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Malware2 associated actors

SIGNBT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs18Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Watering holeSpearphishingDrive by
Platforms
Windows

SIGNBT is a Windows backdoor associated with the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group, used to maintain remote control of compromised systems and execute additional malware. Its capabilities include remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and payload delivery. Its modular execution chains use in-memory payload loading, DLL sideloading, and encrypted configuration storage to conceal malicious activity.

SIGNBT was used alongside LPEClient in Lazarus operations targeting software vendors during 2023. It subsequently served as an initial implant in the second phase of Operation SyncHole, which targeted South Korean organizations across software, IT, finance, semiconductor manufacturing, and telecommunications. Version 0.0.1 executed inside a legitimate Windows process and fetched additional malware, while version 1.2 emphasized additional-payload execution and obtained command-and-control addresses from configuration files.

Distribution has included watering-hole attacks that compromise trusted South Korean websites and exploit locally installed financial-security software. Campaigns have also used spear-phishing messages with recruitment, résumé, investment, and industry-survey lures. Vulnerable AnySign4PC installations could be compromised through website visits without a download prompt. Struggle is identified as SIGNBT 3.0.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

The July 2026 advisory described backdoors including Struggle, also identified as SIGNBT 3.0.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
TraderTraitor

Malware SIGNBT Lazarus malware family reused in updated TraderTraitor operations.

via wiz blogwiz.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1584.001DomainsEvidence1

"...most of the C2 servers were legitimate but compromised websites in South Korea (T1584.001)..."

T1608.004Drive-by TargetEvidence1

"...filters visitors with a server-side script and redirects desired targets to an attacker-controlled website (T1608.004)."

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

The attackers used those sites to exploit locally installed financial-security software and infect targeted visitors with SIGNBT or COPPERHEDGE backdoors. | A compromised page could infect a system running a vulnerable AnySign4PC version without a prompt or user-initiated download.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"...targeting a potential flaw in Cross EX (T1190) installed on the target PC..."

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The malicious page communicated with the local security program over WebSocket and triggered a buffer overflow to execute shellcode.

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The resulting backdoor decrypted later stages in memory, injected code into svchost.exe, and read command-and-control information from the Windows registry.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The payload was then injected into legitimate Microsoft processes.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The payload was then injected into legitimate Microsoft processes.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

S2W's analysis of three malware clusters found a recurring pattern of DLL side-loading, encrypted registry blobs, and in-memory Portable Executable loading.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Defense Evasion Debugger Evasion T1622 Dual TLS callbacks before DllMain

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The resulting backdoor decrypted later stages in memory, injected code into svchost.exe, and read command-and-control information from the Windows registry.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Defense Evasion Debugger Evasion T1622 Dual TLS callbacks before DllMain

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"...includes the __Host-next-auth-token key within the Cookie field... (T1071.001)..."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The malware supported remote command execution, file theft, internal reconnaissance, process injection, and delivery of additional payloads.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching18Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.