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Malware3 associated actors8 associated CVEs

DevilsTongue

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns8Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs247Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionByovd
Delivery
SpearphishingWatering holeDrive byMalvertising
Platforms
Windows

DevilsTongue is modular Windows spyware developed by the Israeli commercial surveillance vendor Candiru, whose activity Microsoft tracks as SOURGUM. Written in C and C++, it is multithreaded and includes user-mode and kernel-mode components. Government customers use the platform for targeted surveillance. Documented victims include journalists, human rights defenders, politicians, academics, embassy personnel, and dissidents across multiple countries, with a substantial concentration of victims identified in 2021 in Palestinian territories.

DevilsTongue collects files, steals credentials from LSASS and web browsers, and decrypts and exfiltrates Signal desktop conversations. It also steals browser cookies to impersonate victims on online services and can send messages through some compromised accounts. Additional functionality includes registry queries, WMI command execution, and access to SQLite databases. Persistence relies on COM hijacking. Its evasion mechanisms include encrypted payloads and configuration data, in-memory payload execution, removal of identifying build metadata, and per-installation file variation. It abuses a legitimate signed third-party driver for kernel-memory access and API-call proxying.

Deployment uses browser and Windows exploit chains, including zero-day vulnerabilities. Windows vulnerabilities CVE-2021-31979 and CVE-2021-33771 enabled browser-sandbox escape, privilege escalation, and kernel code execution before being patched in July 2021. Documented delivery methods include targeted malicious links sent through messaging applications, weaponized Office documents, and compromised websites used as watering holes. Later Candiru surveillance campaigns also used targeted online advertisements for zero-click spyware delivery.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

8 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-33742via recordedfutureExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Windows MSHTMLFollowing a fingerprinting phase, targets were served an Internet Explorer zero-day exploit, later assigned CVE-2021-33742 and patched by Microsoft in June 2021.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-21166via recordedfutureExploited in the wildGoogle Chrome Audio Data Race Leading to Renderer Code ExecutionGoogle’s Threat Analysis Group disclosed in 2021 that two Google Chrome renderer remote code execution zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551) had been exploited by Candiru.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-31979via falconfeeds blogExploited in the wildWindows Kernel Integer Overflow Privilege EscalationCandiru was found to have exploited two Microsoft Windows zero-days, CVE-2021-31979 and CVE-2021-33771, to grant attackers full privileges on victim machines.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-2294via recordedfutureExploited in the wildWebRTC Heap Buffer Overflow in Google ChromeIn July 2022, Avast reported that CVE-2022-2294, a high-severity heap buffer overflow vulnerability in WebRTC within Google Chrome, was exploited to execute shellcode in the browser’s renderer process, targeting users in the Middle East.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-33771via falconfeeds blogExploited in the wildWindows Kernel Race Condition Privilege EscalationCandiru was found to have exploited two Microsoft Windows zero-days, CVE-2021-31979 and CVE-2021-33771, to grant attackers full privileges on victim machines.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-30551via recordedfutureExploited in the wildGoogle Chrome V8 Type Confusion Leading to Renderer Code ExecutionThese exploits were distributed via single-use links sent to specific targets, who were believed to be located in Armenia.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-5217via the hacker newsExploited in the wildHeap Buffer Overflow in libvpx VP8 EncodingCVE-2023-5217 (Google Chrome) — Candiru (DevilsTongue).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-1844via recorded future blogWebKit Memory Corruption Leading to Arbitrary Code Execution"DevilsTongue is a sophisticated, modular Windows malware."View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Uzbekistan State Security Service (SSS)

“DevilsTongue, the name given by Microsoft to the Windows-based spyware developed by Candiru, is a complex, modular, multi-threaded malware written in C and C++ with a wide range of capabilities.”

via recordedfutureassets.recordedfuture.com
Candiru

Candiru uses a chain of vulnerabilities in web browsers and Windows to install its DevilsTongue modular multi-threaded backdoor.

via cyjax blogcyjax.com
SOURGUM

Candiru uses a chain of vulnerabilities in web browsers and Windows to install its DevilsTongue modular multi-threaded backdoor.

via cyjax blogcyjax.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

“Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Domains — T1583.001”

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

“The cluster manages its infrastructure through a combination of direct access ... and administration via a set of virtual private servers (VPSes).”

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

“Resource Development: Acquire Infrastructure: Server — T1583.004”

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

"The operators probably bought access to Candiru implants." and "...redirecting to exploits and the DevilsTongue implant."

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...spyware can be deployed through multiple vectors, including... physical access."

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence4

By examining how Sourgum’s customers were delivering DevilsTongue to victim computers, we saw they were doing so through a chain of exploits that impacted popular browsers and our Windows operating system.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"...campaign targeting Armenian users with malicious Office documents that loaded web content through Internet Explorer... embedding a remote ActiveX object... or... via VBA macros..."

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence3

“Candiru has used both actor-controlled links, such as spearphishing emails and strategic website compromises known as watering hole attacks, to deliver its spyware.”

Execution

3 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

DevilsTongue has standard malware capabilities, including file collection, registry querying, running WMI commands, and querying SQLite databases.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

SOURGUM appears to use a chain of browser and Windows exploits, including 0-days, to install malware on victim boxes.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

“These exploits were distributed via single-use links sent to specific targets...”

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...spyware can be deployed through multiple vectors, including... physical access."

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"It maintains persistence via COM hijacking by overwriting a legitimate COM class registry key’s DLL path with a first-stage DLL..."

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence3

These threat actors have also weaponised Windows 0day vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2021-31979 and CVE-2021-33771, to support delivery. Successful exploitation led to privilege escalation, giving an attacker the ability to escape browser sandboxes and gain kernel code execution.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...spyware can be deployed through multiple vectors, including... physical access."

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"It maintains persistence via COM hijacking by overwriting a legitimate COM class registry key’s DLL path with a first-stage DLL..."

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

For files on disk, PDB paths and PE timestamps are scrubbed, strings and configs are encrypted, and each file has a unique hash.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

When the malware is installed, a first-stage ‘hijack’ malware DLL is dropped in a subfolder of C:\Windows\system32\IME\ ; the folders and names of the hijack DLLs blend with legitimate names in the \IME\ directories.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"...spyware can be deployed through multiple vectors, including... physical access."

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The main functionality resides in DLLs that are encrypted on disk and only decrypted in memory, making detection more difficult.

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

The driver’s description is “Physical Memory Access Driver,” and it appears to offer a “by-design” kernel read/write capability. This appears to be abused by DevilsTongue to proxy certain API calls via the kernel to hinder detection

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Alongside DevilsTongue a third-party signed driver is dropped to C:\Windows\system32\drivers\physmem.sys .

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

"All additional payloads are decrypted and executed only in memory..."

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

It’s capable of stealing victim credentials from both LSASS and from browsers, such as Chrome and Firefox.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

"...allowing the malware to steal credentials from LSASS and browsers..."

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

It can retrieve cookies from a variety of web browsers. These stolen cookies can later be used by the attacker to sign in as the victim to websites to enable further information gathering.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

It’s capable of stealing victim credentials from both LSASS and from browsers, such as Chrome and Firefox.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

This custom malware is written and can steal credentials from web browsers, such as Chrome or Firefox.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

"...spyware can be deployed through multiple vectors, including malicious links, weaponized files, man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, and physical access."

Discovery

1 technique
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

DevilsTongue has standard malware capabilities, including file collection, registry querying, running WMI commands, and querying SQLite databases.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

DevilsTongue has standard malware capabilities, including file collection, registry querying, running WMI commands, and querying SQLite databases.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

"...spyware can be deployed through multiple vectors, including malicious links, weaponized files, man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, and physical access."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"...victim-facing components likely used for deploying and controlling Candiru’s DevilsTongue spyware, as well as higher-tier operator infrastructure... others use intermediaries or the Tor network."

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

It also decrypts and exfiltrates conversations from Signal, the E2EE messaging app.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

247 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching247Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities8CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.