with hidden settings that are unique entry of malware like Industroyer2

T1106Native APIEvidence3

The next step that the sample performs using its hardcoded station configuration is to iterate through the hardcoded list of IOA per station and send C_SC_NA_1 or C_DC_NA_1 type frames, depending on each IOA’s configuration.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Schtasks Run Task On Demand ... T1053 ... Scheduled Tasks

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter ... This command line parameter can be abused by malware like Industroyer2, adversaries, and red teamers to add a crontab entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings ... A scheduled task was created to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with hidden settings that are unique entry of malware like Industroyer2

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

"...erase system-crucial Registry keys..."

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1543 Create or Modify System Process Persistence

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

"An additional backdoor provides an alternative persistence mechanism that allows the attackers to regain access to a targeted network in case the main backdoor is detected and/or disabled."

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Schtasks Run Task On Demand ... T1053 ... Scheduled Tasks

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Linux Adding Crontab Using List Parameter ... This command line parameter can be abused by malware like Industroyer2, adversaries, and red teamers to add a crontab entry to their malicious code to execute to the schedule they want.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Windows Hidden Schedule Task Settings ... A scheduled task was created to identify suspicious tasks registered on Windows either via schtasks.exe OR TaskService with hidden settings that are unique entry of malware like Industroyer2

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1543 Create or Modify System Process Persistence

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

"An additional backdoor provides an alternative persistence mechanism that allows the attackers to regain access to a targeted network in case the main backdoor is detected and/or disabled."

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Executables Or Script Creation In Temp Path ... T1036

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Linux High Frequency Of File Deletion In Boot Folder ... identifies a high frequency of file deletion ... /boot/ folder.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

"...erase system-crucial Registry keys..."

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

Related Detections ... Dump LSASS via procdump ... Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr ... Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation ... Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access ... Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL ... Windows Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Createdump ... Windows Possible Credential Dumping

Discovery

5 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

"The functionalities of the payload components include mapping the network, and then issuing commands to the specific industrial control devices."

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence6

[Industroyer2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1072) has the ability to cyclically enumerate running processes such as PServiceControl.exe, PService_PDD.exe, and other targets supplied through a hardcoded configuration.(Citation: Industroyer2 Mandiant April 2022)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The first parameter is “-t” which will trigger a waiting timer relative to the current minute of the system time.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

It will also look for the file path of that process in a specific folder that is in the config file and rename it with “.MZ” file extension.

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ID Technique Tactic T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The config data contains values ... The first component is the IP address of devices where it tries to communicate via IEC-104 protocol, the next one is the port number (2404)

Impact

5 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence5

In two recent major geopolitical conflicts, in Ukraine and in Israel, wipers - malware used to destroy access to files and commonly used to halt telecom operations - were used to destroy digital infrastructure.

T1489Service StopEvidence4

Terminate Process and Rename Process File Path ... looks for the process named “PServiceControl.exe” ... and rename it with “.MZ” file extension. | Linux Disable Services This analytic identifies events that attempt to disable a service. | Linux Stop Services This analytic identifies events that attempt to stop or clear a service.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence4

After terminating PServiceControl.exe, and based on the configuration, PService_PPD.exe which is then renamed with .MZ appended to its name, the sample begins IEC 104 interaction.

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

The takeaway for security teams is that advanced threat actors are continuously refining their OT capabilities to adapt to different operational scenarios... their ability to analyze the targeted environment and modify its status was demonstrated once more with Industroyer2.

T1565.002Transmitted Data ManipulationEvidence2

Вектор 4: злоупотребление промышленными протоколами (MITRE ATT&CK T1565.002 - Transmitted Data Manipulation)… атакующий с сетевым доступом может слать произвольные Write-команды на ПЛК.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

65 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.