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Malware2 associated actors

Monokle

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Android

Monokle is an Android spyware family developed by Special Technology Center, a sanctioned Russian defense contractor. It supports extensive surveillance of compromised devices, including keystroke logging, microphone and telephone-call recording with configurable audio quality, and camera-based photo and video capture. It can retrieve contacts, call history, browser history, user dictionaries, and user-defined shortcuts. Monokle can also obtain the salt associated with stored password hashes, assisting attempts to recover a device password or PIN.

Its device-profiling capabilities include enumerating installed applications, collecting manufacturer, model, and battery information, and checking whether connectivity uses Wi-Fi or mobile data. It can delete arbitrary files, remove staging artifacts, and uninstall itself, supporting operational cleanup and defense evasion.

Monokle has been linked to Russian state surveillance. In 2024, a closely related spyware implant was discovered on Russian programmer Kirill Parubets’s Android phone after authorities confiscated and returned it during his detention. That implant masqueraded as the legitimate Cube Call Recorder application. The incident demonstrates physical-custody installation of Monokle-related spyware rather than establishing a general delivery mechanism for the family.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FSB

In 2024, legal rights group Perviy Otdel (“First Department”) reported that the FSB installed Monokle, advanced Android spyware developed by sanctioned Russian defense contractor Special Technology Center, on the phone of systems analyst Kirill Parubets following his detention for donating to Ukrainian organizations.

via recorded future blogrecordedfuture.com
Special Technology Center

Monokle can list applications installed on the device.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: ... Executing shell commands

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: ... Injection of Javascript Executing shell commands

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

Once the spyware is loaded onto the phone and executed, the second stage is decrypted and loaded into memory.

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The sample also makes use of accessibility settings, a feature noted in the Lookout report.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The sample also makes use of accessibility settings, a feature noted in the Lookout report.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Most of the malicious functionality of the application is hidden in an encrypted second stage of the spyware. Once the spyware is loaded onto the phone and executed, the second stage is decrypted and loaded into memory.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

Once the spyware is loaded onto the phone and executed, the second stage is decrypted and loaded into memory.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassEvidence1

Our analysis confirms that the application identified by The First Department is malicious, and that it appears to be a trojanized version of the genuine Cube Call Recorder application.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: Location Tracking Screen capture Keylogging Recording calls

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Gooligan steals authentication tokens that can be used to access data from multiple Google applications. RCSAndroid can collect passwords for Wi-Fi networks and online accounts, including Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Google, WhatsApp, Mail, and LinkedIn. Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Monokle checks if the device is connected via Wi-Fi or mobile data; Pegasus for Android checks if the device is on Wi-Fi, a cellular network, and is roaming; TianySpy can check to see if Wi‑Fi is enabled; TERRACOTTA can check if the active network connection is metered; TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi‑Fi connection state.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage. BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history. CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: Location Tracking Screen capture Keylogging Recording calls

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

The second stage contains many common spyware capabilities, including: ... Extracting files from the device Extracting stored passwords Reading messages from other messaging apps

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The most compelling evidence that the app installed on the individual’s device is related to the Monokle sample from the 2019 Lookout report is the overlap in the commands issued by the command and control server

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
recorded future blogNews · Oct 15, 2026Russia Is Tightening Internet Controls, Leading to Operational RisksAdvanced Android spyware developed by Special Technology Center. The report describes its alleged installation by the FSB on a detained Russian national's phone as a precedent for domestic spyware deployment. Citizen Lab assessed that the software was likely an upgraded Monokle variant or new software reusing Monokle code.Read more ↗citizenlabNews · Dec 8, 2025Something to Remember Us By: Device Confiscated by Russian Authorities Returned with Monokle-Type Spyware Installed - The Citizen LabAdvanced mobile spyware for Android, observed here as a trojanized Cube Call Recorder app. It can track location, record calls, capture screens, log keystrokes, read messages from encrypted apps, extract files and stored passwords, execute shell commands, and add device administrator privileges. The report assesses the sample as either an updated Monokle variant or new spyware heavily reusing Monokle code.Read more ↗codebyNews · Aug 6, 2025Cellebrite взлом iPhone: техники форензик-экстракции 2026Spyware installed on an Android device after seizure by the FSB, used for surveillance of a civilian target and attributed through technical artifact analysis by Citizen Lab.Read more ↗bushidotoken blogNews · Sep 1, 2024Examining Mobile Threats from RussiaAdvanced Android spyware capable of exfiltrating data without root, leveraging accessibility services, performing AiTM attacks, searching for keywords, and recording locked screens to steal credentials. Used in highly targeted attacks.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.