DEATHRANSOM
- Type
- Ransomware
- Capabilities
- ExtortionReconnaissanceDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
DeathRansom is a Windows ransomware family first observed in November 2019, with early distribution documented in South Korea. Initial variants simulated encryption by renaming files without altering their contents, allowing recovery by reversing the filename changes. Later variants implemented actual encryption, generally without changing file extensions, and placed ransom notes in affected directories demanding Bitcoin payment and email contact using a victim-specific identifier.
DeathRansom recursively discovers files on local and network drives and enumerates network resources through Windows APIs. It excludes selected operating-system directories and files from processing. Analyzed encrypting variants combine Curve25519-based ECDH, Salsa20, RSA-2048, and AES-based operations to protect cryptographic material and encrypt file data. They generate per-file symmetric keys, encrypt those keys with an RSA public key, and append encrypted key material and identifying metadata to processed files. Some implementations encrypt only an initial portion of each file. Cryptographic material is also stored in the Windows registry.
The malware can delete Volume Shadow Copies through Windows Management Instrumentation to inhibit recovery. Some versions check system language and keyboard layouts and terminate when Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian, or Tatar settings are detected. Packed samples use staged in-memory unpacking and dynamic API resolution. DeathRansom is related to the HelloKitty and FiveHands ransomware families; FiveHands has been identified as a later rewrite of DeathRansom.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
FortiGuard Labs recently discovered an ongoing DeathRansom malicious campaign... as you may remember from our first blog, DeathRansom uses the name ‘Wacatac’ to store crypto keys in a registry.
Techniques & procedures
25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
Write back to our e-mail: deathransom@airmail.cc
...обманных загрузок... вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов, фальшивых обновлений...
...ботнетов, эксплойтов...
...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений...
...с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений...
Execution
1 technique
Execution
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) has the ability to use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Записи реестра, связанные с этим Ransomware: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Wacatac ... \private ... \public
Write back to our e-mail: deathransom@airmail.cc
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
the malware comes in a packed formal and many noisy mangled symbols generated by the C++ Compiler, so let’s try to unpack it using some methods and techniques
we see another call to GetProcAddress() which is used to get the address of an API
DEATHRanom 랜섬웨어는 아래 폴더와 파일을 제외하고 모두 감염 대상이다. 감염 제외 목록 폴더 Programdata, $recycle bin, program files, windows, all users, appdata 파일 read_me.txt, autoexec.bat, desktop.ini, autorun.inf, ntuser.dat, iconcache.db, bootsect.back, boot.ini, ntuser.dat, thumbs.db
we need to search for these APIs in The imports section in the Malware and trace these calls and look at what happens in the allocated spaces may we get the 2Stage or another shell Code
DeathRansom performs a check for the system language, and it will not encrypt files if it detects locales from an ex-USSR country.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Записи реестра, связанные с этим Ransomware: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Wacatac ... \private ... \public
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as hostname, OS version, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other machine characteristics; e.g., "Action RAT has the ability to collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of an infected host."
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can use loop operations to enumerate directories on a compromised host.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
DeathRansom performs a check for the system language, and it will not encrypt files if it detects locales from an ex-USSR country.
Some versions of [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) have performed language ID and keyboard layout checks; if either of these matched Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Tatar [DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) would exit.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can enumerate logical drives on a target system.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
Looking at the packets captured during the dynamic analysis we notice a DNS request plus TCP traffic to iplogger[.]org which was not present in the first Version of the Ransomware. Looks like the criminals are trying to track infections over time.
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can use HTTPS to download files.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can download files to a compromised host.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can use public and private key pair encryption to encrypt files for ransom payment.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
[DEATHRANSOM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0616) can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
After encryption, it drops a ransom note in every directory. It includes a LOCK-ID that is unique for every user.
Observables
44 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.