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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

POWERSTAR

POWERSTAR is a multi-stage PowerShell-based malware framework/variant associated with Iranian cyber-espionage activity. The content links it to Charming Kitten and to the Iran-based APT group GreenCharlie, whose toolset is described as centered on PowerShell malware variants including GORBLE, TAMECAT, and POWERSTAR. Reported delivery methods include spear-phishing using fake personas and compromised email accounts, and exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities. The malware family uses advanced obfuscation, layered decryption, and in-memory execution to evade detection; noted obfuscation techniques include array fragments, wildcards, and string replacement. In the GreenCharlie execution chain, POWERSTAR is described as using AES-based decryption of embedded payloads and executing decrypted content via Invoke-Expression. Related staging/C2 behavior described for this framework includes collecting victim OS and computer name, formatting host data as JSON, encrypting and Base64-encoding it, and sending it via HTTP POST to command-and-control infrastructure. The content also notes overlap between TAMECAT and PowerStar artifacts, including a parameter value ($k12ey = T2r0y1M1e1n1o0w1) identified in a PowerStar variant by Volexity. High-confidence infrastructure and lure examples tied to the broader GreenCharlie framework include domains such as activeeditor[.]info, webviewerpage[.]info, documentcloudeditor.ddnsgeek[.]com, coldwarehexahash.dns-dynamic[.]net, uptime-timezone.dns-dynamic[.]net, and translatorupdater.dns-dynamic[.]net; documentcloudeditor.ddnsgeek[.]com was observed resolving to 38.180.146[.]174.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GreenCharlie

“GreenCharlie’s toolset centers on a multi-stage PowerShell-based malware framework, including variants known as GORBLE, TAMECAT, and POWERSTAR.”

via picus security blogpicussecurity.com
Magic Hound

Charming Kitten... specializes in espionage through spear-phishing... to deliver POWERSTAR malware, exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities...

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

"The group utilizes the commercial registrar Namecheap to register domains that are thematically aligned with their social engineering lures..."

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Charming Kitten, Haywire Kitten, and Remix Kitten are described as “exploiting Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities,” including “ProxyShell.”

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Multiple Iran-nexus APT groups are described as using spear-phishing: e.g., Charming Kitten uses “spear-phishing with fake personas and compromised emails… phishing via benign PDFs for credential harvesting”; several others use “spear-phishing with malicious documents/attachments/links.”

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

"The entire GORBLE, TAMECAT, and POWERSTAR malware family is constructed as a multi-stage PowerShell execution chain."

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

"Obfuscation techniques include array fragments, wildcards, and string replacement..." and "MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed include ... obfuscated files/information (T1027)."

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

"GreenCharlie leveraged dynamic DNS (DDNS) to establish and manage its infrastructure..."

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.