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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

PowGoop

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs128Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
DLL sideloadingDefense evasionPost exploitationExfiltration
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

PowGoop is a Windows malware loader used by MuddyWater, also known as Seedworm, MERCURY, and Static Kitten, an Iranian cyberespionage group subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Documented since 2020, it combines a malicious DLL loader with a PowerShell-based downloader and command-and-control payload to retrieve and execute additional scripts and malware.

PowGoop abuses DLL search order hijacking and DLL side-loading, initially through legitimate Google Update components and later through other legitimate applications. Its multistage execution chain decodes obfuscated PowerShell scripts stored in external files. The resulting beacon receives encrypted commands, decrypts and executes them locally, and returns encrypted, Base64-encoded command output through HTTP Cookie fields. Later variants incorporate shellcode and reflective loading stages. Masquerading as legitimate software, script obfuscation, and encoded communications help conceal execution and command-and-control activity.

PowGoop has been deployed following malicious document lures and exploitation of Microsoft Exchange, including CVE-2020-0688, and through remote execution tools within compromised networks. Observed targets include government, telecommunications, technology, oil and gas, real estate, and education organizations across the Middle East and parts of Asia. It has also appeared in campaigns associated with destructive Thanos ransomware, but PowGoop itself is a loader rather than ransomware or a wiper.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-1472via clearsky blogExploited in the wildZerologonRecently, Microsoft revealed that MuddyWater had been leveraging the ZeroLogon vulnerability as well (CVE-2020-1472)... CVE-2020-1472 - An elevation of privilege vulnerability that exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller, using the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). | During the campaign, the group attempted to install a variant of the “PowGoop”, a malicious replacement to Google update dll. Based on PaloAlto report, “PowGoop” is a loader for a variant of Thanos ransomware with destructive capabilities.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-0688via clearsky blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange Server Validation Key Remote Code ExecutionThe second vector involves exploiting CVE-2020-0688 and deploying the same payload via aspx file (WebShell). ... CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange vulnerability A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange software when the software fails to properly handle objects in memory... The exploitation provides the attacker SYSTEM level code execution privileges. | During the campaign, the group attempted to install a variant of the “PowGoop”, a malicious replacement to Google update dll. Based on PaloAlto report, “PowGoop” is a loader for a variant of Thanos ransomware with destructive capabilities.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater

Among multiple malware sets, MuddyWater is using new variants of the PowGoop malware family, CNMF said.

via threatpostthreatpost.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The second vector involves exploiting CVE-2020-0688 and deploying the same payload via aspx file (WebShell).

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The second vector is more in line with common MuddyWater vectors... the target receives a link to their corporate email, joined by a link to a file storing service.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

MuddyWater attempts to coax their targeted victim into downloading ZIP files, containing either an Excel file with a malicious macro that communicates with the actor’s command and control server or a PDF file that drops a malicious file to the victim’s network.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

A scheduled task is also generated by the attacker. This task would take part in running GoopDate.dll (PowGoop).

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence16

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) has the ability to use PowerShell scripts to execute commands.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Macro - A malicious macro embedded in an excel file. The malicious piece of code installs three files used in the first stage of the infection. | A VBS file called db.vbs is downloaded from the server and stored in the Public folder.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The ZIP contains one of two types of file: An Excel file containing a malicious macro... A PDF file that drops a malicious dll file to the victim’s network.

T1574.001DLLEvidence6

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) can side-load `Goopdate.dll` into `GoogleUpdate.exe`.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

A scheduled task is also generated by the attacker. This task would take part in running GoopDate.dll (PowGoop).

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

A scheduled task is also generated by the attacker. This task would take part in running GoopDate.dll (PowGoop).

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

CVE-2020-1472 - An elevation of privilege vulnerability that exists when an attacker establishes a vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

This file was identified as an obfuscated PowerShell script

T1036MasqueradingEvidence6

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) has disguised a PowerShell script as a .dat file (goopdate.dat).(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence5

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) has used a DLL named Goopdate.dll to impersonate a legitimate Google update file.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) can decrypt PowerShell scripts for execution.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence3

spawns a Rundll32.exe process to launch goopdate.dll with the DllRegisterServer function

T1574.001DLLEvidence6

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) can side-load `Goopdate.dll` into `GoogleUpdate.exe`.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The config.txt contains a hardcoded C2 address and victim GUID, beacons via modified base64-encoded HTTP, and runs C2 traffic under the legitimate Google Update process to evade network detection.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

These components retrieve encrypted commands from a C2 server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) can send HTTP GET requests to malicious servers.(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Seedworm was also observed setting up tunnels to its own infrastructure using Secure Sockets Funneling and Chisel. These tools allow the attackers to configure local and remote port forwarding

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

during PowGoop activity, we also observed the attackers downloading tools and some unknown content from GitHub repos

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

Known as PowGoop, the malicious code can install other programs capable of siphoning data off of networks.

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence3

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) can use a modified Base64 encoding mechanism to send data to and from the C2 server.(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

In the majority of recent infections, PowGoop appears to have been deployed via a remote execution tool known as Remadmin.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence5

[PowGoop](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1046) can receive encrypted commands from C2.(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication… BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications… Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server… gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection… Gomir uses a custom encryption algorithm…”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

The script exfiltrates the result of the command in a Base64 encoded string passed through the 'Cookie: <Base64_encoded_string>' part of the packet.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

Once this payload is run successfully, a Thanos Ransomware payload can be downloaded to the server

Indicators of compromise

Observables

128 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

35 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching128Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.