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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

RftRAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs55Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
SpearphishingPhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

RftRAT is a Windows remote-access malware family used in North Korea-linked intrusion activity, including campaigns attributed to Kimsuky and Konni. It is commonly described as a backdoor or RAT that receives commands from command-and-control infrastructure and executes them on compromised hosts. Observed campaigns have primarily targeted South Korean individuals and organizations, including defense-related, government, media, academic, and North Korea-focused communities, often as part of espionage operations.

RftRAT has been delivered through spearphishing-driven infection chains that use malicious shortcut files, archive attachments, signed MSI installers, and AutoIt-based loaders. In multiple observed cases, attackers used lure documents or decoy content to induce execution, then unpacked or downloaded AutoIt components that installed or injected RftRAT. The malware has been observed injected into legitimate Windows processes, including through AutoIt-based injector stages, and some samples were packed or otherwise obfuscated to hinder analysis and evade detection.

Documented capabilities include remote command execution, file upload and download, process enumeration and termination, directory creation, file deletion and renaming, and reverse shell access. In Kimsuky-linked reporting, RftRAT was also observed using a UAC bypass via CMSTPLUACOM and ICMLuaUtil to obtain elevated execution. Its role in broader operations has included maintaining remote access, supporting follow-on reconnaissance and data theft, and enabling operators to manage compromised systems over extended periods.

RftRAT has appeared alongside other malware families such as Amadey, RemcosRAT, QuasarRAT, and EndRAT in multi-stage campaigns. In Konni operations, it was part of AutoIt-heavy toolchains that established persistence through scheduled tasks and startup mechanisms, while in Kimsuky activity it was associated with script-based loaders and post-compromise deployment of additional credential theft and surveillance tooling. Overall, RftRAT is best characterized as a Windows RAT/backdoor used in targeted espionage campaigns for persistent remote control and post-compromise operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

RftRAT is a backdoor that can receive commands from the C&C server and execute them.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
KONNI

The decrypted execution module is classified as RFTServer (commonly referred to as RftRAT) and is injected into the "cleanmgr.exe" process.

via genians bloggenians.co.kr
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

After gaining unauthorized access to the victim’s KakaoTalk PC application, the threat actor selectively chose contacts from the friend list for secondary distribution of the malicious file.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

The group usually employs spear phishing attacks... The threat actor led users to download a compressed file through attachments or download links within spear phishing emails.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

The threat actors infiltrated specific individuals’ devices through spear-phishing that spoofed organizations such as the National Tax Service... Another victim opened an email impersonating the National Tax Service and executed the attached malicious file.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

The BAT and VBS scripts inside can either be used for executing other scripts... There is also a script for maintaining persistence as well as a downloader that downloads and executes additional payloads from an external source. | 0x0A Reverse shell

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When this compressed file is decompressed, it yields a legitimate document file along with a malicious LNK file... prompted users to download the compressed file and execute the LNK shortcut file inside.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

After gaining unauthorized access to the victim’s KakaoTalk PC application, the threat actor selectively chose contacts from the friend list for secondary distribution of the malicious file.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Windows 시작 프로그램(Startup) 영역을 악용 ... %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Ht.dll references this information to read and decrypt the encrypted file before injecting it into a legitimate process... Amadey... goes through svchost.exe before being injected into the iexplore.exe process and run.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

After gaining unauthorized access to the victim’s KakaoTalk PC application, the threat actor selectively chose contacts from the friend list for secondary distribution of the malicious file.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Windows 시작 프로그램(Startup) 영역을 악용 ... %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

the same library file is used, that ICMLuaUtil is used to bypass UAC... RftRAT uses the ICMLuaUtil interface of the CMSTPLUACOM component to bypass UAC and execute itself as administrator.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

While these malware are all packed with VMP when in distribution, recently, Amadey and RftRAT variants created with AutoIt have been used... This method seems to be for the purpose of bypassing security products.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The delivered archive contained a malicious LNK shortcut file disguised with the icon of a legitimate document.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Ht.dll references this information to read and decrypt the encrypted file before injecting it into a legitimate process... Amadey... goes through svchost.exe before being injected into the iexplore.exe process and run.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

After gaining unauthorized access to the victim’s KakaoTalk PC application, the threat actor selectively chose contacts from the friend list for secondary distribution of the malicious file.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

숨김 속성이 적용된 ProgramData 및 Public 경로 하위 폴더에서 AutoIt 기반 악성 스크립트를 실행

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The actor then remained concealed on the infected system for an extended period while collecting internal documents, user account information, and system environment data.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

0x08 Look up process information

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

it can also transmit basic information about the system... After being run as administrator, RftRAT collects basic information about the infected system and sends it to the C&C server.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

A key characteristic of this campaign is the threat actor’s unauthorized access to the victim’s KakaoTalk PC application and abuse of the active messaging session.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The actor selected certain contacts from the victim’s friend list and sent them additional malicious files.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

감염 단말에 장기간 은닉하면서 내부 문서, 사용자 계정 정보, 시스템 환경 정보 등을 수집

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The collected data is believed to have been encrypted or encoded before being transmitted to an external server.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The HTTP request structure for sending the system information collected from the infected system to the C&C server is identical to that of the typical Amadey... After being run as administrator, RftRAT collects basic information about the infected system and sends it to the C&C server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

its command-and-control (C2) connection is made through a Germany-based domain. The domain is built on WordPress... multiple C2 servers were hosted on WordPress.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

피해자의 카카오톡 PC 버전에 비인가 접근하여 친구 목록 중 일부를 선별 대상으로 삼아 추가 악성파일을 전송

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

There is also a script for maintaining persistence as well as a downloader that downloads and executes additional payloads from an external source... it supports the feature to download additional payloads in not only an exe format, but also dll, PowerShell, vbs, and js formats.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

The threat actor used an AutoIt script to launch RemcosRAT (Remote Access Trojan)... On some victims’ systems, RemcosRAT 7.0.4 Pro was identified.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

the command, the execution results, and the additionally downloaded file are created in the paths below... 0x01 Upload file (zip compressed)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

55 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching55Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.