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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

PIPEDREAM

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 9 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceScanningBrute forcePost exploitationPrivilege escalationLateral movementPersistenceDefense evasionByovd
Platforms
Windows
Also known asINCONTROLLER

PIPEDREAM, also known as INCONTROLLER, is a modular industrial control system attack framework publicly disclosed in April 2022. Developed by the threat group designated CHERNOVITE, it combines industrial device reconnaissance and manipulation tools with Windows intrusion components. It targets Schneider Electric and Omron programmable logic controllers, CODESYS-based automation environments, and OPC UA servers. Its capabilities support disruption, degradation, and potentially physical destruction of industrial processes across multiple industries. At its initial disclosure, researchers assessed that it had not been used to produce disruptive or destructive effects.

The framework abuses legitimate industrial programming and management capabilities, weak authentication, and device vulnerabilities after an attacker obtains access to an operational technology network. EVILSCHOLAR discovers and manipulates Schneider Electric controllers through CODESYS, supports password brute-forcing and file transfers, and can modify controller logic or disable communications. BADOMEN targets Omron controllers, enabling remote command execution, configuration changes, logic manipulation, memory wiping, and servo-drive parameter modification. It uses CVE-2022-34151, a hard-coded credentials vulnerability. MOUSEHOLE enumerates OPC UA servers and reads or writes exposed node attributes. Laboratory testing demonstrated controller logic corruption, loss of engineering access, unsafe motor-speed changes, and manipulation of process settings beyond safe operating limits.

PIPEDREAM also supports Windows host reconnaissance, command and control, lateral movement, and persistent controller implants. DUSTTUNNEL provides remote operational access, while LAZYCARGO exploits a vulnerable signed ASRock driver through CVE-2020-15368 to load unsigned kernel drivers. Compromised controllers can serve as network proxies, helping attackers traverse operational networks and evade perimeter monitoring. Its industrial components can deny operators control or visibility while executing untrusted code beyond the coverage of conventional workstation-based security monitoring.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2022-34151via dragos blogHard-coded Credentials in Omron NJ/NX/NA/Sysmac StudioBADOMEN provides similar abilities to EVILSCHOLAR but targets Omron’s NX/NJ series controllers. Its command line console leverages CVE-2022-34151, a hard-coded credentials vulnerability, to interact with an HTTP Server on the controller.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-15368via cisa advisoriesUnrestricted privileged IOCTL access in ASRock RGB DriverThe advisory describes modular tools for compromising Schneider Electric and OMRON PLCs and OPC UA servers, and identifies supporting analyses titled “INCONTROLLER: New State-Sponsored Cyber Attack Tools Target Multiple Industrial Control Systems” and “CHERNOVITE'S PIPEDREAM: Malware Targeting Industrial Control Systems.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Chernovite

The advisory describes modular tools for compromising Schneider Electric and OMRON PLCs and OPC UA servers, and identifies supporting analyses titled “INCONTROLLER: New State-Sponsored Cyber Attack Tools Target Multiple Industrial Control Systems” and “CHERNOVITE'S PIPEDREAM: Malware Targeting Industrial Control Systems.”

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

Activity: PIPEDREAM Interrogate Windows System ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Activity: PIPEDREAM Execution ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

...it does so by exploiting underlying software in those PLCs known as Codesys, which is used far more broadly across hundreds of other types of PLCs.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

Using DUSTTUNNEL's command-and-control functions, CHERNOVITE could drop additional tools such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to access a legitimate account and gain a persistent foothold in the enterprise network.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

Remotely interacting with PLCs using CODESYS to support numerous attacks like brute-force passwords, performing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the controller, and severing connections.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence2

Activity: BADOMEN Telnet Login Bypass / BADOMEN HTTP Login Bypass ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence3

CHERNOVITE can leverage PIPEDREAM’s multiple components to perform rapid reconnaissance of ICS networks by using a variety of mechanisms, including: Identifying known MAC addresses, Port numbers, HTTP banners, Omron’s proprietary Factory Interface Network Service Protocol (FINS), Modbus, Schneider’s custom Discovery broadcast protocol (NetManage).

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

Remotely interacting with Omron PLCs through HTTP and Telnet to load a native implant to support further command execution.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Activity: File Transfer of PIPEDREAM ... MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1544 Remote File Copy; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

“BADOMEN HTTP Encrypted Post … MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Technique: T1573 Encrypted Channel”

Impact

1 technique
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

Another water utility serving 2 million people in North Texas said Tuesday that it is also dealing with a cybersecurity incident that caused operational issues...

Activity feed

Recent activity

25 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.