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Malware1 associated actor

Penquin

Tracked since Nov 27, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Linux
Also known asPenquin 2.0

Penquin_x64 is a 64-bit variant of Penquin, a GNU/Linux backdoor attributed to the Turla threat group. Publicly analyzed in 2020, it extends a family previously identified in 32-bit form. Penquin supports remote execution of downloaded programs, file exfiltration over its command-and-control channel, and reporting of the compromised host’s IP address.

Penquin uses a passive, packet-triggered activation mechanism rather than a fixed command-and-control address. It monitors network traffic for specially crafted TCP or UDP packets, validates the trigger, and extracts the command-and-control destination from the packet before initiating contact. Its activation logic tracks packet identifiers to avoid accepting the same trigger consecutively. Communications can be encrypted with Blowfish using a symmetric key established through Diffie–Hellman key exchange.

Defense-evasion behaviors include masquerading as a legitimate system scheduling component, removing identifying strings from binaries, and deleting downloaded executables after running them. Internet-facing server infections have been identified in Europe, Russia, and the United States, including virtual private servers across multiple hosting providers. Some Penquin-infected servers have also hosted command-and-control components associated with other Turla tools.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

The Penquin C2 mechanism is based on TCP and UDP packets.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can use Cron to create periodic and pre-scheduled background jobs.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can execute remote commands using bash scripts.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can use Cron to create periodic and pre-scheduled background jobs.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)

T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) installs a `TCP` and `UDP` filter on the `eth0` interface.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

This threat, despite being a compiled and relatively complex binary, has the same capabilities that are usually found in webshells. Furthermore, the group itself could be said to use them in a similar way than other less advanced groups using webshells

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.003CronEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can use Cron to create periodic and pre-scheduled background jobs.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can remove strings from binaries.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) has encrypted strings in the binary for obfuscation.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) has mimicked the Cron binary to hide itself on compromised systems.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence9

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can delete downloaded executables after running them.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)

T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) installs a `TCP` and `UDP` filter on the `eth0` interface.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can add the executable flag to a downloaded file.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence4

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can sniff network traffic to look for packets matching specific conditions.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can report the IP of the compromised host to attacker controlled infrastructure.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1040Network SniffingEvidence4

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can sniff network traffic to look for packets matching specific conditions.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence10

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can report the file system type of a compromised host to C2.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence10

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can use the command code <code>do_vslist</code> to send file names, size, and status to C2.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can report the disk space of a compromised host to C2.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

this threat does not have its own command and control server, but rather stands by waiting for a very specific packet generated by the attacker and from that packet it extracts its command and control server.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

it has been observed how in servers infected by this threat, command and controls from other Turla tools have been deployed in order to use them as infrastructure in recent campaigns.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

The [Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) C2 mechanism is based on TCP and UDP packets.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can execute the command code <code>do_download</code> to retrieve remote files from C2.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Penquin December 2014)

T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence3

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) installs a `TCP` and `UDP` filter on the `eth0` interface.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can encrypt communications using the BlowFish algorithm and a symmetric key exchanged with Diffie Hellman.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence6

[Penquin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0587) can execute the command code <code>do_upload</code> to send files to C2.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.