SILENTTRINITY is a command-and-control framework/stager used on Windows systems. The provided content states it was deployed as a C2 stager immediately after a server compromise in at least one intrusion case. Its capabilities include security software discovery by resolving service virtual SIDs to determine whether antivirus products are installed; registry discovery and modification, including checking AlwaysInstallElevated policy keys in HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated and HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated, inspecting AutoRun values, and reading values across HKCU, HKLM, HKCR, and HKCC; enabling or disabling Remote Desktop Protocol via registry changes; and establishing persistence by creating a new Windows service. It can gather logged-on users, retrieve domain user information via System.Security.AccessControl namespaces, enumerate and collect properties of domain computers, monitor and collect clipboard text via System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard.GetText(), collect cleartext web credentials for Internet Explorer/Edge, transfer files from an infected host to its C2 server, execute commands with PowerShell, use WMI for lateral movement, inject shellcode directly into Excel.exe or another specified process, scan for open ports on a compromised machine, hide its window state, disable AMSI through its amsiPatch.py module, and remove artifacts from the host including created registry keys. High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content include creation of new services for persistence, registry access to the AlwaysInstallElevated policy keys, registry modifications affecting RDP, AMSI patching behavior, shellcode injection into Excel.exe, clipboard collection, PowerShell execution, WMI-based lateral movement, file transfer to C2, and cleanup of created registry keys.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Moreover, exploitation of a public-facing application was the root cause in 42.37% of cases investigated by the Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) in 2023. During the investigation of one case, we identified that the web server was patched a month after the attacker infiltrated the network.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'
Immediately after compromising the server, the attacker deployed a SILENTTRINITY C2 stager.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe ... AADInternals can modify registry keys ... ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values ... [many additional examples].
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
APT5 has used the THINBLOOD utility to clear SSL VPN log files located at /home/runtime/logs.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.
CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe ... AADInternals can modify registry keys ... ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values ... [many additional examples].
Bundlore prompts the user for their credentials. Calisto presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password. Cuckoo Stealer has captured passwords by prompting victims with a "macOS needs to access System Settings" GUI window. Dok prompts the user for credentials. FIN4 has presented victims with spoofed Windows Authentication prompts to collect their credentials. iKitten prompts the user for their credentials. Keydnap prompts the users for credentials. Proton prompts users for their credentials. RedCurl prompts the user for credentials through a Microsoft Outlook pop-up. SILENTTRINITY's credphisher.py module can prompt a current user for their credentials. XCSSET prompts the user to input credentials using a native macOS dialog box leveraging the system process /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/SafariForWebKitDevelopment.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, opening, and reading Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations" and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware performing network scanning, port scanning, service enumeration, OS fingerprinting, and identifying open ports/services across victim environments.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.
Multiple entries describe enumerating local, logical, or physical drives and disk/volume information, e.g., 'can enumerate local drives,' 'GetLogicalDrives,' 'fsutil fsinfo drives,' 'list drives,' and 'discover logical drive information including the drive type, free space, and volume information.'
AdFind can enumerate domain users. APT41 used built-in net commands to enumerate domain administrator users. BloodHound can collect information about domain users, including identification of domain admin accounts.
The content states 'SILENTTRINITY can use cmd.exe to enable lateral movement using DCOM.'
Aquatic Panda modified the victim registry to enable the RestrictedAdmin mode feature, allowing for pass the hash behaviors to function via RDP. SILENTTRINITY can modify registry keys, including to enable or disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). SMOKEDHAM has modified registry keys for persistence, to enable credential caching for credential access, and to facilitate lateral movement via RDP.
Bundlore prompts the user for their credentials. Calisto presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password. Cuckoo Stealer has captured passwords by prompting victims with a "macOS needs to access System Settings" GUI window. Dok prompts the user for credentials. FIN4 has presented victims with spoofed Windows Authentication prompts to collect their credentials. iKitten prompts the user for their credentials. Keydnap prompts the users for credentials. Proton prompts users for their credentials. RedCurl prompts the user for credentials through a Microsoft Outlook pop-up. SILENTTRINITY's credphisher.py module can prompt a current user for their credentials. XCSSET prompts the user to input credentials using a native macOS dialog box leveraging the system process /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/SafariForWebKitDevelopment.
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
74 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A command-and-control stager deployed immediately after server compromise to establish attacker control and support follow-on activity.
Backdoor malware providing persistent access to compromised systems, distributed via fake Bitdefender download pages.
Post-exploitation framework capable of direct shellcode injection into Excel.exe or other specified processes.
Post-exploitation framework that can use PowerShell to execute commands.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.