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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

OATBOAT

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK3Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Platforms
Windows

OATBOAT is a Windows malware loader associated with the Iranian state-sponsored threat cluster UNC1860, which is assessed to be affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It is used in stealth-focused intrusion chains targeting high-priority networks in the Middle East, particularly government and telecommunications organizations. OATBOAT loads and executes shellcode payloads and has been observed carrying passive implants such as TOFULOAD and TOFUPIPE. In broader UNC1860 operations, these payloads support long-term covert access by relying on passive listener-style communications rather than conventional outbound command-and-control traffic, complicating network detection and enabling durable post-compromise access. OATBOAT appears in the actor’s later-stage tooling set and is part of a wider ecosystem that includes web shells, droppers, passive backdoors, and operator controllers used to establish footholds, maintain persistence, and facilitate follow-on access for other Iranian operators. Its role is best characterized as a shellcode-loading component within UNC1860’s espionage-oriented tradecraft.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ShroudedSnooper

OATBOAT ... CyveraConsole.exe_OATBOAT that contains encrypted shellcode of TOFULOAD ... OATBOAT with TOFULOAD shellcode

via contagiodump blogcontagiodump.blogspot.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595Active ScanningEvidence1

"Its job is merely to gain that initial foothold, primarily by scanning for vulnerabilities in public-facing assets at targeted organizations"

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"Stayshante, Sasheyaway, and tools like it provide its first toe in the water, and can be used to download more substantial backdoors"

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

"Because the group's implants utilize HTTPS-encrypted traffic, victims will not be able to decrypt its commands or payloads."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping3Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.