Sagerunex is a Windows espionage backdoor and remote access tool closely associated with the China-linked Lotus Blossom intrusion set, also tracked as Billbug, Thrip, Spring Dragon, Lotus Panda, Red Salamander, Bronze Elgin, and Raspberry Typhoon. It has been used for years as a signature malware family in long-running intelligence collection operations targeting government, defense, telecommunications, manufacturing, media, banking, energy, military, and digital certificate-related organizations, with a strong concentration on victims in Asia including the Philippines, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Sagerunex is designed for resilient post-compromise access and supports modular remote command execution, execution of programs and shell commands, loading DLLs and invoking exported functions, downloading additional payloads, and theft of local files for exfiltration. It gathers host information, stages collected material locally, and has been observed archiving data in RAR format before transmitting it over established command-and-control channels. Variants encrypt configuration, logs, and network traffic, and use HTTPS for command and control. Some samples are proxy-aware and can enumerate or discover proxy settings through multiple mechanisms, allowing the malware to maintain connectivity in enterprise environments. More recent variants have also used legitimate third-party services such as Dropbox, Twitter, and Zimbra as command-and-control tunnels, in addition to more traditional infrastructure.
Operationally, Sagerunex emphasizes stealth and persistence. It has been installed as a Windows service, including through service-related registry configuration, and has been described as capable of running in memory after DLL injection. Reported variants use token impersonation to inherit the context of the logged-in user, improving access to proxy settings, filesystem resources, and network egress while reducing conspicuous process creation. The malware also supports configurable operating time windows so activity can be limited to selected hours, helping it blend with normal user behavior. Additional evasion measures reported for the family include encrypted local state, timestamp manipulation, and code obfuscation.
Sagerunex has figured prominently in Lotus Blossom espionage campaigns involving broad network compromise, long dwell times, and follow-on use of dual-use tools for reconnaissance, lateral movement, and data theft. Its long-term exclusive association with that actor and its evolution into cloud- and service-backed command-and-control variants make it a defining component of Lotus Blossom tradecraft.
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The Sagerunex backdoor is fairly resilient and implements multiple forms of communication with its command-and-control (C&C) server.
Main Features: Sagerunex is shipped with several features, including modifying its configuration, executing commands remotely, downloading further files, or sending files to the C2. This piece of malware therefore appears as an efficient backdoor for espionage purposes.
44 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
“...Lotus Blossom (G0030), the threat actor behind the recent Notepad++ supply chain attack.”
“Tools such as WMI, PsExec, and PowerShell are used to move laterally.”
it is also possible to set up operational time windows for Sagerunex and therefore have it operate only during office hours
The tools that were reportedly used by Billbug APT are the following: ... PowerShell
Can execute cmd.exe /c %s command to gather system information
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) calls the `WaitForSingleObject` API function as part of time-check logic.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
“Tools such as WMI, PsExec, and PowerShell are used to move laterally.” / “relied heavily on legitimate administrative tools such as PsExec and PowerShell…”
it is also possible to set up operational time windows for Sagerunex and therefore have it operate only during office hours
“Persistence is typically achieved through Windows services…” / “Sagerunex… Installed as a service…” / “Hannotog… creating services…”
it is also possible to set up operational time windows for Sagerunex and therefore have it operate only during office hours
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) is designed to be dynamic link library (DLL) injected into an infected endpoint and executed directly in memory.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) finds the `explorer.exe` process after execution and uses it to change the token of its executing thread.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
“Persistence is typically achieved through Windows services…” / “Sagerunex… Installed as a service…” / “Hannotog… creating services…”
Attackers used a sophisticated loader that leverages Microsoft Warbird, an undocumented internal Windows code-protection framework. This allowed them to execute malicious shellcode while masquerading as a legitimate, Microsoft-signed binary, effectively bypassing many security solutions.
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) has used VMProtect to pack and obscure itself.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) can be passed a reference to an XOR-encrypted configuration file at runtime.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
“Service name masquerading… remain common persistence techniques.”
The sample stores configuration and state in the following file: %appdata%/microsoft/protect/windows/DMI%X.DAT
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) is designed to be dynamic link library (DLL) injected into an infected endpoint and executed directly in memory.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
The config file modification date will always be in the year 2011 – the “file last edit” year is changed by the malware to 2011.
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) finds the `explorer.exe` process after execution and uses it to change the token of its executing thread.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) uses a custom decryption routine to unpack itself during installation.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
rundll : loads a DLL and invokes a specified exported function
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) uses a "servicemain" function to verify its environment to ensure it can only be executed as a service, as well as the existence of a configuration file in a specified directory.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
“Sagerunex… configuration of custom operating time windows.”
The tools that were reportedly used by Billbug APT are the following: ... Mimikatz
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) will gather system information such as MAC and IP addresses.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
“Active Directory reconnaissance with AdFind…”
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) identifies the `explorer.exe` process on the executing system.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) gathers information from the infected system such as hostname.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
15: Get a configured file path... 18: Select a file path for commands 15 and 17.
“Sagerunex… configuration of custom operating time windows.”
The tools that were reportedly used by Billbug APT are the following: ... PsExec
11: Steal a local file (gets a file name specified in the command payload).
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) gathers host information and stages it locally as a RAR file prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025) [Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) stores logged data in an encrypted file located at `%TEMP%/TS_FB56.tmp` during execution.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
Multiple actors and tools are described as using 7-Zip/WinRAR/zip/tar/gzip/makecab/PowerShell Compress-Archive to compress (often password-protect/encrypt) collected data prior to exfiltration (e.g., “used 7zip to archive extracted data in preparation for exfiltration”, “created password-protected RAR archives prior to exfiltration”, “used built-in PowerShell capabilities (Compress-Archive cmdlet) to compress collected data”).
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) has archived collected materials in RAR format.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) communicates via HTTPS, at times using a hard-coded User Agent of `Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Win32)`.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) uses several proxy configuration settings to ensure connectivity.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
the sample will try all the following supported connection modes... HTTPS with configured proxy ... use proxy provided by WPAD ... Use proxy from ... Internet Settings\ProxyServer ... get proxy from \Mozilla\Firefox\profiles.ini
It initially attempts to connect using the system’s default WinHTTP configuration... If this attempt fails, it seems to fall back to multiple explicit proxy discovery mechanisms including WPAD, Internet Explorer, Firefox, auto-proxy, and preconfigured proxy settings.
Cisco Talos’ findings, according to which Sagerunex also leverages legitimate services such as Dropbox, Twitter, and Zimbra for C2 purposes.
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) has used virtual private servers (VPS) for command and control traffic as well as third-party cloud services in more recent variants.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) has used web services such as Twitter for command and control purposes.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
A tool called Stowaway Proxy Tool was also downloaded to victim machines.
In all cases, HTTPS is used... The network packet is composed of two parts: the header and the payload. Both are encrypted separately.
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) uses HTTPS for command and control communication.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
[Sagerunex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1210) encrypts collected system data then exfiltrates via existing command and control channels.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
The tools that were reportedly used by Billbug APT are the following: ... WinSCP
25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
31 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.