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StormKitty is an information-stealing malware family focused on harvesting financial credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data. The provided reporting explicitly describes it as an infostealer and notes that code from StormKitty was reused in other malware, including Prynt Stealer, where Telegram exfiltration functionality was copied from StormKitty with minor modifications. StormKitty has also appeared as part of multi-malware delivery chains and shared infrastructure: a Golang loader identified as Birkenhead was reported to drop StormKitty, VenomRAT, and Vidar simultaneously using process hollowing, and StormKitty was linked to the multi-family C2 server 178.22.24.175 in Russian ASN AS209290 alongside VenomRAT, Vidar, QuasarRAT/AsyncRAT, RedLine, and other malware hosted in the same broader cluster. Additional reporting states that a fake Bitdefender website distributed StormKitty together with VenomRAT and SilentTrinity, and that another campaign toolkit incorporated commodity malware including Remcos RAT, Stealerium, StormKitty, and ZZ Stealer. SafeBreach also reported that ZZ Stealer loaded a fork of the StormKitty infostealer. High-confidence infrastructure and campaign details directly mentioned in the content include the association of StormKitty with 178.22.24.175 and its use in bundled or staged malware operations targeting Windows systems through trojanized installers, fake software sites, and loader-based deployment.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The expanded toolkit in this phase incorporated commodity tools such as Remcos RAT, Stealerium, StormKitty, and ZZ Stealer...
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Process Injection (T1055.012): CreateProcessAsUserW → Create suspended target process; WriteProcessMemory → Write payload into target address space; SetThreadContext → Redirect execution to payload entry point; ResumeThread → Resume execution under target process identity
Process Injection (T1055.012): CreateProcessAsUserW → Create suspended target process; WriteProcessMemory → Write payload into target address space; SetThreadContext → Redirect execution to payload entry point; ResumeThread → Resume execution under target process identity
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A stealer family observed sharing the same Russian-hosted multi-family C2 infrastructure.
Stealer payload delivered by the Golang 'Birkenhead' loader together with VenomRAT and Vidar. The content states it exfiltrates Discord tokens, browser data, and keylogging data.
Commodity stealer added to Infy’s toolkit during its expanded operations.
Open-source infostealer family (and forks) used as a second-stage payload; exfiltrates victim data via Telegram bot API to specific chat IDs; observed in multiple branded variants (e.g., "8==3", "Monkey") and reused across different campaigns/actors.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.