Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware3 associated actors3 associated CVEs

CHOPSTICK

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK58Techniques
IOCs77Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
WindowsLinuxmacOSiOS
Also known asBackdoor.SofacyXSPLMwebhpXagent

X-Agent, also known as CHOPSTICK and SPLM, is a modular espionage backdoor associated with APT28, the Russian GRU-linked threat actor also known as Fancy Bear, Sednit, Sofacy, and Pawn Storm. The malware family has variants for Windows, Linux, macOS, and iOS and supports intelligence collection against government, military, defense-industry, media, and other high-value targets.

CHOPSTICK supports remote command execution, keylogging, screenshot capture, and discovery of antivirus and forensic software. Windows variants can store RC4-encrypted configuration data in the Registry and have been executed through Rundll32. Command-and-control communications use HTTP, HTTPS, and other channels depending on configuration, with RC4 encryption supported. The malware can switch communication channels when connectivity fails and can generate fallback command-and-control domains by concatenating words from predefined lists.

The macOS variant provides remote shell access, system and application enumeration, file operations, Firefox password theft, keylogging, screenshot capture, and data exfiltration over HTTP and FTP. It can discover and steal locally stored iOS backups, checks for debuggers, and includes a module that attempts process injection. The iOS variant requires a jailbroken device and collects messages, contacts, photographs, location information, audio, and device details. On iOS 7, it hides its application icon and restarts after termination; these behaviors do not occur on iOS 8. An application-installation lure has been observed, although the exact iOS installation mechanism is not established.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2014-4076via malpediaExploited in the wildWindows TCP/IP Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability2015-12-17 ⋅ Bitdefender ⋅ APT28 Under the Scope: A Journey into Exfiltrating Intelligence and Government Information X-Agent XP PrivEsc (CVE-2014-4076)View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11292via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player type confusion in bytecode verificationIoCs Table 2 lists a lure document (World War3.docx; SHA-1 7aada8bcc0d1ab8ffb1f0fae4757789c6f5546a3) detected as SWF/Exploit.CVE-2017-11292.A; the report notes DealersChoice generates malicious documents with embedded Adobe Flash Player exploits.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-4117via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildRemote code execution in Adobe Flash PlayerIoCs Table 2 lists a phishing document (f3805382ae2e23ff1147301d131a06e00e4ff75f) detected as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2016-4117.A; the report describes Sednit’s DealersChoice platform embedding Adobe Flash Player exploits in malicious Office documents.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
APT28

Primary Implant: Compiled C/C++ backdoors (Sofacy, CHOPSTICK, Zebrocy).

via sh3llc0d3 blogsh3llc0d3.com
GRU

Another unit mate, Capt. Nikolay Kozachek, allegedly crafted the X-Agent malware used to hack the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and DNC networks in April 2016.

via washington postwashingtonpost.com
Unit 26165

...their involvement in the development of Unit 26165’s X-Agent malware

via security weeksecurityweek.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

58 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

"BeardShell and SlimAgent are custom malware."

Initial Access

6 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence3

Part of [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007)'s operation involved using [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They also send emails purportedly containing links to news items, but instead linking to malware drop sites that install toolkits onto the target's computer.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"it uses zero-day exploits..." / "used a zero-day exploit of Java..." / "utilized 'two zero-day vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash and the down-level Windows kernel.'"

T1566PhishingEvidence4

Multiple entries describe APT28/Pawn Storm/Sofacy campaigns using lure documents, themed emails, and phishing schemes, e.g., “APT28 Hacker Group Targeting Europe, Americas, Asia in Widespread Phishing Scheme”, “New Spear Phishing Campaign Pretends to be EFF”, and “distribution of emails with 'instructions' on 'updating the operating system'”.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

Figure 2. Main attack methods and malware used by the Sednit group since 2014... Email attachments

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence4

The hackers used a spear phishing attack, directing emails to the false URL electronicfrontierfoundation.org.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence9

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is capable of performing remote command execution.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

RemoteShell 0x1302 Executes supplied commands in Linux command-line interpreter /bin/sh

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Examples include “APT28 racing to exploit CVE-2017-11292 Flash vulnerability before patches are deployed”, “New Adobe Flash Zero-Day Used in Pawn Storm Campaign”, and “Adobe & Windows Zero-Day Exploits Likely Leveraged by Russia’s APT28”.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence11

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) may modify Registry keys to store RC4 encrypted configuration information.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

When we try to terminate it by killing the process, it will restart almost immediately.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

One listed item explicitly names “T1055 Process Injection” and includes APT28-linked malware such as Downdelph among examples.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

When we try to terminate it by killing the process, it will restart almost immediately.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The malware uses a token to identify which module is communicating. The token is Base64 encoded data, but padded with a 5-byte random prefix so that it looks like valid Base64 data.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence4

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The Komplex Trojan is a binder with multiple parts: a dropper, a payload and a decoy pdf file.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

One listed item explicitly names “T1055 Process Injection” and includes APT28-linked malware such as Downdelph among examples.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

case ‘m’: deletFileFromPath

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence2

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. Operation Spalax threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

After being installed on iOS 7, the app’s icon is hidden and it runs in the background immediately.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Checks if a debugger is present and, if so, the malware exits.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

The exact way how the actors install the espionage malware on iOS devices is currently unknown to us. It is very likely that social engineering is an important part.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence11

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) may modify Registry keys to store RC4 encrypted configuration information.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Consistent with GRU techniques and 'methods of persistence' identified by computer forensic investigators in other intrusions, the hackers again used X-Agent to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather system data; used a lateral-movement tool called RemCom; and used Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence21

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is capable of performing keylogging.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Password: used to obtain passwords from Firefox browser profiles.

Discovery

12 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence8

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) provides access to the Windows Registry, which can be used to gather information.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources...

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Command Value 102 ... InfoOS getProcessList

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

InfoOS: Gather information from the infected computer, such as: IOPlatformUUID, process list, operating system version.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence12

An older version of [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) has a module that monitors all mounted volumes for files with the extensions .doc, .docx, .pgp, .gpg, .m2f, or .m2o.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence2

20 Map network resources

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Command 109: Browser history and bookmarks

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence5

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. Operation Spalax threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

RemoteShell: Used to execute remote commands received from the attacker on the infected machine. It lists installed applications as well as iPhone backups.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence5

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) checks for antivirus and forensics software.(Citation: FireEye APT28)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Checks if a debugger is present and, if so, the malware exits.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

An arrow representing the malicious fils moving laterally through the network. | The graphic indicates three methods of APT 29 tradecraft, including remote execution, file transmission, and keylogging

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence3

Part of [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007)'s operation involved using [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen grabbing and file exfiltration.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence21

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is capable of performing keylogging.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence10

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) has the capability to capture screenshots.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Madcap is similar to the XAgent malware, but the former is focused on recording audio.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

The Mac agent brings more spying capabilities such as stealing iOS backups from Mac computers, which contain messages, contacts, voicemail, call history, notes, calendar and Safari data.

Command and Control

15 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence3

The command request to the C&C server is made via HTTP GET. It receives a base64 encoded cmdPacket that has previously been encrypted with RC4 using a hardcoded KERNEL_CRYPTO_MAIN_KEY.

T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence5

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) can switch to a new C2 channel if the current one is broken.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence7

C2 azureon-line[.]com (TCP/80) ... C2 198.105.125[.]74 (TCP/80) ... C2 mozilla-plugins[.]com (TCP/80) ... The oldest sample... was found to beacon to the domain azureon-line[.]com... The first of the newer samples... beacons to an IP also widely associated with the Sofacy group... The newest sample... introduces a previously unknown command and control beacon to mozilla-plugins[.]com.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence13

Various implementations of [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) communicate with C2 over HTTP.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence5

Various implementations of [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) communicate with C2 over SMTP and POP3.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence3

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) used a proxy server between victims and the C2 server.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1092Communication Through Removable MediaEvidence3

Part of [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007)'s operation involved using [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence13

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is capable of performing remote file transmission.(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Recommended yara for the linux versions: rule sofacy_xagent ... x4 = "ChannelController" x5 = "RemoteKeylogger"

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence6

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) can use a DGA for [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008), domains are generated by concatenating words from lists.(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) encrypts C2 communications with RC4.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) encrypts C2 communications with TLS.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

To exfiltrate information to the C&C server (such as screenshots, passwords, files and more), the agent uses a defined structure called msgPacket.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The app is also able to upload files via FTP protocol.

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads ... QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information ... Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file ...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

77 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching77Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping58Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.