PIPEDREAM
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceScanningBrute forcePost exploitationPrivilege escalationLateral movementPersistenceDefense evasionByovd
- Platforms
- Windows
PIPEDREAM, also known as INCONTROLLER, is a modular industrial control system attack framework publicly disclosed in April 2022. Developed by the threat group designated CHERNOVITE, it combines industrial device reconnaissance and manipulation tools with Windows intrusion components. It targets Schneider Electric and Omron programmable logic controllers, CODESYS-based automation environments, and OPC UA servers. Its capabilities support disruption, degradation, and potentially physical destruction of industrial processes across multiple industries. At its initial disclosure, researchers assessed that it had not been used to produce disruptive or destructive effects.
The framework abuses legitimate industrial programming and management capabilities, weak authentication, and device vulnerabilities after an attacker obtains access to an operational technology network. EVILSCHOLAR discovers and manipulates Schneider Electric controllers through CODESYS, supports password brute-forcing and file transfers, and can modify controller logic or disable communications. BADOMEN targets Omron controllers, enabling remote command execution, configuration changes, logic manipulation, memory wiping, and servo-drive parameter modification. It uses CVE-2022-34151, a hard-coded credentials vulnerability. MOUSEHOLE enumerates OPC UA servers and reads or writes exposed node attributes. Laboratory testing demonstrated controller logic corruption, loss of engineering access, unsafe motor-speed changes, and manipulation of process settings beyond safe operating limits.
PIPEDREAM also supports Windows host reconnaissance, command and control, lateral movement, and persistent controller implants. DUSTTUNNEL provides remote operational access, while LAZYCARGO exploits a vulnerable signed ASRock driver through CVE-2020-15368 to load unsigned kernel drivers. Compromised controllers can serve as network proxies, helping attackers traverse operational networks and evade perimeter monitoring. Its industrial components can deny operators control or visibility while executing untrusted code beyond the coverage of conventional workstation-based security monitoring.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The advisory describes modular tools for compromising Schneider Electric and OMRON PLCs and OPC UA servers, and identifies supporting analyses titled “INCONTROLLER: New State-Sponsored Cyber Attack Tools Target Multiple Industrial Control Systems” and “CHERNOVITE'S PIPEDREAM: Malware Targeting Industrial Control Systems.”
Techniques & procedures
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Activity: PIPEDREAM Interrogate Windows System ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Activity: PIPEDREAM Execution ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
...it does so by exploiting underlying software in those PLCs known as Codesys, which is used far more broadly across hundreds of other types of PLCs.
Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Remotely interacting with PLCs using CODESYS to support numerous attacks like brute-force passwords, performing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the controller, and severing connections.
Activity: BADOMEN Telnet Login Bypass / BADOMEN HTTP Login Bypass ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
CHERNOVITE can leverage PIPEDREAM’s multiple components to perform rapid reconnaissance of ICS networks by using a variety of mechanisms, including: Identifying known MAC addresses, Port numbers, HTTP banners, Omron’s proprietary Factory Interface Network Service Protocol (FINS), Modbus, Schneider’s custom Discovery broadcast protocol (NetManage).
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Remotely interacting with Omron PLCs through HTTP and Telnet to load a native implant to support further command execution.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
Activity: File Transfer of PIPEDREAM ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1544 Remote File Copy; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
“BADOMEN HTTP Encrypted Post … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1573 Encrypted Channel”
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Another water utility serving 2 million people in North Texas said Tuesday that it is also dealing with a cybersecurity incident that caused operational issues...
Recent activity
25 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.