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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

Atlantida Stealer

Atlantida Stealer is an information-stealing malware family first discovered in January 2024 and active throughout 2024. It has been associated with the threat actor Void Banshee, which used it as the final payload in campaigns exploiting Windows MSHTML/Internet Explorer-related flaws including CVE-2024-38112, and reporting also links similar MSHTML spoofing flaws such as CVE-2024-43461 and CVE-2024-43573 to delivery of this malware. In the documented Void Banshee infection chain, victims were lured with spearphishing-style files disguised as PDF books, often delivered via ZIP archives and distributed through cloud-sharing sites, Discord servers, online libraries, compromised websites, and malicious GitHub repositories amplified through the Stargazers Ghost network. The exploit chain abused .URL files, the MHTML protocol handler, x-usc directives, malicious HTA/VBScript/PowerShell stages, and a .NET loader to execute the payload on Windows systems via the disabled but still present Internet Explorer/MSHTML components. Atlantida Stealer is reported to be built from the open-source stealers NecroStealer and PredatorTheStealer. Its theft capabilities include passwords and browser credentials, cookies, screenshots, desktop files, system information, Telegram data, Steam data, FileZilla data, browser extension data, and cryptocurrency wallet extension data. Collected data is compressed into a ZIP archive and exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure, including over TCP port 6655. Reported targeting in the Void Banshee campaigns was concentrated in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. A reported payload sample, AtlantidaStealer.exe, had SHA256 6f1f3415c3e52dcdbb012f412aef7b9744786b2d4a1b850f1f4561048716c750.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2024-38112Windows MSHTML Platform Spoofing VulnerabilityExploited in the wild

The vulnerability CVE-2024-38112 (ZDI-CAN-24433) was used as a zero-day to access and execute files through the disabled Internet Explorer using MSHTML. | The final payload of this zero-day attack chain is the Atlantida stealer, which was first discovered in January 2024.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Void Banshee

The final payload of this zero-day attack chain is the Atlantida stealer, which was first discovered in January 2024.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1584.004ServerEvidence1

Victim is redirected to compromised site which downloads a malicious HTML Application (.HTA).

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"CVE-2024-43461 ... MSHTML platform spoofing vulnerability similar to CVE-2024-38112, which was exploited by the threat actor to deliver Atlantida stealer malware" ... "exploited as a part of an attack chain relating to CVE-2024-38112"

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Void Banshee used zip archives containing copies of books in PDF format, along with malicious files disguised as PDFs in spearphishing links (T1566.002), on online libraries, cloud sharing sites, Discord, and a slew of compromised websites.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

This script uses PowerShell to download an additional script hosted on a compromised web server and executes the command using the PowerShell irm (Invoke-RestMethod) alias and iex (Invoke-Expression) alias commands.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

The HTA file contains a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) that decrypts XOR encrypted content with key 4 and executes the content using PowerShell.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

The zero-day attack begins when the victim opens a URL shortcut file designed to exploit CVE-2024-38112.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then injects them into C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe. The malware employs a common process injection technique... CreateProcess ... VirtualAllocEx ... WriteProcessMemory ... CreateRemoteThread API.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The HTA file contains a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) that decrypts XOR encrypted content with key 4... LoadToBadXml is a .NET Trojan loader that is obfuscated using Eziriz .NET Reactor.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

It then injects them into C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe. The malware employs a common process injection technique... CreateProcess ... VirtualAllocEx ... WriteProcessMemory ... CreateRemoteThread API.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

By using specially crafted .URL files that contained the MHTML protocol handler and the x-usc! directive, Void Banshee was able to access and run HTML Application (HTA) files directly through the disabled IE process.

T1218.009Regsvcs/RegasmEvidence1
TacticStealth

Atlantida abuses RegAsm.exe to proxy malicious code execution.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

It targets sensitive information from various applications... web browsers... extracting stored sensitive and potentially valuable data, such as passwords and cookies... Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Edge’s cookies and credentials.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Next, the malware starts to collect system information such as RAM, GPU, CPU, and screen resolution and stores it in “User Information.txt”

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Furthermore, the malware harvests credentials and sensitive files from various applications... All files with the ".txt" extension from the infected system’s desktop directory... Telegram data... Steam configurations... cookies and credentials.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Afterward, it takes a screenshot, saves it as "screenshot.jpeg," and adds it to the ZIP.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

The stolen data is then compressed into a ZIP file and transmitted to the attacker via TCP... The malware compresses all the collected data into a ZIP file and exfiltrates it to the attacker's C&C server over TCP port 6655.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The malware compresses all the collected data into a ZIP file and exfiltrates it to the attacker's C&C server over TCP port 6655.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
7 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping16

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.