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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

Atlantida Stealer

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationReconnaissance
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

Atlantida Stealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family first discovered in January 2024 and built from the open-source NecroStealer and PredatorTheStealer projects. It collects browser credentials, passwords, cookies, cryptocurrency wallet extension data, screenshots, desktop files, system information, and data associated with Telegram, Steam, and FileZilla. Collected information is compressed into a ZIP archive and exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

Void Banshee deployed Atlantida Stealer in campaigns targeting North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia for information theft and financial gain. In activity observed in May 2024, attackers exploited CVE-2024-38112 through crafted internet shortcuts that invoked the legacy Internet Explorer MSHTML/MHTML components on Windows. ZIP archives containing files disguised as PDF books were distributed through cloud-sharing services, Discord, online libraries, and compromised websites. The infection chain used HTA, VBScript, PowerShell, and .NET stages, with intermediate loaders performing process injection and in-memory payload execution. Atlantida Stealer has also been distributed through malicious GitHub repositories promoted through Discord by the Stargazers Ghost network associated with Stargazer Goblin.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-38112via cisecurity advisoriesExploited in the wildWindows MSHTML Platform Spoofing VulnerabilityTrend Micro reports the MHTML remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability CVE-2024-38112 was used as part of an attack chain by the advanced persistent threat (APT) group Void Banshee... The final payload of this zero-day attack chain is the Atlantida stealer... evolved to use CVE-2024-38112 as part of Void Banshee infection chains.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Stargazer Goblin

The delivery methods observed in this campaign exhibits significant overlap with tactics attributed to the threat group Stargazer Goblin (as outlined in Check Point Research's Atlantida Stealer campaign report from July 2024).

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
Void Banshee

The final payload of this zero-day attack chain is the Atlantida stealer, which was first discovered in January 2024.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.004ServerEvidence1

Victim is redirected to compromised site which downloads a malicious HTML Application (.HTA).

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"CVE-2024-43461 ... MSHTML platform spoofing vulnerability similar to CVE-2024-38112, which was exploited by the threat actor to deliver Atlantida stealer malware" ... "exploited as a part of an attack chain relating to CVE-2024-38112"

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Void Banshee used zip archives containing copies of books in PDF format, along with malicious files disguised as PDFs in spearphishing links (T1566.002), on online libraries, cloud sharing sites, Discord, and a slew of compromised websites.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

This script uses PowerShell to download an additional script hosted on a compromised web server and executes the command using the PowerShell irm (Invoke-RestMethod) alias and iex (Invoke-Expression) alias commands.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The HTA file contains a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) that decrypts XOR encrypted content with key 4 and executes the content using PowerShell.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Trend Micro reports the MHTML remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability CVE-2024-38112 was used as part of an attack chain by the advanced persistent threat (APT) group Void Banshee... The final payload of this zero-day attack chain is the Atlantida stealer.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The zero-day attack begins when the victim opens a URL shortcut file designed to exploit CVE-2024-38112.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then injects them into C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe. The malware employs a common process injection technique... CreateProcess ... VirtualAllocEx ... WriteProcessMemory ... CreateRemoteThread API.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The HTA file contains a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) that decrypts XOR encrypted content with key 4... LoadToBadXml is a .NET Trojan loader that is obfuscated using Eziriz .NET Reactor.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then injects them into C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe. The malware employs a common process injection technique... CreateProcess ... VirtualAllocEx ... WriteProcessMemory ... CreateRemoteThread API.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

By using specially crafted .URL files that contained the MHTML protocol handler and the x-usc! directive, Void Banshee was able to access and run HTML Application (HTA) files directly through the disabled IE process.

T1218.009Regsvcs/RegasmEvidence1

Atlantida abuses RegAsm.exe to proxy malicious code execution.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

It targets sensitive information from various applications... web browsers... extracting stored sensitive and potentially valuable data, such as passwords and cookies... Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Edge’s cookies and credentials.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Next, the malware starts to collect system information such as RAM, GPU, CPU, and screen resolution and stores it in “User Information.txt”

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Furthermore, the malware harvests credentials and sensitive files from various applications... All files with the ".txt" extension from the infected system’s desktop directory... Telegram data... Steam configurations... cookies and credentials.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Afterward, it takes a screenshot, saves it as "screenshot.jpeg," and adds it to the ZIP.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

The stolen data is then compressed into a ZIP file and transmitted to the attacker via TCP... The malware compresses all the collected data into a ZIP file and exfiltrates it to the attacker's C&C server over TCP port 6655.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The malware compresses all the collected data into a ZIP file and exfiltrates it to the attacker's C&C server over TCP port 6655.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.