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Malware1 associated actor

FrostyGoop

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows
Also known asBUSTLEBERM

FrostyGoop, also known as BUSTLEBERM, is industrial control system malware written in Go and compiled for Windows. Discovered in April 2024, it communicates directly with industrial devices using Modbus TCP to read and modify holding registers containing process values and configuration data. Its functionality is generic to Modbus TCP rather than restricted to a particular controller vendor, enabling manipulation of operational technology through legitimate industrial protocol commands.

FrostyGoop supports reading holding registers, writing individual registers, and writing multiple registers. Operators supply connection details and commands through command-line arguments or JSON configuration files, with optional timing and delay parameters. The malware can record device responses to the console or a JSON log. It incorporates an open-source Modbus library and implements an anti-debugging check by examining the Windows Process Environment Block directly.

FrostyGoop is associated with the January 2024 attack against municipal district-heating infrastructure in Lviv, Ukraine, which interrupted heating to more than 600 apartment buildings during sub-zero temperatures for almost two days. Attackers sent Modbus commands to ENCO controllers, producing inaccurate measurements and operational malfunctions. During the same intrusion, adversaries downgraded controller firmware to impair monitoring and operator visibility; this was an incident-level action rather than an established FrostyGoop function. Inadequate segmentation between network infrastructure, management servers, and heating controllers facilitated the attack. Its demonstrated use targets energy and district-heating operations, while its vendor-independent protocol support makes other Modbus-connected industrial environments susceptible to similar manipulation.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

"FrostyGoop (Jan 2024) cut heating to 600+ buildings in Ukraine in winter."

via cloudsek blogcloudsek.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

The investigation of the Ukraine cyber incident revealed that the adversaries possibly gained access to the victim network through an undetermined vulnerability in an externally facing router.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The details needed by FrostyGoop to establish a Modbus TCP connection and send Modbus commands to a targeted ICS device can be provided as command-line arguments or included in a separate JSON configuration file.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

FrostyGoop also implements a debugger evasion technique by checking the BeingDebugged value in Windows' Process Environment Block (PEB). This method provides an alternative way to check the PEB's BeingDebugged flag without calling IsDebuggerPresent().

Stealth

1 technique
T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

FrostyGoop also implements a debugger evasion technique by checking the BeingDebugged value in Windows' Process Environment Block (PEB). Attackers use this technique to detect and avoid debuggers used by malware analysts.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Our analysis of FrostyGoop samples indicates the malware performs read, write and write-multiple Modbus operations. The content of the task_test.json sample depicted in Figure 15 only shows read operations (Code 3).

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

FrostyGoop also implements a debugger evasion technique by checking the BeingDebugged value in Windows' Process Environment Block (PEB). Attackers use this technique to detect and avoid debuggers used by malware analysts.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

An associated FrostyGoop configuration file contained the IP address of an ENCO control device, leading Dragos to assess with moderate confidence that FrostyGoop was used to target ENCO controllers through Modbus TCP port 502 open to the internet.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“FrostyGoop… interact[s] directly with industrial control systems (ICS) using Modbus TCP over port 502… [and] sends Modbus commands to read or modify data on ICS devices.”

Impact

1 technique
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

“FrostyGoop malware targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure… to cause physical disruptions…” and “WIRTE… utilized an Android wiper…”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.