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Malware2 associated actors2 associated CVEs

NotDoor

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs38Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

NotDoor, also known as GONEPOSTAL, is a Microsoft Outlook backdoor for Windows associated with the Russian military intelligence-linked threat actor APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, and UAC-0001. Implemented as Outlook VBA macros, it supports persistent espionage against organizations across multiple sectors in NATO member states. Campaigns deploying it have targeted Ukrainian and European government, military, diplomatic, maritime, transportation, and logistics organizations.

NotDoor integrates with Outlook event handling and monitors incoming messages for a predefined trigger word. Its functionality includes command execution, uploading files to compromised systems, and exfiltrating data. Email-collection variants monitor mailbox folders and automatically forward messages and attachments to attacker-controlled email accounts. They track processed messages to avoid duplicate forwarding and remove outgoing copies to conceal the activity. Installation weakens Outlook macro security, suppresses security warnings, and enables automatic macro loading to sustain execution through Outlook.

In January 2026 campaigns, NotDoor was deployed through multi-stage infection chains initiated by spear-phishing attachments exploiting Microsoft Office security feature bypass vulnerability CVE-2026-21509. Opening a malicious document caused embedded OLE objects to retrieve external payloads through WebDAV without requiring document macros to be enabled. NotDoor served as an Outlook-focused payload for long-term email intelligence collection, alongside separate infection branches deploying other implants. MiniDoor is a stripped-down derivative focused on email theft.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-21509via osint team blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office COM/OLE Security Feature BypassPatching CVE-2026–21509 is necessary, but not sufficient. Malicious .doc → CVE- 2026 - 21509 exploit → LNK shortcut + SimpleLoader DLL → EhStoreShell .dll (steganography loader) → SplashScreen .png (shellcode hidden in PNG image) → CovenantGrunt (in-memory .NET backdoor) → filen .io (C2 communication)View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-21513via trend micro researchExploited in the wildMicrosoft MSHTML Framework Security Feature BypassCVE-2026-21513 zero-day: Exploited at least 11 days before the February 10, 2026 patch release... By combining zero-day exploitation (CVE-2026-21513) with rapid weaponization of newly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-21509)... Immediate mitigations Patching: Prioritize the remediation of both CVE-2026-21509 and CVE-2026-21513 across the entire fleet immediately.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

Researchers from Trend Micro assess that this advanced toolkit represents a strategic expansion of the group's older "NotDoor" malware network.

via broadcombroadcom.com
TA422

The exploitation delivers a multi-stage infection chain culminating in the NotDoor Outlook backdoor and Covenant Grunt implants.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

"APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) managed to reverse-engineer Microsoft's urgent Office patch for CVE-2026-21509 and had working exploits hitting targets within 48 hours of release."

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

In these attacks, phishing emails with geopolitically-charged narratives related to transnational weapons smuggling, military training programs, and meteorological emergency bulletins contain weaponized documents that exploit CVE-2026-21509...

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

APT28's attack begins with spear-phishing emails containing weaponized documents that exploit CVE-2026-21509... All emails carried weaponized RTF/DOC attachments.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

upon detection, allows attackers to exfiltrate data, upload files, and execute commands on the compromised system

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

The campaign relies on a layered infection chain and new tooling, starting with a lightweight loader and progressing to an Outlook VBA backdoor called NotDoor... The loader either... drops VbaProject.OTM for NotDoor payload.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

CVE-2026-21509, a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Office affecting RTF and OLE document processing... weaponized the flaw in malicious RTF files targeting Ukrainian government agencies and European defense, transportation, and diplomatic entities.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

When victims open these malicious documents, the exploit triggers automatically without requiring macros or user interaction.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1137.001Office Template MacrosEvidence1

The dropper then writes the VbaProject.OTM directly to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Outlook... establishes LoadMacroProviderOnBoot as 1.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

scrutinizing registry modifications aimed at establishing persistence mechanisms

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

scrutinizing registry modifications aimed at establishing persistence mechanisms

Stealth

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

"while covering its tracks by purging sent items"

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

allows attackers to exfiltrate data, upload files, and execute commands on the compromised system

Collection

2 techniques
T1114Email CollectionEvidence2

The VBA macro itself implements email surveillance through dual automatic triggers... processing up to 10 messages per folder per execution.

T1114.003Email Forwarding RuleEvidence1

"NotDoor was monitoring email folders and automatically forwarding sensitive messages"

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Cloud storage services (notably filen.io) serve as C2 infrastructure, blending malicious traffic with normal enterprise activity.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

"they used legitimate cloud services for command and control to stay under the radar"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The vulnerability allows embedded OLE objects to execute by leveraging the WebDAV protocol to fetch external payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure... the initial exploitation downloads a malicious LNK shortcut and first-stage loader DLL...

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

upon detection, allows attackers to exfiltrate data, upload files, and execute commands on the compromised system

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

creates a new forwarding message with the original attached, and transmits it to two adversary-controlled addresses via standard SMTP.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

38 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching38Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.