OATBOAT
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Post exploitation
- Platforms
- Windows
OATBOAT is a Windows malware loader associated with the Iranian state-sponsored threat cluster UNC1860, which is assessed to be affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It is used in stealth-focused intrusion chains targeting high-priority networks in the Middle East, particularly government and telecommunications organizations. OATBOAT loads and executes shellcode payloads and has been observed carrying passive implants such as TOFULOAD and TOFUPIPE. In broader UNC1860 operations, these payloads support long-term covert access by relying on passive listener-style communications rather than conventional outbound command-and-control traffic, complicating network detection and enabling durable post-compromise access. OATBOAT appears in the actor’s later-stage tooling set and is part of a wider ecosystem that includes web shells, droppers, passive backdoors, and operator controllers used to establish footholds, maintain persistence, and facilitate follow-on access for other Iranian operators. Its role is best characterized as a shellcode-loading component within UNC1860’s espionage-oriented tradecraft.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
OATBOAT ... CyveraConsole.exe_OATBOAT that contains encrypted shellcode of TOFULOAD ... OATBOAT with TOFULOAD shellcode
Techniques & procedures
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
"Its job is merely to gain that initial foothold, primarily by scanning for vulnerabilities in public-facing assets at targeted organizations"
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
"Stayshante, Sasheyaway, and tools like it provide its first toe in the water, and can be used to download more substantial backdoors"
"Because the group's implants utilize HTTPS-encrypted traffic, victims will not be able to decrypt its commands or payloads."
Observables
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.