17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
LevelBlue Labs recently discovered a new highly evasive loader that is being delivered to specific targets through phishing attachments.
The observed SquidLoader attack follows a five-stage infection chain: Spear-phishing email: The attack commences with a targeted spear-phishing email directed at employees of Hong Kong financial services institutions. Password-Protected RAR archive: The email contains an attachment disguised as an invoice within a password-protected RAR archive.
Whenever possible, the malware avoids calling Windows NT APIs and opts instead to perform their own syscalls.
Upon extraction, the RAR archive reveals a PE binary... Upon execution SquidLoader copies itself to c:\users\public\setup_xitgutx.exe and relaunches
The shellcode that is delivered is also loaded in the same loader process, likely to avoid writing the payload to disk and thus risk being detected.
The analyzed sample exhibits significant control flow obfuscation... This technique makes static analysis and reverse engineering significantly more challenging by introducing numerous conditional jumps and loops that obscure the actual program flow.
SquidLoader employs sophisticated techniques to dynamically resolve necessary Windows APIs... The names of these APIs are individually XORed and then immediately overwritten in memory, effectively erasing any static traces of the API names.
This binary is crafted with an icon and name mimicking a Microsoft Word document to deceive the user. However, the underlying file properties resemble a legitimate "AMDRSServ.exe" (Radeon settings host service), further aiding in social engineering.
The shellcode that is delivered is also loaded in the same loader process, likely to avoid writing the payload to disk and thus risk being detected.
Each byte is XORed with the value 0xF4 and then has 19 added to it. This de-obfuscation routine reveals the subsequent stages of the malware.
The malware hijacks the __scrt_common_main_seh function during its epilogue, diverting control to the malicious code before WinMain is ever reached.
SquidLoader incorporates a comprehensive suite of anti-analysis measures to evade detection... Username check... checks if it matches "Abby" or "WALKER," common usernames in some sandbox environments.
SquidLoader uses a syscall to NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemProcessInformation parameter to obtain a list of running processes... checking for the presence of various analysis and debugging tools.
SquidLoader performs a syscall to the NtQueryInformationProcess function with the undocumented parameter 0x1e (ProcessDebugObjectHandle)... the malware interprets this as a sign of being debugged and exits.
SquidLoader uses a syscall to NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemProcessInformation parameter to obtain a list of running processes.
The malware transmits a significant amount of information about the compromised host to the C2 server, including: IP address Username Computer name Windows version Process ID Thread ID Filename Administrator privileges status Active Code Page OEM Code Page
SquidLoader incorporates a comprehensive suite of anti-analysis measures to evade detection... Username check... checks if it matches "Abby" or "WALKER," common usernames in some sandbox environments.
SquidLoader uses a syscall to NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemProcessInformation parameter to obtain a list of running processes... checking for the presence of various analysis and debugging tools.
SquidLoader performs a syscall to the NtQueryInformationProcess function with the undocumented parameter 0x1e (ProcessDebugObjectHandle)... the malware interprets this as a sign of being debugged and exits.
Once the user dismisses the deceptive error message box, SquidLoader proceeds to establish communication with its Command and Control (C2) server... The analyzed sample communicates with hxxps://39.107.156.136/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/services.
The final stage involves the download and in-memory execution of a Cobalt Strike Beacon, granting the attackers persistent remote access to the compromised system.
20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.