SIGNBT
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionDLL sideloading
- Delivery
- Watering holeSpearphishingDrive by
- Platforms
- Windows
SIGNBT is a Windows backdoor associated with the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group, used to maintain remote control of compromised systems and execute additional malware. Its capabilities include remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and payload delivery. Its modular execution chains use in-memory payload loading, DLL sideloading, and encrypted configuration storage to conceal malicious activity.
SIGNBT was used alongside LPEClient in Lazarus operations targeting software vendors during 2023. It subsequently served as an initial implant in the second phase of Operation SyncHole, which targeted South Korean organizations across software, IT, finance, semiconductor manufacturing, and telecommunications. Version 0.0.1 executed inside a legitimate Windows process and fetched additional malware, while version 1.2 emphasized additional-payload execution and obtained command-and-control addresses from configuration files.
Distribution has included watering-hole attacks that compromise trusted South Korean websites and exploit locally installed financial-security software. Campaigns have also used spear-phishing messages with recruitment, résumé, investment, and industry-survey lures. Vulnerable AnySign4PC installations could be compromised through website visits without a download prompt. Struggle is identified as SIGNBT 3.0.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The July 2026 advisory described backdoors including Struggle, also identified as SIGNBT 3.0.
Techniques & procedures
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
"...most of the C2 servers were legitimate but compromised websites in South Korea (T1584.001)..."
"...filters visitors with a server-side script and redirects desired targets to an attacker-controlled website (T1608.004)."
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The attackers used those sites to exploit locally installed financial-security software and infect targeted visitors with SIGNBT or COPPERHEDGE backdoors. | A compromised page could infect a system running a vulnerable AnySign4PC version without a prompt or user-initiated download.
"...targeting a potential flaw in Cross EX (T1190) installed on the target PC..."
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.
The malicious page communicated with the local security program over WebSocket and triggered a buffer overflow to execute shellcode.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The resulting backdoor decrypted later stages in memory, injected code into svchost.exe, and read command-and-control information from the Windows registry.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The payload was then injected into legitimate Microsoft processes.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
The payload was then injected into legitimate Microsoft processes.
S2W's analysis of three malware clusters found a recurring pattern of DLL side-loading, encrypted registry blobs, and in-memory Portable Executable loading.
Defense Evasion Debugger Evasion T1622 Dual TLS callbacks before DllMain
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The resulting backdoor decrypted later stages in memory, injected code into svchost.exe, and read command-and-control information from the Windows registry.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.
Defense Evasion Debugger Evasion T1622 Dual TLS callbacks before DllMain
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
"...includes the __Host-next-auth-token key within the Cookie field... (T1071.001)..."
The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.
Observables
18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.