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Malware3 associated actors

ExMatter

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionLateral movementPost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

Exmatter, also known as Fendr, is a custom .NET-based data-theft and exfiltration malware targeting Windows systems. Discovered in 2021 in BlackMatter ransomware attacks, it was subsequently used in BlackCat/ALPHV/Noberus, Conti, and LockBit operations. Its creation and use have been attributed to the ransomware affiliate Velvet Tempest, formerly tracked as DEV-0504. Operators deploy it within compromised enterprise networks to steal sensitive business data before ransomware execution, supporting double-extortion attacks.

Exmatter enumerates logical drives and selectively collects documents, databases, email stores, archives, source code, and engineering files. Variant-specific filters select files by extension, size, modification time, and location while excluding operating-system and application directories. Some versions prioritize recently modified files. Stolen data is transferred to attacker-controlled servers using SFTP, WebDAV, or FTP, depending on the variant; WebDAV can serve as a fallback when SFTP fails. Later versions can generate reports of processed files and corrupt collected files through an optional erasure feature.

Observed deployment methods include Group Policy Objects and remote execution with PsExec or network shares. A later variant discovers mapped network drives, coordinates multiple instances through interprocess communication, and remotely executes itself on additional systems while collecting data. When already running with administrative privileges, it can take ownership of otherwise inaccessible files. Defense-evasion features include executable protection and obfuscation, window hiding, and PowerShell-based overwriting and deletion of its own executable. Some versions also support self-destruction in unsuitable execution environments. Exmatter does not exhibit persistence behavior.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Velvet Tempest

S-RM’s incident response team has observed a new variant of the data exfiltration tool, Exmatter, being used by a LockBit affiliate on a recent ransomware engagement.

via s rm blogs-rminform.com
Coreid

Exmatter, which was discovered by Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, is designed to steal specific file types from a number of selected directories and upload them to an attacker-controlled server prior to deployment of the ransomware itself on the victim’s network.

via symantec enterprise blogssymantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com
BlackCat

"...deploying custom data exfiltration tools like ExMatter to siphon sensitive data prior to encryption."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

The specific sample from this incident was compiled close to the attack and contains a popular .NET protection named Confuser.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

by invoking PowerShell to overwrite the first 65,536 bytes of the malicious file and subsequently delete itself

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

If executed with administrator rights, it was also able to modify the permissions of files using the command ‘takeown’...

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

If executed with administrator rights, it was also able to modify the permissions of files using the command ‘takeown’, which uses the SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Microsoft API, giving the threat actor ownership permissions over files they were previously denied access to.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Analysis of the Exmatter binary revealed that, beneath multiple layers of obfuscation, including the use of Spanish to write its functions, and encoding large sections of the malware in Base64...

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

Exmatter leverages anti-forensic techniques, removing any traces of itself from the device by invoking PowerShell to overwrite the first 65,536 bytes of the malicious file and subsequently delete itself.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence2

If the string “nownd” or “-nownd” was passed to the file on execution, the file would attempt to hide its own window in order to avoid visual detection by any end user on the system.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Analysis of the Exmatter binary revealed that... its ability to read mapped network drives from the registry of the host system.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

Analysis of the Exmatter binary revealed that... its ability to read mapped network drives from the registry of the host system... Querying of the Network registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Network\*\RemotePath, which stores the UNC paths of mounted shares.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

After scanning the corporate network, BlackCat attackers created multiple text files, each one containing the names of identified machines in the network.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

the ransomware and Fendr are delivered simultaneously across a network to many systems as “v2.exe” and “v2c.exe”, or as “v2.exe” and “sender2.exe”

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Exmatter abuses Windows administrative shares to perform lateral movement, a type of share enabled by default in Windows environments to facilitate the remote management of hosts by administrators and software.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence3

The attacker tried to deploy this tool to over 2,000 machines in the network using PsExec, like described earlier.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Exmatter... target[s] specific directories and file types for collection and exfiltration.

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence1

The use of IPC allowed it to move laterally between network shares on the victim’s network, simultaneously targeting data for exfiltration whilst remotely executing itself on other systems.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The tool, dubbed Fendr, has not only been upgraded to include more file types but also used by the gang extensively to steal data from corporate networks in December 2021 and January 2022 prior to encryption, in a popular tactic called double extortion.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

In order to identify files for exfiltration, it will retrieve the drive names of all logical drives on the infected computer and collect all file path names... It will only exfiltrate files with the following extensions... It attempts to prioritize files for exfiltration by using LastWriteTime.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

Exmatter is designed to steal a range of user files, databases and compressed files (including email and zip archive files)

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

By default, this specific sample is trying to communicate with an IP address via WebDav, initially sending a PROPFIND request.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

The team identified additional embedded configuration data ... as well as a SOCKS5 proxy configuration with the localhost IP address.

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Exmatter is designed to steal a range of user files, databases and compressed files ... and then upload them to a preconfigured server via Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP).

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence4

Between November 3 and December 26, 673,977 flows took place... a large majority ... involved only two IP addresses... All of these flows used port 22 of 174.138.64[.]88.

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Tool description: “ExMatter… upload… via SFTP” and mapping “T1048… .002: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol”

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

Of those, a large majority (462,552/673,977) occurred from December 15 onward and involved only two IP addresses, one attributed to the vendor and a DigitalOcean IP address, 174.138.64[.]88. These transfers may represent the attackers’ data exfiltration from the vendor’s network.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3

This tool has been observed shortly before ransomware deployment on the victim's network.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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securityscorecard researchNews · Apr 22, 2026Ransomware Attack on Vendor Managing U.S. Government Records - SecurityScorecardData exfiltration tool associated in the report with BlackCat activity; described as connecting from victim networks to remote servers over port 22, consistent with suspected exfiltration traffic in this incident.Read more ↗securityscorecard researchNews · Apr 21, 2026BlackCat Ransomware Group Claims Attack on Healthcare Service Provider - SecurityScorecardExfiltration tool associated in the report with BlackCat. It is described as using command-and-control infrastructure largely on DigitalOcean IP addresses and exfiltrating data to a remote server over port 22.Read more ↗cybereason blogNews · Jan 1, 2025THREAT ANALYSIS REPORT: Inside the LockBit Arsenal - The StealBit Exfiltration ToolMentioned as another custom data exfiltration tool used in ransomware operations; no further analysis is provided in this content.Read more ↗s rm blogNews · Jan 18, 2024Exmatter malware levels up: S-RM observes new variant with simultaneous remote code execution and data targetingA custom-built data exfiltration tool used prior to ransomware deployment to automate collection and theft of sensitive data from Windows environments. This variant targets specific directories and file types, reads mapped network drives from the registry, uses TinyIPC for inter-process communication to support lateral movement and remote execution across network shares, can take ownership of files when run with administrator rights, and exfiltrates data to an attacker-controlled WebDAV server over HTTP PUT.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.