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Malware4 associated actors3 associated CVEs

COATHANGER

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
Platforms
Network device

COATHANGER is a custom remote access trojan designed to infect Fortinet FortiGate network security appliances running FortiOS. It is associated with Chinese state-sponsored cyberespionage and was publicly disclosed by Dutch intelligence and cybersecurity agencies in February 2024 following a 2023 intrusion into a segmented Dutch Ministry of Defence research network. Attackers deployed it after exploiting CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOS SSL VPN functionality. The broader campaign targeted governments, international organizations, and defense-industry companies, with persistent implants deployed on selected compromised systems.

COATHANGER provides persistent remote access and command execution. It can survive device reboots and firmware upgrades by injecting a backup of itself into the process responsible for rebooting the appliance and restoring its installation during the reboot sequence. Consequently, applying security updates after compromise does not necessarily remove the implant. It communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using SSL and exchanges configuration information through ICMP.

Its evasion mechanisms include a hidden installation directory, a packed first-stage payload, library injection into running processes, and function hooking. It intercepts system calls to conceal its presence and removes files after use to reduce forensic visibility. These persistence and concealment mechanisms make infections difficult to identify and eradicate.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2022-42475via ncscExploited in the wildUnauthenticated remote code execution in Fortinet SSL-VPNDe statelijke actor heeft zowel in 2022 als in 2023 binnen enkele maanden toegang verkregen tot ten minste 20.000 FortiGate-systemen wereldwijd middels de kwetsbaarheid met het kenmerk CVE-2022-42475. Tijdens de ‘zero-day’ periode infecteerde de actor alleen al 14.000 apparaten.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-13379via mitre attack websiteExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Path Traversal in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy SSL VPNAgrius exploits public-facing applications for initial access to victim environments. Examples include widespread attempts to exploit CVE-2018-13379 in FortiOS devices... APT29 has exploited ... CVE-2018-13379 for FortiGate VPNs... Dragonfly ... exploited ... CVE-2018-13379 for Fortinet VPNs... Magic Hound ... exploited ... Fortios SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379). Play ... including CVE-2018-13379 ... in FortiOS.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-27997via bleeping computerExploited in the wildPre-authentication remote code execution in FortiOS and FortiProxy SSL-VPN...the Chinese Volt Typhoon hacking group exploited two FortiOS vulnerabilities (tracked as CVE-2023-27997 and CVE-2022-42475) to deploy Coathanger remote access trojan malware...View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Salt Typhoon

In February 2024, the service revealed that Chinese hackers had broken into a compartmentalized Dutch Ministry of Defence network by exploiting a FortiGate vulnerability, deploying malware the agencies named COATHANGER.

via the record mediatherecord.media
Volt Typhoon

In February 2024, the service revealed that Chinese hackers had broken into a compartmentalized Dutch Ministry of Defence network by exploiting a FortiGate vulnerability, deploying malware the agencies named COATHANGER.

via the record mediatherecord.media
PRC state-sponsored attackers

"...attackers exploited CVE-2022-42475 against a Fortigate device to gain initial access and deploy malware known as \"COATHANGER.\""

via tenable blogtenable.com
Ke3chang

This sample contained an interesting string that led one of our CERT partners to name this cluster COATHANGER “She took his coat and hung it up.”

via fortinet psirt blogfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

In February 2024, the service revealed that Chinese hackers had broken into a compartmentalized Dutch Ministry of Defence network by exploiting a FortiGate vulnerability, deploying malware the agencies named COATHANGER.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

De campagne richtte zich op FortiGate-systemen en het NCSC beschrijft een bredere trend van misbruik van publiek benaderbare edge devices, zoals firewalls, VPN-servers, routers en e-mailservers.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence9

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) is installed following exploitation of a vulnerable FortiGate device. (Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) provides a BusyBox reverse shell for command and control.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Fortinet disclosed in February that the Chinese Volt Typhoon hacking group exploited two FortiOS SSL VPN flaws (CVE-2022-42475 and CVE-2023-27997) to backdoor a Dutch Ministry of Defence military network using custom Coathanger remote access trojan (RAT) malware.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will remove and write malicious shared objects associated with legitimate system functions such as `read(2)`.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) copies the malicious file <code>/data2/.bd.key/preload.so</code> to <code>/lib/preload.so</code>, then launches a child process that executes the malicious file <code>/data2/.bd.key/authd</code> as <code>/bin/authd</code> with the arguments <code>/lib/preload.so reboot newreboot 1</code>.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024) This injects the malicious preload.so file into the process with PID 1, and replaces its reboot function with the malicious newreboot function for persistence.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

De campagne richtte zich op FortiGate-systemen en het NCSC beschrijft een bredere trend van misbruik van publiek benaderbare edge devices, zoals firewalls, VPN-servers, routers en e-mailservers.

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

Fortinet disclosed in February that the Chinese Volt Typhoon hacking group exploited two FortiOS SSL VPN flaws (CVE-2022-42475 and CVE-2023-27997) to backdoor a Dutch Ministry of Defence military network using custom Coathanger remote access trojan (RAT) malware.

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

De statelijke actor installeerde bij relevante doelwitten op een later moment malware. Zo kreeg de actor permanente toegang tot de systemen. Ook als een slachtoffer beveiligingsupdates van FortiGate installeert, blijft de toegang behouden.

T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will create a daemon for timed check-ins with command and control infrastructure.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

"persistent, recovering after every reboot by injecting a backup of itself in the process responsible for rebooting the system."

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence6

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) includes a binary labeled `authd` that can inject a library into a running process and then hook an existing function within that process with a new function from that library.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Silence has injected a DLL library containing a Trojan into the fwmain32.exe process. WarzoneRAT has the ability to inject malicious DLLs into a specific process for privilege escalation. COATHANGER includes a binary labeled authd that can inject a library into a running process and then hook an existing function within that process with a new function from that library.

T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will create a daemon for timed check-ins with command and control infrastructure.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

"persistent, recovering after every reboot by injecting a backup of itself in the process responsible for rebooting the system."

Stealth

12 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence4

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) hooks or replaces multiple legitimate processes and other functions on victim devices.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) can store obfuscated configuration information in the last 56 bytes of the file `/date/.bd.key/preload.so`.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence3

The first stage of [COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) is delivered as a packed file.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence6

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) includes a binary labeled `authd` that can inject a library into a running process and then hook an existing function within that process with a new function from that library.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

Silence has injected a DLL library containing a Trojan into the fwmain32.exe process. WarzoneRAT has the ability to inject malicious DLLs into a specific process for privilege escalation. COATHANGER includes a binary labeled authd that can inject a library into a running process and then hook an existing function within that process with a new function from that library.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence7

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) removes files from victim environments following use in multiple instances.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) decodes configuration items from a bundled file for command and control activity.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence1

De statelijke actor installeerde bij relevante doelwitten op een later moment malware. Zo kreeg de actor permanente toegang tot de systemen. Ook als een slachtoffer beveiligingsupdates van FortiGate installeert, blijft de toegang behouden.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence5

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) creates and installs itself to a hidden installation directory.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will remove and write malicious shared objects associated with legitimate system functions such as `read(2)`.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) copies the malicious file <code>/data2/.bd.key/preload.so</code> to <code>/lib/preload.so</code>, then launches a child process that executes the malicious file <code>/data2/.bd.key/authd</code> as <code>/bin/authd</code> with the arguments <code>/lib/preload.so reboot newreboot 1</code>.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024) This injects the malicious preload.so file into the process with PID 1, and replaces its reboot function with the malicious newreboot function for persistence.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsEvidence3

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will set the GID of `httpsd` to 90 when infected.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will query running process information to determine subsequent program execution flow.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) will survey the contents of system files during installation.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

"...a new critical remote code execution vulnerability in FortiOS SSL VPN..."

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

De Nederlandse inlichtingendiensten en het NCSC achten het waarschijnlijk dat de statelijke actor bij honderden slachtoffers wereldwijd zijn toegang uit kon breiden en aanvullende acties uit heeft kunnen voeren zoals het stelen van gegevens.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence6

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) uses an HTTP GET request to initialize a follow-on TLS tunnel for command and control.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) uses ICMP for transmitting configuration information to and from its command and control server.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

"a previously unknown malware strain named Coathanger, a remote access trojan (RAT) designed to infect Fortigate network security appliances"

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

Examples include: "COATHANGER uses an HTTP GET request to initialize a follow-on TLS tunnel for command and control" and "Drovorub can use the WebSocket protocol and has initiated communication with C2 servers with an HTTP Upgrade request."

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[COATHANGER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1105) connects to command and control infrastructure using SSL.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)

Impact

1 technique
T1495Firmware CorruptionEvidence1

"Moreover, the infection survives firmware upgrades" and "Even fully patched FortiGate devices may therefore be infected, if they were compromised before the latest patch was applied."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.