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Malware4 associated actors

SmartLoader

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs175Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
LureCracked softwareSeo poisoning
Platforms
Windows

SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader that uses obfuscated Lua code executed through LuaJIT to profile compromised systems, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, and download and execute additional malware. It has delivered information stealers including StealC and Lumma Stealer. Its own collection capabilities include host identifiers, operating-system information, public IP and geolocation data, and desktop screenshots, which it transmits to its command servers.

SmartLoader is extensively distributed through deceptive GitHub repositories, including the large-scale FakeGit operation. Attackers copy legitimate projects, documentation, contributor information, and developer identities, then modify installation instructions or add download buttons directing users to malicious ZIP archives. Lures impersonate AI skills, Model Context Protocol servers, developer utilities, game cheats, and cracked software. Some campaigns use SEO poisoning to promote malicious repositories. Execution typically requires the user to extract an archive and run a batch launcher, which starts a bundled or renamed LuaJIT interpreter with an obfuscated Lua payload disguised as a data file.

Analyzed variants use EtherHiding to retrieve their current command-server address from a Polygon smart contract, allowing operators to rotate infrastructure without redistributing the loader. SmartLoader supports encrypted tasking and multistage delivery, including additional Lua stages and encrypted payloads hosted on GitHub. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and registry-based startup entries; some configurations provide separate local-recovery and payload-redownload paths. Defense-evasion techniques include Lua obfuscation, hidden console windows, anti-debugging and anti-tampering checks, and conditional Microsoft Defender exclusions.

Campaigns target Windows users broadly, with a substantial focus on developers and AI-tool users. Affected organizations have included financial services, banking, and technology enterprises in North America, Asia, and Southern Europe. Follow-on stealers can expose credentials, browser cookies, authenticated sessions, and cryptocurrency-wallet data.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Kurita

Forum members are dissecting FakeGit, a campaign attributed to the actor Water Kurita in which roughly 7,600 fraudulent GitHub repositories spread SmartLoader malware.

via help net securityhelpnetsecurity.com
TroyDen

The repo copies a real project, the README sends every click to a ZIP, and the ZIP runs SmartLoader, which finds its C2 on a blockchain and installs the StealC infostealer.

via apiiro blogapiiro.com
TroysDen’s

Together, the four files make up SmartLoader, a malware loader Netskope has previously seen distributed through GitHub repositories.

via help net securityhelpnetsecurity.com
FakeGit

A newly documented campaign called AgentBaiting uses fraudulent AI Skills and Model Context Protocol, or MCP, servers to distribute SmartLoader malware through trusted-looking GitHub projects and public capability catalogs.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

A large-scale malware distribution campaign has been uncovered involving 109 fake GitHub repositories that were used to trick users into downloading two dangerous malware tools named SmartLoader and StealC. The threat actor behind this campaign copied real GitHub projects, republished them under different accounts, and replaced the original documentation with download buttons pointing to malicious ZIP files.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Unsuspecting users are directed to these repositories through techniques like SEO poisoning.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The counterfeit repositories, either completely fabricated or copied from legitimate projects, serve as a conduit for a ZIP archive, which is then used to trigger a LuaJIT loader chain, leading to the execution of an obfuscated Lua script responsible for dropping SmartLoader.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence11

Threat actors are actively targeting public GitHub repositories that share tools such as game cheats, Claude code splitters, AI-powered security camera utilities, Amazon validators, coding extensions, and similar software. Attackers fork or clone legitimate repositories, then upload a malicious SmartLoader payload into them.

T1199Trusted RelationshipEvidence1

The campaign appears designed to exploit GitHub’s visibility in search engines and developer workflows. By cloning newly created or low-traffic repositories, attackers increase the likelihood of appearing in search results for niche queries. Preserving commit history and contributor metadata adds legitimacy, making it more likely that users will trust and download the malicious files.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

A new advanced tactic, AgentBaiting, has also been identified... By optimizing fake repositories, threat actors can provide users with legitimate resources instead of forcing them to visit malicious links.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence7

Netskope came across the campaign while tracking a Windows-based MaaS infostealer, first reported in April 2026, that was spread through the ClickFix social engineering trick.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence5

After installation, SmartLoader creates persistence using scheduled tasks...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

Scheduled Tasks: The script also creates schedules task under the following names for persistence. These tasks are configured to execute the malicious Lua script daily at a predetermined time.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence8

The Lua script executes and connects to a Polygon RPC endpoint (leveraging the blockchain network for C2 retrieval).

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Launcher.cmd – Command shell script file with command to execute the malicious Lua script using Luajit.exe

T1059.006PythonEvidence2

compiler.exe is a renamed LuaJIT interpreter... causing the interpreter to read and execute the contents of the text file

T1059.011LuaEvidence1

The executable compiler.exe is a renamed LuaJIT 2.1 interpreter. When the batch script runs compiler.exe with gc.txt as an argument, the interpreter reads the contents of the text file and executes them.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence8

victims are lured into trusting the GitHub page, leading them to download and execute the MaaS malware infostealer. | In April 2026, Netskope Threat Labs exposed a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) NodeJS infostealer delivered through the ClickFix social engineering technique.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence5

The victim extracts the ZIP and launches a batch file. That launcher starts a LuaJIT interpreter with an obfuscated Lua script as its argument.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence5

After installation, SmartLoader creates persistence using scheduled tasks...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

Scheduled Tasks: The script also creates schedules task under the following names for persistence. These tasks are configured to execute the malicious Lua script daily at a predetermined time.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

One or more directories are created on the local filesystem Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence5

After installation, SmartLoader creates persistence using scheduled tasks...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence6

Scheduled Tasks: The script also creates schedules task under the following names for persistence. These tasks are configured to execute the malicious Lua script daily at a predetermined time.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Follow-on analysis of related FakeGit samples showed persistence through scheduled tasks under %LOCALAPPDATA% , encrypted stage retrieval from GitHub, and StealC injection after SmartLoader runs.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

One or more directories are created on the local filesystem Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence12

The Lua script is heavily obfuscated, and was obfuscated using the Prometheus Lua obfuscator.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The script dynamically loads multiple additional DLLs using ldrloaddll.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

In this campaign, the attacker-controlled GitHub repository hosts two XOR encoded distinct payloads

T1036MasqueradingEvidence15

The actor changes only the parts that influence user behavior: the README, the repository metadata, and the embedded archive.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Follow-on analysis of related FakeGit samples showed persistence through scheduled tasks under %LOCALAPPDATA% , encrypted stage retrieval from GitHub, and StealC injection after SmartLoader runs.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

"dll_loader": {"func": null, "type": "Rundll32"}

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

The malware creates a mutex with the following long hardcoded name... This mutex prevents multiple instances of the payload from running simultaneously on the same machine.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After successfully deobfuscating the initial script, several sophisticated anti-debugging and anti-tampering mechanisms became clearly visible.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

The payload performs connectivity and geolocation checks before proceeding to C2 communication

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

All 109 identified repositories contain a single ZIP file buried deep in the directory structure. The path often resembles an ordinary project archive, such as repo/some/deep/path/project-name-version.zip.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence3

The use of start detaches the new process, while the GUI subsystem flag suppresses the console window. The Lua stage then calls GetConsoleWindow and ShowWindow(SW_HIDE) through LuaJIT FFI as a second layer of concealment.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The same staging repository also hosted an encrypted StealC payload that SmartLoader was capable of decrypting and loading directly in memory without writing it to disk.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Credential Theft T1539 StealC injected to steal browser sessions, credentials, and tokens

Discovery

5 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

In the samples we analyzed, that SmartLoader stage hides execution, performs a native anti-debug check... fingerprints the host, captures a screenshot, exfiltrates the collected data...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The script enumerates the following user-specific directories: C:\Users\BBBB\AppData\Local\Temp\ C:\Users\BBBB\AppData\Roaming\ C:\Users\BBBB\Desktop\

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After successfully deobfuscating the initial script, several sophisticated anti-debugging and anti-tampering mechanisms became clearly visible.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

The payload performs connectivity and geolocation checks before proceeding to C2 communication

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence2

Sends a GET request to ip-api[.]com/json with a custom User-Agent string. Parses the JSON response to obtain the victim’s approximate geolocation

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence5

Grabs a screenshot of the victims machine and sends an HTTP POST request to the retrieved C2 server.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The malicious payload distributed via the cloned GitHub repositories is delivered in a zip archive containing four files

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence6

The payload constructs and sends a POST request to a Polygon blockchain RPC endpoint (polygon-rpc.com).

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

Once SmartLoader resolves the active server, it sends a POST request to /api/<base64_victim_id> on the bare-IP C2. The request body is multipart/form-data... The server responds with JSON...

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

C2 via Blockchain T1102 Command server located through a value stored in a Polygon smart contract.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence4

EtherHiding is an advanced evasion and delivery technique in which attackers leverage blockchain networks as an intermediary infrastructure to host and retrieve command-and-control (C2) information and payload locations.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence15

When unsuspecting users download and run the software from these compromised repositories, they unknowingly retrieve and execute the malicious Lua payload alongside the intended files.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence5

SmartLoader resolves its active C2 through a Polygon smart contract, allowing the operator to rotate infrastructure without rebuilding the loader or updating every staged sample.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

the second stage Lua script... reuses the same XOR key to encrypt outbound traffic and decrypt server responses

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Collected host data is exfiltrated to bare-IP C2 servers via multipart POST.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

175 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

46 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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help net securityNews · Oct 16, 2026Stolen AI API keys are paying for hackers' autonomous scans - Help Net SecurityMalware distributed through fraudulent GitHub repositories in the FakeGit campaign. More than 800 repositories impersonated AI skills or MCP servers, including a lookalike Docker MCP Gateway, to gain indexing in public AI registries and lure engineering teams into installing malicious tooling.Read more ↗scworldNews · Oct 9, 2026FakeGit campaign reactivates, distributing SmartLoader malware via GitHub | brief | SC MediaInitial malware payload distributed through fake GitHub repositories in the FakeGit campaign. Repositories masquerade as AI skills or MCP servers to lure developers and users seeking legitimate tools. SmartLoader subsequently distributes additional malware, including StealC.Read more ↗bleeping computerNews · Oct 8, 2026FakeGit malware campaign returns with 17,610 malicious GitHub reposAn initial-stage malware loader distributed through ZIP archives linked from fake GitHub repositories. The FakeGit campaign uses it to deliver additional malware, including StealC. Apiiro reported 17,610 repositories in the renewed campaign; 88% of sampled commits pointed their download buttons to ZIP archives that install SmartLoader. Suspected execution should be treated as a potential GitHub account compromise.Read more ↗spectrum security blogNews · Oct 8, 2026Fake OnionClaw: from a trojanized agent skill to StealC v2An obfuscated Lua loader distributed in a malicious archive added to an OnionClaw repository copy. It collects host information and screenshots, communicates with command servers, and supports server-directed downloads and execution. Conditional capabilities include scheduled-task persistence and Microsoft Defender exclusion requests. A Polygon smart contract supplies a fallback server address. The investigation reconstructed subsequent stages leading to a probable StealC v2-family infostealer, but did not observe end-to-end execution; captured task responses had incompatible decoding keys that would prevent the unmodified clients from completing the chain. April 7, 2026 is the cited first-seen date for the matching archive sample, not an established discovery date for the malware family.Read more ↗
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IOC matching175Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.