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MalwareUsed by 4 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

CHOPSTICK

Also known asBackdoor.SofacyXSPLMwebhpXagent

CHOPSTICK, also referred to as XAgent, SPLM, WebHP, and X-Agent, is a modular espionage backdoor associated with APT28/Sofacy/Sednit/Fancy Bear, which multiple sources link to Russian GRU operations. The malware has been used in long-running cyber espionage campaigns against government, military, defense, political, telecom, NATO-, OSCE-, and Eastern Europe-related targets, including activity tied to the 2016 compromises of the DCCC and DNC. Reported variants or builds exist for Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, and macOS, and samples are often specially compiled for specific targets with selected modules and communication channels enabled or disabled.

High-confidence capabilities described in the content include remote command execution, keystroke logging, file exfiltration, file-system and Windows Registry access, process creation, network resource enumeration, access to stored credentials, and anti-analysis runtime checks that prevent execution in analysis environments. The malware can use multiple command-and-control channels depending on module configuration, including HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, POP3, IMAP, and email-based communications; C2 traffic has been reported as encrypted with TLS. The content also notes that CHOPSTICK/XAgent can use a domain generation algorithm for fallback C2, generating domains by concatenating words from lists, and that APT28 used relay/proxy infrastructure, including compromised machines, to obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and its servers.

The content further states that CHOPSTICK may store RC4-encrypted configuration data in the Windows Registry. FireEye described CHOPSTICK as a flexible modular implant used alongside SOURFACE and EVILTOSS to enhance APT28 espionage operations. ESET described XAgent as Sednit's flagship modular backdoor with spying functionality and noted a Python-based proxy server used to relay XAgent MailChannel traffic into HTTP requests. Additional reporting in the content links X-Agent to an infected Android artillery-targeting application used by Ukrainian officers and to later expansion of the malware family to macOS. Mentioned infrastructure and related indicators include Njalla.no being used to register SPLM and XTUNNEL C2 servers.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2017-11292Adobe Flash Player type confusion in bytecode verificationExploited in the wild

IoCs Table 2 lists a lure document (World War3.docx; SHA-1 7aada8bcc0d1ab8ffb1f0fae4757789c6f5546a3) detected as SWF/Exploit.CVE-2017-11292.A; the report notes DealersChoice generates malicious documents with embedded Adobe Flash Player exploits.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
CVE-2016-4117Adobe Flash Player Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

IoCs Table 2 lists a phishing document (f3805382ae2e23ff1147301d131a06e00e4ff75f) detected as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2016-4117.A; the report describes Sednit’s DealersChoice platform embedding Adobe Flash Player exploits in malicious Office documents.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

APT28 has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and their server.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
GRU

Another unit mate, Capt. Nikolay Kozachek, allegedly crafted the X-Agent malware used to hack the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and DNC networks in April 2016.

via washington postwashingtonpost.com
unit_26165

...their involvement in the development of Unit 26165’s X-Agent malware

via security weeksecurityweek.com
APT29

...their involvement in the development of Unit 26165’s X-Agent malware

via security weeksecurityweek.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

They also send emails purportedly containing links to news items, but instead linking to malware drop sites that install toolkits onto the target's computer.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Among other things, it uses zero-day exploits, spear phishing and malware to compromise targets.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Figure 2. Main attack methods and malware used by the Sednit group since 2014... Email attachments

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The hackers used a spear phishing attack, directing emails to the false URL electronicfrontierfoundation.org.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2
TacticExecution

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources; create processes... | It used a downloader tool that FireEye dubbed " SOURFACE ", a backdoor labelled " EVILTOSS " that gives hackers remote access and a flexible modular implant called " CHOPSTICK " to enhance functionality of the espionage software.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

RemoteShell 0x1302 Executes supplied commands in Linux command-line interpreter /bin/sh

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The threat group implements counter-analysis techniques to obfuscate their code. They add junk data to encoded strings, making decoding difficult without the junk removal algorithm.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1
TacticStealth

Examples include: “ComRAT has encrypted and stored its orchestrator code in the Registry…”, “ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.”, and “QakBot can store its configuration information…under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.”

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
TacticStealth

APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\twain_64.dll".

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. Operation Spalax threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution. | Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

Consistent with GRU techniques and 'methods of persistence' identified by computer forensic investigators in other intrusions, the hackers again used X-Agent to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gather system data; used a lateral-movement tool called RemCom; and used Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Xagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration... RemoteKeylogger 0x1002 Logs keystrokes

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Together with the help of above mentioned tools... access stored credentials...

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Together with the help of above mentioned tools, the group gained access to the file system and registry; enumerate network resources...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

5 List directories ... 22 List files and directories

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

20 Map network resources

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it. Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads. Operation Spalax threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

An arrow representing the malicious fils moving laterally through the network. | The graphic indicates three methods of APT 29 tradecraft, including remote execution, file transmission, and keylogging

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Xagent is a modular backdoor with spying functionalities such as keystroke logging and file exfiltration... RemoteKeylogger 0x1002 Logs keystrokes

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

The GRU had used malware called 'X-Agent' to take screenshots and capture the key strokes of a DCCC employee who had authorization to access the DNC network.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

These actors set up operational infrastructure to obfuscate their source infrastructure, host domains and malware for targeting organizations, establish command and control nodes, and harvest credentials and other valuable information from their targets.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The source code contains two different channel implementations, one over HTTP and one over email... HttpChannel::getRawPacket() method is implemented as a HTTP GET request... sendRawPacket() is an HTTP POST request.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

The Xagent backdoor can communicate with its C&C server over email with a custom protocol... MailChannel... SMTP to send emails and POP3 to receive emails (over TLS)

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

LOAD_NEW_MODULE Instantiates an IAgentModule object from the given data, and registers this new module with the kernel... LOAD_NEW_CHANNEL Instantiates an IAgentChannel object from the given data... Sedreco plugin comes as a Windows DLL... downloading and execution of those plugins can be requested by the C&C server with command number 1

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The Xagent backdoor can communicate with its C&C server over email with a custom protocol... messages are sent and received as attachments to emails... Sedreco core threads store the output generated by a command execution in the outbound file... periodically transmitted in bulk to the server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
13 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
23 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
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What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching36

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping29

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.