Candiru
Candiru is an Israeli private sector offensive actor and spyware vendor. Known aliases in the provided content include Caramel Tsunami and DEV-0236; Microsoft also tracks activity linked to Candiru as SOURGUM. The company is described as a mercenary hacking company and commercial legal entity that creates and sells cyberweapons to government customers. It was added to the U.S. Department of Commerce Entity List in November 2021. Candiru is associated with the DevilsTongue spyware, described as a sophisticated modular Windows spyware with user- and kernel-mode components, persistence via COM hijacking, use of a signed driver (physmem.sys), in-memory decryption and execution, and capabilities to steal credentials and access Signal messages. Recorded Future identified victim-facing deployment and command-and-control infrastructure as well as higher-tier operator infrastructure linked to Candiru, and reported eight distinct operational clusters, with five assessed as likely still active, including clusters linked to Hungary and Saudi Arabia. Other reporting in the content links Candiru-associated activity to customers or clusters tied to Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Uzbekistan, and Hungary. The content states Candiru spyware has targeted journalists, dissidents, civil society, and political figures. Citizen Lab reported at least 65 individuals were targeted or infected with Pegasus or Candiru in the CatalanGate case, including four targeted or infected with Candiru, and identified Joan Matamala as a confirmed Candiru victim. Microsoft and Citizen Lab reported Candiru spyware had compromised at least 100 victims globally across multiple countries and victim categories. The content also notes reporting that German MEP Daniel Freund was likely targeted by spyware originating from Candiru before EU elections. Candiru-linked exploitation in the provided content includes use of Windows zero-days CVE-2021-31979 and CVE-2021-33771, Chrome zero-days CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551, an Internet Explorer zero-day later assigned CVE-2021-33742, and reported exploitation of Chrome/WebRTC CVE-2022-2294. ESET linked watering-hole activity targeting high-profile Middle Eastern websites, especially Yemen-related sites, to operators assessed with medium confidence to be Candiru customers. That activity used compromised websites for visitor profiling and selective redirection toward likely browser exploit chains. The content also references Candiru phishing infrastructure and impersonation themes involving the Government of Spain, the World Health Organization, Barcelona’s Mercantile Registry, and Mobile World Congress. The provided content describes Candiru as founded in 2014 by Eran Shorer and Yaakov Weizmann and operating as Saito Tech Ltd.; it also references DF Associates Ltd. and Grindavik Solutions Ltd. as later corporate names. A 2025 report cited in the content states Candiru was acquired by Integrity Partners and that assets and employees were transferred to a newly established entity, with Integrity Labs Ltd. identified as a suspected related company.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Government & Administration
- Non-Governmental Organizations
- Academia & Research
- Software & Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇪🇸 Spain
- 🇺🇸 United States
Tradecraft
24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Associated vulnerabilities
6 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 6 of them exploited in the wild.
Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) disclosed in 2021 that two Google Chrome renderer remote code execution zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551) had been exploited by Candiru... Google TAG discovered that CVE-2021-21166 also affected WebKit, prompting Apple to patch it as CVE-2021-1844; however, there is no evidence it was used against Safari users.
Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) disclosed in 2021 that two Google Chrome renderer remote code execution zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551) had been exploited by Candiru.
Following a fingerprinting phase, targets were served an Internet Explorer zero-day exploit, later assigned CVE-2021-33742 and patched by Microsoft in June 2021.
In July 2022, Avast reported that CVE-2022-2294, a high-severity heap buffer overflow vulnerability in WebRTC within Google Chrome, was exploited to execute shellcode in the browser’s renderer process, targeting users in the Middle East.
Microsoft also discovered two zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-31979, CVE-2021-33771) employed by Candiru to infect Windows systems, and patched them in July 2021.
1 more CVE tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
47 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as an Israeli spyware vendor observed among customers of the malicious hosting provider discussed.
Referenced as an Israeli spyware vendor observed among customers of the malicious hosting provider discussed.
Candiru is an Israeli spyware vendor operating multiple infrastructure clusters for managing and delivering its DevilsTongue spyware, with active operations linked to several countries.
Mercenary spyware vendor and associated operator clusters deploying the DevilsTongue Windows spyware via victim-facing infrastructure and higher-tier operator infrastructure; linked to multiple government customers and campaigns including watering-hole and spearphishing-style single-use link delivery, and exploitation of browser/IE zero-days.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.