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Mallory
Malware

SquidLoader

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs20Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

LevelBlue Labs recently discovered a new highly evasive loader that is being delivered to specific targets through phishing attachments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The observed SquidLoader attack follows a five-stage infection chain: Spear-phishing email: The attack commences with a targeted spear-phishing email directed at employees of Hong Kong financial services institutions. Password-Protected RAR archive: The email contains an attachment disguised as an invoice within a password-protected RAR archive.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

Whenever possible, the malware avoids calling Windows NT APIs and opts instead to perform their own syscalls.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Upon extraction, the RAR archive reveals a PE binary... Upon execution SquidLoader copies itself to c:\users\public\setup_xitgutx.exe and relaunches

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The shellcode that is delivered is also loaded in the same loader process, likely to avoid writing the payload to disk and thus risk being detected.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The analyzed sample exhibits significant control flow obfuscation... This technique makes static analysis and reverse engineering significantly more challenging by introducing numerous conditional jumps and loops that obscure the actual program flow.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

SquidLoader employs sophisticated techniques to dynamically resolve necessary Windows APIs... The names of these APIs are individually XORed and then immediately overwritten in memory, effectively erasing any static traces of the API names.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

This binary is crafted with an icon and name mimicking a Microsoft Word document to deceive the user. However, the underlying file properties resemble a legitimate "AMDRSServ.exe" (Radeon settings host service), further aiding in social engineering.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The shellcode that is delivered is also loaded in the same loader process, likely to avoid writing the payload to disk and thus risk being detected.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Each byte is XORed with the value 0xF4 and then has 19 added to it. This de-obfuscation routine reveals the subsequent stages of the malware.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The malware hijacks the __scrt_common_main_seh function during its epilogue, diverting control to the malicious code before WinMain is ever reached.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

SquidLoader incorporates a comprehensive suite of anti-analysis measures to evade detection... Username check... checks if it matches "Abby" or "WALKER," common usernames in some sandbox environments.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

SquidLoader uses a syscall to NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemProcessInformation parameter to obtain a list of running processes... checking for the presence of various analysis and debugging tools.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

SquidLoader performs a syscall to the NtQueryInformationProcess function with the undocumented parameter 0x1e (ProcessDebugObjectHandle)... the malware interprets this as a sign of being debugged and exits.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

SquidLoader uses a syscall to NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemProcessInformation parameter to obtain a list of running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware transmits a significant amount of information about the compromised host to the C2 server, including: IP address Username Computer name Windows version Process ID Thread ID Filename Administrator privileges status Active Code Page OEM Code Page

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

SquidLoader incorporates a comprehensive suite of anti-analysis measures to evade detection... Username check... checks if it matches "Abby" or "WALKER," common usernames in some sandbox environments.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

SquidLoader uses a syscall to NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemProcessInformation parameter to obtain a list of running processes... checking for the presence of various analysis and debugging tools.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

SquidLoader performs a syscall to the NtQueryInformationProcess function with the undocumented parameter 0x1e (ProcessDebugObjectHandle)... the malware interprets this as a sign of being debugged and exits.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Once the user dismisses the deceptive error message box, SquidLoader proceeds to establish communication with its Command and Control (C2) server... The analyzed sample communicates with hxxps://39.107.156.136/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/services.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The final stage involves the download and in-memory execution of a Cobalt Strike Beacon, granting the attackers persistent remote access to the compromised system.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching20Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.