GoldenDealer
GoldenDealer is a custom GoldenJackal malware component used to bridge air-gapped environments via removable media. It was observed in attacks against government and diplomatic targets, including a South Asian embassy in Belarus in 2019, and is associated with the GoldenJackal cyberespionage group, which has targeted government and diplomatic entities in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia since at least 2019. GoldenDealer is deployed on internet-connected systems, where it monitors for USB drive insertion, copies itself and other malicious components to removable media, and can download executables from command-and-control infrastructure and hide them on the USB device. When the compromised USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped machine, GoldenDealer retrieves additional malware from the drive and executes it, including GoldenHowl, a modular backdoor, and GoldenRobo, a file collection and exfiltration tool. In the documented workflow, GoldenRobo collects documents, images, certificates, encryption keys, archives, and OpenVPN configuration files from the isolated host, stores them in a hidden directory on the USB drive, and the data is later exfiltrated when the drive is reconnected to an online system running GoldenDealer. High-confidence behaviors reported by ESET include monitoring removable drive insertion and internet connectivity, staging base64-encoded executables from C2 for USB transfer, and using USB-mediated delivery to compromise isolated systems. GoldenDealer attempts persistence by creating a Windows service named NetDnsActivatorSharing and falls back to a Run registry key if service creation fails. It also modifies HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\ShowSuperHidden to keep hidden files from being shown in Windows Explorer. Reported working-directory artifacts include XOR-encrypted JSON configuration data and files named b8b9-de4d-3b06-9d44, fb43-138c-2eb0-c651, and 130d-1154-30ce-be1e, observed under C:\Windows\TAPI. It checks connectivity by issuing periodic GET requests to https://1.1.1.1/<user_id> and expecting a 404 response, and reported 2019 C2 infrastructure includes 83.24.9[.]124 as primary and 196.29.32[.]210 as secondary.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
During the attack on a South Asian embassy in Belarus in August 2019, the hackers used several custom tools, including GoldenDealer malware to deliver executables to the air-gapped system via USB monitoring...
Techniques & procedures
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
GoldenDealer monitors for the insertion of USB drives on those systems, and when it happens, it automatically copies itself and other malicious components onto it. | Eventually, that same USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped computer, allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
GoldenDealer monitors for the insertion of USB drives on those systems, and when it happens, it automatically copies itself and other malicious components onto it. | Eventually, that same USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped computer, allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
“GoldenDealer… watches for the insertion of a USB storage device… hide them on removable drives… And on air-gapped machines, it can retrieve additional malware from the USB and then execute it.”
allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
When the USB drive is removed from the air-gapped computer and re-connected to the original internet-connected system, GoldenDealer automatically sends the stolen data stored on the drive to the threat actor's command and control (C2) server.
Observables
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.