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Malware1 associated actor

GoldenHowl

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs3Tracked

GoldenHowl is a modular Python backdoor used by the GoldenJackal cyberespionage group in operations against government and diplomatic targets, including a South Asian embassy in Belarus in 2019. It was delivered to air-gapped systems via compromised USB drives by the GoldenDealer malware, alongside the GoldenRobo file stealer. GoldenHowl is described as a multi-functional backdoor with modules for file theft and exfiltration, file upload/download, file listing, writing files, persistence, SSH command execution, IP and port scanning, SSH tunneling, and SOCKS proxying. Persistence is achieved via a scheduled task named Microsoft\Windows\Multimedia\SystemSoundsService2. ESET reported that GoldenHowl was distributed as a self-extracting archive containing legitimate Python 2.7.15 binaries renamed as WinAeroModule.exe together with malicious scripts, and that it decrypts configuration data using Fernet with the hardcoded key _ylmUTbqcx6FxMZ5ZvNxDQZYuNh41yxhKcPJLzxgqEY=. Its transport_http module communicated over HTTPS with command-and-control infrastructure observed at 83.24.9[.]124 on port 443 using URLs of the form https://<server_address>:<server_port>/<client_id>/. ESET also noted the term transport_http overlaps with terminology seen in Turla- and MoustachedBouncer-linked tooling, but treated that only as a low-confidence attribution clue. GoldenHowl formed part of GoldenJackal’s older USB-based air-gap bridging toolset, whose apparent objective was theft of confidential information from high-value, potentially isolated systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GoldenJackal

During the attack on a South Asian embassy in Belarus in August 2019, the hackers used several custom tools, including GoldenDealer malware to deliver executables to the air-gapped system via USB monitoring, the GoldenHowl backdoor...

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Eventually, that same USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped computer, allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.006PythonEvidence1

GoldenHowl is a multi-functional Python backdoor that can steal files, facilitate persistence, scan for vulnerabilities, and communicate directly with the C2.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Eventually, that same USB drive is inserted into an air-gapped computer, allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1092Communication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

“GoldenDealer… watches for the insertion of a USB storage device… hide them on removable drives… And on air-gapped machines, it can retrieve additional malware from the USB and then execute it.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

allowing GoldenDealer to install GoldenHowl (a backdoor) and GoldenRobo (a file stealer) onto these isolated systems

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.