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LONEFLEET is a deceptive installer used in an Iran-aligned cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC2428 in October 2024, targeting Israeli organizations. Distributed via a fake recruitment process impersonating Israeli defense contractor Rafael, LONEFLEET presents a GUI to collect personal information and resumes from victims, thereby lowering suspicion. Upon execution, it launches the MURKYTOUR backdoor as a background process via a launcher named LEAFPILE. The campaign demonstrates advanced social engineering and operational security, leveraging GUIs to disguise malicious activity. LONEFLEET is directly associated with credential harvesting and initial access operations in support of Iranian intelligence objectives, with overlaps to activity attributed to the Black Shadow group, which is linked to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
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