Monokle
- Type
- Spyware
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Platforms
- Android
Monokle is an Android spyware family developed by Special Technology Center, a sanctioned Russian defense contractor. It supports extensive surveillance of compromised devices, including keystroke logging, microphone and telephone-call recording with configurable audio quality, and camera-based photo and video capture. It can retrieve contacts, call history, browser history, user dictionaries, and user-defined shortcuts. Monokle can also obtain the salt associated with stored password hashes, assisting attempts to recover a device password or PIN.
Its device-profiling capabilities include enumerating installed applications, collecting manufacturer, model, and battery information, and checking whether connectivity uses Wi-Fi or mobile data. It can delete arbitrary files, remove staging artifacts, and uninstall itself, supporting operational cleanup and defense evasion.
Monokle has been linked to Russian state surveillance. In 2024, a closely related spyware implant was discovered on Russian programmer Kirill Parubets’s Android phone after authorities confiscated and returned it during his detention. That implant masqueraded as the legitimate Cube Call Recorder application. The incident demonstrates physical-custody installation of Monokle-related spyware rather than establishing a general delivery mechanism for the family.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In 2024, legal rights group Perviy Otdel (“First Department”) reported that the FSB installed Monokle, advanced Android spyware developed by sanctioned Russian defense contractor Special Technology Center, on the phone of systems analyst Kirill Parubets following his detention for donating to Ukrainian organizations.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: ... Executing shell commands
The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: ... Injection of Javascript Executing shell commands
Once the spyware is loaded onto the phone and executed, the second stage is decrypted and loaded into memory.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The sample also makes use of accessibility settings, a feature noted in the Lookout report.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The sample also makes use of accessibility settings, a feature noted in the Lookout report.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Most of the malicious functionality of the application is hidden in an encrypted second stage of the spyware. Once the spyware is loaded onto the phone and executed, the second stage is decrypted and loaded into memory.
Once the spyware is loaded onto the phone and executed, the second stage is decrypted and loaded into memory.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Our analysis confirms that the application identified by The First Department is malicious, and that it appears to be a trojanized version of the genuine Cube Call Recorder application.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: Location Tracking Screen capture Keylogging Recording calls
Gooligan steals authentication tokens that can be used to access data from multiple Google applications. RCSAndroid can collect passwords for Wi-Fi networks and online accounts, including Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Google, WhatsApp, Mail, and LinkedIn. Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Monokle checks if the device is connected via Wi-Fi or mobile data; Pegasus for Android checks if the device is on Wi-Fi, a cellular network, and is roaming; TianySpy can check to see if Wi‑Fi is enabled; TERRACOTTA can check if the active network connection is metered; TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi‑Fi connection state.
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage. BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history. CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.
The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: Location Tracking Screen capture Keylogging Recording calls
The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: ... Extracting files from the device Extracting stored passwords Reading messages from other messaging apps
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
The most compelling evidence that the app installed on the individual’s device is related to the Monokle sample from the 2019 Lookout report is the overlap in the commands issued by the command and control server
Observables
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.