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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

STATICPLUGIN

STATICPLUGIN is a digitally signed Windows downloader used in a multi-stage espionage infection chain attributed to UNC6384, which Google Threat Intelligence Group linked to the Chinese threat actor TEMP.Hex, also known as Mustang Panda and Silk Typhoon. In reported March 2025 activity targeting diplomats in Southeast Asia and globally, attackers used an adversary-in-the-middle technique involving captive portal hijacking and abuse of Chrome connectivity checks to redirect victims to a fake Adobe plugin update site. Victims were prompted to execute a signed file such as AdobePlugins.exe, meaning the malware required user execution. STATICPLUGIN used the Windows COM Installer Object to download an MSI package; the MSI was disguised as a BMP file to hide its true MSI extension. The downloaded package contained components including a legitimate Canon printer tool and CANONSTAGER, which used DLL side-loading to decrypt and execute the final SOGU.SEC backdoor, a PlugX variant, entirely in memory. Reporting states STATICPLUGIN was signed with a valid Certificate Authority-issued certificate to help circumvent endpoint defenses, and campaign samples were signed by Chengdu Nuoxin Times Technology Co., Ltd., though it was unclear whether that entity was complicit or compromised. The broader infection chain ultimately deployed PlugX/SOGU.SEC, which was described as capable of collecting system information, uploading and downloading files, and providing a remote command shell. Detection references in the content include published YARA rules for STATICPLUGIN and CANONSTAGER.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mustang Panda

UNC6384 ... delivered a downloader dubbed STATICPLUGIN, and ultimately deployed a variant of the PlugX back-door...

via foresiet blogforesiet.com
hafnium

"...delivering a signed downloader (STATICPLUGIN) that installed the PlugX backdoor (SOGU.SEC)."

via securityaffairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

“or through fake software updates.”

T1566PhishingEvidence1

“distributed via phishing emails with meeting invitation lures…”

Execution

3 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Examples include: "Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros..."; "Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs"; "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files."

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1
T1036.008Masquerade File TypeEvidence2

Kapeka masquerades as a Microsoft Word Add-In file, with the extension .wll, but is a malicious DLL file.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using valid, stolen, forged, self-signed, or abused code-signing certificates to sign malware and appear legitimate, including examples such as AppleJeus using a valid digital signature from Sectigo, APT41 leveraging code-signing certificates, FIN7 signing Carbanak payloads, and SUNBURST being digitally signed by SolarWinds.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

"Deception in Depth: PRC-Nexus Espionage Campaign Hijacks Web Traffic to Target Diplomats"

Collection

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

"Deception in Depth: PRC-Nexus Espionage Campaign Hijacks Web Traffic to Target Diplomats"

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping10

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.