Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Seatbelt

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs10Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

Seatbelt is a publicly available C#/.NET security-assessment and host-enumeration utility for Windows. It performs numerous security-oriented checks, collecting system information, installed patch information, security policies, User Account Control settings, and details of defensive protections. Its enumeration can also access credential-related files and registry data, including PuTTY SSH host-key information. It is a dual-use reconnaissance tool rather than an inherently malicious payload.

Seatbelt is used in authorized security assessments and adversarial post-exploitation activity to characterize compromised hosts and identify environmental constraints. LockBit affiliates have used it for system enumeration, and Conti operator materials describe using it to identify defensive protections. Post-exploitation frameworks can deploy and execute Seatbelt; Merlin supports downloading its source code, compiling it on the target, executing it, and deleting the resulting files. Seatbelt can also be executed in memory as part of a host-survey workflow.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
LockBit

Seatbelt ... Performs numerous security-oriented checks to enumerate system information.

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
Conti

During this phase, a tool such as Seatbelt may be used to enumerate protections in the environment that the operator will have to account for.

via reliaquest com threat huntingreliaquest.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Using the web worker process to execute shell commands, the malicious actor sent this command to PowerShell.exe... the first script block executed is an obfuscated version of the AMSI bypass, base64-encoded and GZip-compressed in an attempt to evade detection.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Local Windows winPEAS PowerUp Seatbelt Unquoted svc paths DLL hijack AlwaysInstallElevated JuicyPotato RoguePotato PrintSpoofer GodPotato UAC fodhelper/sdclt

Stealth

2 techniques
T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Sliver – We tested ... execute-assembly against Seatbelt and Rubeus ... Watching execute-assembly Rubeus.exe kerberoast complete successfully against a domain controller, through a WASM-bridged COM call into the CLR running a loaded Rubeus assembly, was significantly more rewarding ...

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4

.NET リフレクションを使用してアセンブリ名をETWイベントにキャプチャされないようにSeatbelt.exeを実行する

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

SharpChrome and SeatBelt ... were also used for credential-dumping. SharpChrome is a Chrome-specific implementation of SharpDPAPI and attempts to decrypt logins and cookies.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

T1552.001 Credential in Files ... This EQL query uses the process.entity_id field to detect a process accessing multiple sensitive files in a short period of time.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

T1555 - Credentials from password stores Extracts passwords from credential stores using tools such as SharpChrome, Seatbelt, and net-GPPPassword

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers ... Here are detections of Chrome Login Data file access by different infostealers (Poulight Stealer, AgentTesla).

T1555.004Windows Credential ManagerEvidence1

Starting with Windows 7, the credential manager allows users to store credentials for websites and network resources. Credential files are stored in C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ ... These files are protected with user (or system) specific DPAPI masterkeys.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

LockBit affiliates will enumerate system information to include hostname, host configuration, domain information, local drive configuration, remote shares, and mounted external storage devices.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

wmic product get name,version

T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Description Generated datasets for Windows Seatbelt Tool Execution in attack range. MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... Snapattack Path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1526/snapattack/snaattack.log

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Many frameworks can utilize external tools as modules Pattern Download external tools • Merlin

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+5 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.