SmartLoader
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- LureCracked softwareSeo poisoning
- Platforms
- Windows
SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader that uses obfuscated Lua code executed through LuaJIT to profile compromised systems, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, and download and execute additional malware. It has delivered information stealers including StealC and Lumma Stealer. Its own collection capabilities include host identifiers, operating-system information, public IP and geolocation data, and desktop screenshots, which it transmits to its command servers.
SmartLoader is extensively distributed through deceptive GitHub repositories, including the large-scale FakeGit operation. Attackers copy legitimate projects, documentation, contributor information, and developer identities, then modify installation instructions or add download buttons directing users to malicious ZIP archives. Lures impersonate AI skills, Model Context Protocol servers, developer utilities, game cheats, and cracked software. Some campaigns use SEO poisoning to promote malicious repositories. Execution typically requires the user to extract an archive and run a batch launcher, which starts a bundled or renamed LuaJIT interpreter with an obfuscated Lua payload disguised as a data file.
Analyzed variants use EtherHiding to retrieve their current command-server address from a Polygon smart contract, allowing operators to rotate infrastructure without redistributing the loader. SmartLoader supports encrypted tasking and multistage delivery, including additional Lua stages and encrypted payloads hosted on GitHub. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks and registry-based startup entries; some configurations provide separate local-recovery and payload-redownload paths. Defense-evasion techniques include Lua obfuscation, hidden console windows, anti-debugging and anti-tampering checks, and conditional Microsoft Defender exclusions.
Campaigns target Windows users broadly, with a substantial focus on developers and AI-tool users. Affected organizations have included financial services, banking, and technology enterprises in North America, Asia, and Southern Europe. Follow-on stealers can expose credentials, browser cookies, authenticated sessions, and cryptocurrency-wallet data.
Associated threat actors
4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Forum members are dissecting FakeGit, a campaign attributed to the actor Water Kurita in which roughly 7,600 fraudulent GitHub repositories spread SmartLoader malware.
The repo copies a real project, the README sends every click to a ZIP, and the ZIP runs SmartLoader, which finds its C2 on a blockchain and installs the StealC infostealer.
Together, the four files make up SmartLoader, a malware loader Netskope has previously seen distributed through GitHub repositories.
A newly documented campaign called AgentBaiting uses fraudulent AI Skills and Model Context Protocol, or MCP, servers to distribute SmartLoader malware through trusted-looking GitHub projects and public capability catalogs.
Techniques & procedures
43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
A large-scale malware distribution campaign has been uncovered involving 109 fake GitHub repositories that were used to trick users into downloading two dangerous malware tools named SmartLoader and StealC. The threat actor behind this campaign copied real GitHub projects, republished them under different accounts, and replaced the original documentation with download buttons pointing to malicious ZIP files.
Unsuspecting users are directed to these repositories through techniques like SEO poisoning.
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
The counterfeit repositories, either completely fabricated or copied from legitimate projects, serve as a conduit for a ZIP archive, which is then used to trigger a LuaJIT loader chain, leading to the execution of an obfuscated Lua script responsible for dropping SmartLoader.
Threat actors are actively targeting public GitHub repositories that share tools such as game cheats, Claude code splitters, AI-powered security camera utilities, Amazon validators, coding extensions, and similar software. Attackers fork or clone legitimate repositories, then upload a malicious SmartLoader payload into them.
The campaign appears designed to exploit GitHub’s visibility in search engines and developer workflows. By cloning newly created or low-traffic repositories, attackers increase the likelihood of appearing in search results for niche queries. Preserving commit history and contributor metadata adds legitimacy, making it more likely that users will trust and download the malicious files.
A new advanced tactic, AgentBaiting, has also been identified... By optimizing fake repositories, threat actors can provide users with legitimate resources instead of forcing them to visit malicious links.
Netskope came across the campaign while tracking a Windows-based MaaS infostealer, first reported in April 2026, that was spread through the ClickFix social engineering trick.
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
After installation, SmartLoader creates persistence using scheduled tasks...
Scheduled Tasks: The script also creates schedules task under the following names for persistence. These tasks are configured to execute the malicious Lua script daily at a predetermined time.
The Lua script executes and connects to a Polygon RPC endpoint (leveraging the blockchain network for C2 retrieval).
Launcher.cmd – Command shell script file with command to execute the malicious Lua script using Luajit.exe
compiler.exe is a renamed LuaJIT interpreter... causing the interpreter to read and execute the contents of the text file
The executable compiler.exe is a renamed LuaJIT 2.1 interpreter. When the batch script runs compiler.exe with gc.txt as an argument, the interpreter reads the contents of the text file and executes them.
victims are lured into trusting the GitHub page, leading them to download and execute the MaaS malware infostealer. | In April 2026, Netskope Threat Labs exposed a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) NodeJS infostealer delivered through the ClickFix social engineering technique.
The victim extracts the ZIP and launches a batch file. That launcher starts a LuaJIT interpreter with an obfuscated Lua script as its argument.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
After installation, SmartLoader creates persistence using scheduled tasks...
Scheduled Tasks: The script also creates schedules task under the following names for persistence. These tasks are configured to execute the malicious Lua script daily at a predetermined time.
One or more directories are created on the local filesystem Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.
Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
After installation, SmartLoader creates persistence using scheduled tasks...
Scheduled Tasks: The script also creates schedules task under the following names for persistence. These tasks are configured to execute the malicious Lua script daily at a predetermined time.
Follow-on analysis of related FakeGit samples showed persistence through scheduled tasks under %LOCALAPPDATA% , encrypted stage retrieval from GitHub, and StealC injection after SmartLoader runs.
One or more directories are created on the local filesystem Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.
Registry keys are modified to establish persistence.
Stealth
12 techniques
Stealth
The Lua script is heavily obfuscated, and was obfuscated using the Prometheus Lua obfuscator.
The script dynamically loads multiple additional DLLs using ldrloaddll.
In this campaign, the attacker-controlled GitHub repository hosts two XOR encoded distinct payloads
The actor changes only the parts that influence user behavior: the README, the repository metadata, and the embedded archive.
Follow-on analysis of related FakeGit samples showed persistence through scheduled tasks under %LOCALAPPDATA% , encrypted stage retrieval from GitHub, and StealC injection after SmartLoader runs.
"dll_loader": {"func": null, "type": "Rundll32"}
The malware creates a mutex with the following long hardcoded name... This mutex prevents multiple instances of the payload from running simultaneously on the same machine.
After successfully deobfuscating the initial script, several sophisticated anti-debugging and anti-tampering mechanisms became clearly visible.
The payload performs connectivity and geolocation checks before proceeding to C2 communication
All 109 identified repositories contain a single ZIP file buried deep in the directory structure. The path often resembles an ordinary project archive, such as repo/some/deep/path/project-name-version.zip.
The use of start detaches the new process, while the GUI subsystem flag suppresses the console window. The Lua stage then calls GetConsoleWindow and ShowWindow(SW_HIDE) through LuaJIT FFI as a second layer of concealment.
The same staging repository also hosted an encrypted StealC payload that SmartLoader was capable of decrypting and loading directly in memory without writing it to disk.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Credential Theft T1539 StealC injected to steal browser sessions, credentials, and tokens
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
In the samples we analyzed, that SmartLoader stage hides execution, performs a native anti-debug check... fingerprints the host, captures a screenshot, exfiltrates the collected data...
The script enumerates the following user-specific directories: C:\Users\BBBB\AppData\Local\Temp\ C:\Users\BBBB\AppData\Roaming\ C:\Users\BBBB\Desktop\
After successfully deobfuscating the initial script, several sophisticated anti-debugging and anti-tampering mechanisms became clearly visible.
The payload performs connectivity and geolocation checks before proceeding to C2 communication
Sends a GET request to ip-api[.]com/json with a custom User-Agent string. Parses the JSON response to obtain the victim’s approximate geolocation
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
Grabs a screenshot of the victims machine and sends an HTTP POST request to the retrieved C2 server.
The malicious payload distributed via the cloned GitHub repositories is delivered in a zip archive containing four files
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
The payload constructs and sends a POST request to a Polygon blockchain RPC endpoint (polygon-rpc.com).
Once SmartLoader resolves the active server, it sends a POST request to /api/<base64_victim_id> on the bare-IP C2. The request body is multipart/form-data... The server responds with JSON...
C2 via Blockchain T1102 Command server located through a value stored in a Polygon smart contract.
EtherHiding is an advanced evasion and delivery technique in which attackers leverage blockchain networks as an intermediary infrastructure to host and retrieve command-and-control (C2) information and payload locations.
When unsuspecting users download and run the software from these compromised repositories, they unknowingly retrieve and execute the malicious Lua payload alongside the intended files.
SmartLoader resolves its active C2 through a Polygon smart contract, allowing the operator to rotate infrastructure without rebuilding the loader or updating every staged sample.
the second stage Lua script... reuses the same XOR key to encrypt outbound traffic and decrypt server responses
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Collected host data is exfiltrated to bare-IP C2 servers via multipart POST.
Observables
175 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
46 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.