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Malware2 associated actors

BunnyLoader

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs40Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Player_Bunny

This article will focus on the newly released BunnyLoader 3.0, as well as historically observed BunnyLoader infrastructure and an overview of its capabilities. BunnyLoader is dynamically developing malware with the capability to steal information, credentials and cryptocurrency, as well as deliver additional malware to its victims.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
Player

This article will focus on the newly released BunnyLoader 3.0, as well as historically observed BunnyLoader infrastructure and an overview of its capabilities. BunnyLoader is dynamically developing malware with the capability to steal information, credentials and cryptocurrency, as well as deliver additional malware to its victims.

via palo alto networks unit 42 blogunit42.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Downloads .ps1 specified by Task_Arg to the %localappdata%/Temp folder and executes it using powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Sends a request every two seconds. The expected response is a command run via the Windows command line.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Downloads .vbs specified by Task_Arg to the %localappdata%/Temp folder and executes it using cscript.exe.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Downloads .exe specified by Task_Arg and injects it into notepad.exe, entirely in memory.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Samples collected during this time included packed binaries using PureCrypter, UPX and Themida during various campaigns in November.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Threat actors changed filenames of the malware to mimic legitimate video games and other applications.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Downloads .exe specified by Task_Arg and injects it into notepad.exe, entirely in memory.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The BunnyLoader 3.0 keylogger records all keystrokes, saving them to log files in the %localappdata%\Temp folder.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Prior to registration, the malware enumerates the device and uses the collected information as a fingerprint to identify distinct targets.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

All information theft functions will store collected data in the %localappdata%\Temp\ADE_LOGS folder... The stealer will search for and copy to the same folder.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The BunnyLoader 3.0 keylogger records all keystrokes, saving them to log files in the %localappdata%\Temp folder.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

The clipper uses regex patterns to identify whether the target’s clipboard contains a desired wallet address type. If it finds a match, it will replace the victim’s address with the malware operator’s address.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Once all data has been collected, the stealer will use PowerShell to compress the ADE_LOGS folder into a .zip file.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

BunnyLoader 2.0 uses URLs ending with Add.php to initially register the BunnyLoader client with the C2 server... Once BunnyLoader establishes communication with the C2, it repeatedly sends requests using URLs ending with TaskHandler.php.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

These instructions facilitate the download and execution of additional malware on the target’s computer... Downloads .exe specified by Task_Arg and injects it into notepad.exe, entirely in memory.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

If the C2 responds appropriately, the stealer module will upload the .zip file, using the user agent Uploader and a custom Content-Type HTTP header.

Impact

1 technique
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

The C2 can instruct the module to perform either a GET or POST HTTP flood attack against a specified URL.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

40 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching40Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.