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Malware2 associated actors

Nova

Tracked since Nov 30, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days7 mentions · peak 6 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs28Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissanceLateral movementPersistence
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
WindowsEsxi

Nova is a financially motivated ransomware family and ransomware-as-a-service operation that emerged as RALord in March 2025 and rebranded in April 2025. It supplies affiliates with encryption tools and supports double extortion through sensitive-data theft and threats to publish stolen information on a dedicated dark-web leak site. Affiliates provide access to compromised networks and are expected to extract sensitive information before encryption. Its victims span multiple countries and industries, including technology, manufacturing, healthcare, and education.

Analyzed Windows encryptors are written in Rust. A later build uses XChaCha20-Poly1305 for file encryption and RSA-2048 to protect encryption keys. It checks for debuggers, enumerates running processes, and exits when specified analysis or monitoring tools are detected. It also attempts to disable Microsoft Defender protections, introduce broad antivirus exclusions, stop security services, and terminate antivirus and EDR processes. Recovery inhibition and trace removal include deleting Volume Shadow Copies, clearing Windows Event Logs, and deleting the encryptor after execution.

Nova intrusions have also involved VMware ESXi payloads, modifications that force Windows into Safe Mode with Networking before encryption, and legitimate remote-access utilities used for lateral movement and persistence. These intrusion-level behaviors vary by affiliate and should not be assumed to be native capabilities of every encryptor build. No consistent Nova-specific initial-access or delivery mechanism has been established.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Nova

Nova equips affiliates with a Rust-based encryptor and threatens to publish stolen information on a dedicated Dark Web leak site.

via malware newsmalware.news
Sordeal

In this report, we will discuss the behavior of their full version infostealer known as Nova.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

“RALord appeared publicly in March 2025 as a ransomware-as-a-service operation built around a Rust-based encryptor.”

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Most information stealers are distributed using social engineering, phishing, and malvertising campaigns to collect sensitive information from a large number of targets.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The later analyzed build uses PowerShell, registry changes, and service manipulation to interfere with endpoint protection.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware uses cmd.exe and powershell to interact with the registry extensively. It queries and modifies registry keys related to the system for persistence and configuration.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware drops Update[.]exe (renamed version of win32snapshot[.]exe) into the startup folder, indicating an attempt to achieve persistence.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The malware tries to load missing DLLs and creates processes in suspended mode for code injection.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware drops Update[.]exe (renamed version of win32snapshot[.]exe) into the startup folder, indicating an attempt to achieve persistence.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

“Keenadu was also distributed via modified popular apps from unofficial stores and even Google Play, where trojanized smart camera apps with over 300,000 downloads…”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The malware tries to load missing DLLs and creates processes in suspended mode for code injection.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

win32snapshot[.]exe (md5: 13639e7f3707d05d90798d21d404eccc), sets the “Circular Kernel Context Logger” registry key value to “0”. As a result, events related to kernel-mode operations, system calls, and other low-level activities will no longer be recorded.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

It abuses the inbuilt Windows utility Data Protection Application Programming Interface (DPAPI) to perform data decryption. This API contains a class called ProtectedData, that contains two wrappers: “Protect” and “Unprotect.” The infostealer passes a byte array of the encrypted data to the “Unprotect” wrapper, which subsequently returns a byte array of decrypted data.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

A later Windows build checks for a debugger, enumerates running processes, and terminates itself when it detects specified reverse-engineering, debugging, or monitoring tools.

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware uses cmd.exe and powershell to interact with the registry extensively. It queries and modifies registry keys related to the system for persistence and configuration.

T1553.004Install Root CertificateEvidence1

This indicates the installation of a root certificate by the malware, which would allow an attacker to masquerade malicious files as valid signed components from any entity (for example, Microsoft). It could also allow an attacker to decrypt SSL traffic.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Disable Microsoft Defender protections and add drive-wide scan exclusions. Stop security services and terminate processes associated with antivirus (AV) and endpoint detection and response (EDR) products.

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence2

Clear Windows Event Logs across multiple channels to reduce the evidence available to investigators.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malware targets multiple browsers, including the most used Edge, Chrome and Firefox. Additionally, the malware invokes reg.exe to harvest information related to WinSCP, targeting stored sessions and passwords.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The Chrome configuration is stored in the local AppData directory in a file called “Local State”. This configuration contains an entry called “os_crypt,” which has a sub-entry called “encrypted_key.” The “encrypted_key” is used by Chrome to encrypt saved login data. Below we can see that the malware tries to access that.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

The index[.]js file was responsible for stealing the Discord session token and collecting information about the victim.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The malware uses cmd.exe and powershell to interact with the registry extensively. It queries and modifies registry keys related to the system for persistence and configuration.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

These behaviors align with Debugger Evasion (T1622) and Process Discovery (T1057).

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware uses utilities like wmic to gather various system information, including logical disk size, total physical memory, CPU information, UUID etc. The malware checks the online IP address of the machine, indicating an attempt to fingerprint victims.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence2

Discovery Security Software Discovery T1518.001

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

A later Windows build checks for a debugger, enumerates running processes, and terminates itself when it detects specified reverse-engineering, debugging, or monitoring tools.

Collection

3 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The malware uses this open-source utility to capture the screenshot of the target machine.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

Earlier this year, researchers discovered that the main.py file in the Sordeal repository (which has since been deleted) injected malicious Node.js code into the Discord %APPDATA%/Discord/app-(versions)/modules/discord_desktop_core/index.js module.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

After decryption, the malware creates a folder in the temp directory and dumps all the decrypted information in the respective files.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Threat hunters often focus on spotting command-and-control (C2) servers, open directories typically identified by the phrase “Index of” and phishing components.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“Keenadu’s backdoor… loads extra malicious modules from its C2 server… The modules are downloaded from Amazon AWS, verified with MD5 and DSA signatures, then decrypted and executed.”

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Almost one million patients had their data stolen, including basic personal information, highly sensitive Pap smear results, and skin and urine test results.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The attacker received this information, but a copy was also sent to hxxps[:]//panel[.]sordeal[.]com[:]3000/ using a POST method.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence5

The later analyzed Rust build uses XChaCha20-Poly1305 for file encryption and RSA-2048 to protect encryption keys.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

The analyzed Windows build enumerates logical drives through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and deletes Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin and wmic.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

“The operation combined file encryption with data theft, allowing the group to threaten non-paying victims with publication through a Tor-hosted data-leak site.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

28 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

33 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
malware newsNews · Nov 5, 2026Dark Web Profile: Nova Ransomware - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsRust-based ransomware supplied through a Ransomware-as-a-Service operation that first surfaced as RALord in March 2025 and rebranded as Nova in April 2025. The analyzed Windows build checks for debuggers, interferes with endpoint protection, clears event logs, and deletes Volume Shadow Copies. It encrypts files with XChaCha20-Poly1305 and protects encryption keys with RSA-2048. Early samples append .ralord; a later sample appends .xgWLckNV and drops README_NOVA.me. The operation supports encryption-only and double-extortion attacks. Linux and boot-locker variants are advertised, while third-party reporting describes ESXi payloads; these capabilities are not verified across all builds. No consistent initial-access vector or specific exploited vulnerability is established.Read more ↗socradar blogNews · Nov 5, 2026Dark Web Profile: Nova RansomwareRust-based ransomware deployed by affiliates in encryption-only and double-extortion attacks. Analyzed Windows builds encrypt files, inhibit recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies, interfere with endpoint protection, and clear event logs. A later build adds debugger and monitoring-tool checks, uses XChaCha20-Poly1305 for file encryption and RSA-2048 to protect encryption keys, appends .xgWLckNV, and drops README_NOVA.me. Early RALord samples instead append .ralord. Linux and boot-locker variants are advertised, while third-party reporting describes ESXi payloads; these capabilities are not verified across all builds. No consistent initial-access vector is established.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 16, 2026New YuanKong Android RAT Hijacks Phones to Steal Banking PINs and PasswordsThe examined dropper contains an encrypted YuanKong child application and installs it after unpacking the payload. Its payload format uses a simple XOR process, with the key and initialization value stored in configuration, allowing offline recovery of the child application.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Oct 16, 2026New YuanKong Android RAT Hijacks Phones to Steal Banking PINs and Passwords | Cryptika CybersecurityNamed dropper in the examined YuanKong infection chain. It contains an encrypted child application and installs it after unpacking. The payload uses a simple XOR process, with its key and initialization value stored in a configuration file, allowing offline recovery without contacting the operator’s server.Read more ↗
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IOC matching28Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.