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Malware1 associated actor

GoldenDealer

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs5Tracked

GoldenDealer is a custom GoldenJackal malware component used to bridge air-gapped environments via removable media. It was observed in attacks against government and diplomatic targets, including a South Asian embassy in Belarus in 2019, and is associated with the GoldenJackal cyberespionage group, which has targeted government and diplomatic entities in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia since at least 2019. GoldenDealer is deployed on internet-connected systems, where it monitors for USB drive insertion, copies itself and other malicious components to removable media, and can download executables from command-and-control infrastructure and hide them on the USB device. When the compromised USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped machine, GoldenDealer retrieves additional malware from the drive and executes it, including GoldenHowl, a modular backdoor, and GoldenRobo, a file collection and exfiltration tool. In the documented workflow, GoldenRobo collects documents, images, certificates, encryption keys, archives, and OpenVPN configuration files from the isolated host, stores them in a hidden directory on the USB drive, and the data is later exfiltrated when the drive is reconnected to an online system running GoldenDealer. High-confidence behaviors reported by ESET include monitoring removable drive insertion and internet connectivity, staging base64-encoded executables from C2 for USB transfer, and using USB-mediated delivery to compromise isolated systems. GoldenDealer attempts persistence by creating a Windows service named NetDnsActivatorSharing and falls back to a Run registry key if service creation fails. It also modifies HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\ShowSuperHidden to keep hidden files from being shown in Windows Explorer. Reported working-directory artifacts include XOR-encrypted JSON configuration data and files named b8b9-de4d-3b06-9d44, fb43-138c-2eb0-c651, and 130d-1154-30ce-be1e, observed under C:\Windows\TAPI. It checks connectivity by issuing periodic GET requests to https://1.1.1.1/<user_id> and expecting a 404 response, and reported 2019 C2 infrastructure includes 83.24.9[.]124 as primary and 196.29.32[.]210 as secondary.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GoldenJackal

During the attack on a South Asian embassy in Belarus in August 2019, the hackers used several custom tools, including GoldenDealer malware to deliver executables to the air-gapped system via USB monitoring...

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

GoldenDealer monitors for the insertion of USB drives on those systems, and when it happens, it automatically copies itself and other malicious components onto it. | Eventually, that same USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped computer, allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence2

GoldenDealer monitors for the insertion of USB drives on those systems, and when it happens, it automatically copies itself and other malicious components onto it. | Eventually, that same USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped computer, allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1092Communication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

“GoldenDealer… watches for the insertion of a USB storage device… hide them on removable drives… And on air-gapped machines, it can retrieve additional malware from the USB and then execute it.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

When the USB drive is removed from the air-gapped computer and re-connected to the original internet-connected system, GoldenDealer automatically sends the stolen data stored on the drive to the threat actor's command and control (C2) server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.