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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 2 actors

SASHEYAWAY

SASHEYAWAY is a dropper associated with the Iranian state-sponsored threat actor UNC1860, which Mandiant assesses is likely affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). It is used after initial access is obtained, typically alongside the STAYSHANTE web shell, in intrusion chains targeting high-priority networks in the Middle East, especially government and telecommunications organizations. Reporting also links SASHEYAWAY-related activity to Israeli incidents involving wiper operations, where listed indicators included STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY, although Mandiant states UNC1860 is attributed to the access-enabling tooling rather than the destructive actions themselves. SASHEYAWAY is described as having a low detection rate and as leading to execution of embedded implants, including TEMPLEDOOR, FACEFACE, and SPARKLOAD. It is part of UNC1860’s broader tradecraft of exploiting vulnerable internet-facing systems, deploying web shells and droppers, and then installing stealthier passive implants to maintain access and facilitate follow-on operations by other MOIS-associated actors. High-confidence aliases in the provided content only identify this malware as SASHEYAWAY.

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For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC1860

Web shells like STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY are frequently deployed after initial access is achieved.

via contagiodump blogcontagiodump.blogspot.com
Scarred Manticore

ShroudedSnooper built a sprawling toolkit of passive backdoors and web shells — including the LionTail framework, TEMPLEDOOR, SASHEYAWAY, and a repurposed Windows kernel driver derived from Iranian antivirus software — designed to sustain long-term, low-visibility access.

via trellix blogtrellix.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595Active ScanningEvidence1

"Its job is merely to gain that initial foothold, primarily by scanning for vulnerabilities in public-facing assets at targeted organizations"

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence2

Web shells like STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY are frequently deployed after initial access is achieved. These shells enable further persistence by deploying full passive backdoors, such as TEMPLEDOOR and FACEFACE, which can execute commands, transfer files, and interact with system services.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"Stayshante, Sasheyaway, and tools like it provide its first toe in the water, and can be used to download more substantial backdoors"

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.