Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
Back to malware
MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actors

AvNeutralizer

AvNeutralizer, also known as AuKill, is a specialized anti-EDR/AV tool linked with high confidence to the FIN7 cluster and marketed on underground forums since 2022. It is designed to disable, tamper with, or bypass endpoint security products on Windows systems, including by abusing vulnerable drivers to terminate protected EDR-related processes from the kernel. Reporting states FIN7 began developing it in April 2022, advertised it via personas including goodsoft, lefroggy, killerAV, and Stupor, and sold customized builds for buyers’ targeted security products for roughly $4,000 to $15,000.

Observed AvNeutralizer behavior includes use of weaker Process Explorer drivers below version 17.0 in earlier variants, and later use of the built-in Windows ProcLaunchMon.sys driver together with Process Explorer driver version 17.02 to interfere with protected security processes and in some cases induce crashes. SentinelOne reported the unpacked payload used more than 10 user-mode and kernel-mode techniques to tamper with security solutions. Userland components were delivered under filenames mimicking security products, including AVDieSe.exe, AVDieSophos.exe, AVDieMS.exe, AVDiePanda.exe, and later au-prefixed names such as auSentinel.exe, auSophos.exe, auElastic.exe, and auSyma.exe.

The tool was initially observed in early June 2022 and was previously associated for a period with Black Basta, but by early 2023 it was no longer exclusive and was seen in intrusions involving multiple ransomware operators. Reported associated ransomware deployments include Black Basta, AvosLocker, MedusaLocker, BlackCat, Trigona, and LockBit. Additional reporting states it has been used by well-known ransomware groups to impair EDR systems prior to follow-on activity such as ransomware deployment.

AvNeutralizer has also been delivered in packed form using a private packer referred to as PackXOR. PackXOR-protected AvNeutralizer samples were reported in ransomware operations from April 2023 onward. High-confidence sample identifiers directly mentioned in the content include earliest reported sample SHA1 2fc8b38d3f40d8151ec717c8a8813cf06df90c10, updated packed sample SHA1 15186e9d03600c667bbe4b34c5e1348bfc0a8168, and unpacked payload SHA1 8a03580d29fe1dcc3de9fffaf8960bc339ecd994.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
Black Basta

The tool, known as AvNeutralizer, is used by criminal hackers to bypass threat detection systems on victims' devices.

via the record mediatherecord.media
FIN7

The tool, known as AvNeutralizer, is used by criminal hackers to bypass threat detection systems on victims' devices.

via the record mediatherecord.media
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

In particular, the new version uses a built-in Windows driver called "ProcLaunchMon.sys" along with the Process Explorer driver to interfere with security systems and avoid being detected.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

This version of the tool exploited weaker versions (< 17.0) of Process Explorer drivers, allowing for cross-process operations between admin processes and protected processes directly from the kernel.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The packer employs anti-analysis techniques... The final PE payload is unpacked with two iterations of XOR decryption, separated by a step of LZNT1 decompression.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

Researchers have previously discovered that the tool was used exclusively for six months by another hacker group, Black Basta.

T1211Exploitation for Defense EvasionEvidence1

Most of these techniques are already documented, such as removing the PPL protection through the vulnerable RTCore64.sys driver...

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

AvNeutralizer uses... the Windows builtin driver capability previously unseen in the wild. It employs the TTD monitor driver ProcLaunchMon.sys, available on default system installations in the system drivers directory...

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The packer employs anti-analysis techniques, such as checking the “startkey” command-line argument and using Win32 functions like IsDebuggerPresent and SetUnhandledExceptionFilter to detect debugging executions.

Discovery

1 technique
T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The packer employs anti-analysis techniques, such as checking the “startkey” command-line argument and using Win32 functions like IsDebuggerPresent and SetUnhandledExceptionFilter to detect debugging executions.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Since early 2023, AvNeutralizer has been used in numerous intrusions, including with the subsequent deployment of well-known ransomware strains such as AvosLocker, MedusaLocker, BlackCat, Trigona, and LockBit.

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence1

AvNeutralizer uses a combination of drivers and operations to create a failure in some specific implementations of protected processes, ultimately leading to a denial of service condition.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence3

The tool, known as AvNeutralizer, is used by criminal hackers to bypass threat detection systems on victims' devices.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The earliest version of AvNeutralizer... exploited weaker versions (< 17.0) of Process Explorer drivers... The tool utilized this weakness to tamper with security solutions installed on the system.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
16 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching16

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.