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Malware1 associated actor

DEATHRANSOM

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs44Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

DeathRansom is a Windows ransomware family first observed in November 2019, with early distribution documented in South Korea. Initial variants simulated encryption by renaming files without altering their contents, allowing recovery by reversing the filename changes. Later variants implemented actual encryption, generally without changing file extensions, and placed ransom notes in affected directories demanding Bitcoin payment and email contact using a victim-specific identifier.

DeathRansom recursively discovers files on local and network drives and enumerates network resources through Windows APIs. It excludes selected operating-system directories and files from processing. Analyzed encrypting variants combine Curve25519-based ECDH, Salsa20, RSA-2048, and AES-based operations to protect cryptographic material and encrypt file data. They generate per-file symmetric keys, encrypt those keys with an RSA public key, and append encrypted key material and identifying metadata to processed files. Some implementations encrypt only an initial portion of each file. Cryptographic material is also stored in the Windows registry.

The malware can delete Volume Shadow Copies through Windows Management Instrumentation to inhibit recovery. Some versions check system language and keyboard layouts and terminate when Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian, or Tatar settings are detected. Packed samples use staged in-memory unpacking and dynamic API resolution. DeathRansom is related to the HelloKitty and FiveHands ransomware families; FiveHands has been identified as a later rewrite of DeathRansom.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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scat01

FortiGuard Labs recently discovered an ongoing DeathRansom malicious campaign... as you may remember from our first blog, DeathRansom uses the name ‘Wacatac’ to store crypto keys in a registry.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Write back to our e-mail: deathransom@airmail.cc

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

...обманных загрузок... вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов, фальшивых обновлений...

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

...ботнетов, эксплойтов...

T1566PhishingEvidence1

...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений...

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений...

Execution

1 technique
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence5

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) has the ability to use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Записи реестра, связанные с этим Ransomware: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Wacatac ... \private ... \public

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Write back to our e-mail: deathransom@airmail.cc

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

the malware comes in a packed formal and many noisy mangled symbols generated by the C++ Compiler, so let’s try to unpack it using some methods and techniques

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

we see another call to GetProcAddress() which is used to get the address of an API

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

DEATHRanom 랜섬웨어는 아래 폴더와 파일을 제외하고 모두 감염 대상이다. 감염 제외 목록 폴더 Programdata, $recycle bin, program files, windows, all users, appdata 파일 read_me.txt, autoexec.bat, desktop.ini, autorun.inf, ntuser.dat, iconcache.db, bootsect.back, boot.ini, ntuser.dat, thumbs.db

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

we need to search for these APIs in The imports section in the Malware and trace these calls and look at what happens in the allocated spaces may we get the 2Stage or another shell Code

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DeathRansom performs a check for the system language, and it will not encrypt files if it detects locales from an ex-USSR country.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Записи реестра, связанные с этим Ransomware: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Wacatac ... \private ... \public

Discovery

7 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence11

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can use loop operations to enumerate directories on a compromised host.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence2

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence6

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

DeathRansom performs a check for the system language, and it will not encrypt files if it detects locales from an ex-USSR country.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence8

Some versions of [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) have performed language ID and keyboard layout checks; if either of these matched Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Tatar [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) would exit.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can enumerate logical drives on a target system.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Looking at the packets captured during the dynamic analysis we notice a DNS request plus TCP traffic to iplogger[.]org which was not present in the first Version of the Ransomware. Looks like the criminals are trying to track infections over time.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence6

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can use HTTPS to download files.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can download files to a compromised host.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence12

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can use public and private key pair encryption to encrypt files for ransom payment.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence6

[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence1

After encryption, it drops a ransom note in every directory. It includes a LOCK-ID that is unique for every user.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

44 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching44Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.