Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Prestige

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Lateral movementPost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

Prestige is Windows ransomware deployed against transportation and logistics organizations in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022. The campaign is attributed to Sandworm, the Russian military intelligence-linked threat actor also known as IRIDIUM, Seashell Blizzard, and APT44. Its deployment formed part of disruptive operations against organizations supporting critical services during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Prestige encrypts files and inhibits recovery by deleting the Windows backup catalog and volume shadow copies through native system utilities. It also modifies the Windows Registry to register a file-extension handler. Operators deployed the ransomware within already-compromised networks after obtaining Domain Admin privileges, using administrative SMB shares and Active Directory Group Policy Objects. Observed execution methods included PowerShell and scheduled tasks created through Impacket. Payloads were also staged on domain controllers and distributed through the default domain Group Policy Object. These deployment methods relied on privileged access and centralized administration rather than demonstrating autonomous propagation.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Sandworm

The article describes Prestige attacks against organizations in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022, with deployment through ADMIN$ shares and Group Policy Objects after attackers obtained Domain Admin privileges.

via codebycodeby.net
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1590Gather Victim Network InformationEvidence1

However, while the destructive impact was limited, IRIDIUM almost certainly collected intelligence on supply routes and logistics operations that could facilitate future attacks.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has been executed on a target system through a scheduled task created by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) using [Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357).(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) can use PowerShell for payload execution on targeted systems.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has used the `Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection()` and `Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection()` functions to disable and restore file system redirection.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has been executed on a target system through a scheduled task created by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) using [Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357).(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence7

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has the ability to register new registry keys for a new extension handler via `HKCR\.enc` and `HKCR\enc\shell\open\command`.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1546.001Change Default File AssociationEvidence2

The following analytic detects attempts to change the default file association for files without an extension to open with Notepad.exe.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has been executed on a target system through a scheduled task created by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) using [Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357).(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence3

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1546.001Change Default File AssociationEvidence2

The following analytic detects attempts to change the default file association for files without an extension to open with Notepad.exe.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence7

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has the ability to register new registry keys for a new extension handler via `HKCR\.enc` and `HKCR\enc\shell\open\command`.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence3

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"Prestige has used the Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection() and Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection()"; "Sandworm Team uses Prestige to disable and restore file system redirection"

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) can traverse the file system to discover files to encrypt by identifying specific extensions defined in a hardcoded list.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence9

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has leveraged the CryptoPP C++ library to encrypt files on target systems using AES and appended filenames with `.enc`.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1489Service StopEvidence3

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) has attempted to stop the MSSQL Windows service to ensure successful encryption using `C:\Windows\System32\net.exe stop MSSQLSERVER`.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence5

[Prestige](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1058) can delete the backup catalog from the target system using: `c:\Windows\System32\wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet` and can also delete volume shadow copies using: `\Windows\System32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet`.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

Activity feed

Recent activity

46 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+42 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.