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Malware2 associated actors3 associated CVEs

MacMa

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK45Techniques
IOCs32Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Watering holeDrive byFake update
Platforms
macOS
Also known asDazzleSpyOSX.CDDS

MacMa, also known as OSX.CDDS, is a macOS backdoor used for cyberespionage and surveillance. It supports device fingerprinting, username collection, keylogging, arbitrary command execution, screen and audio capture, and bidirectional file transfer. It can stage collected files locally before exfiltrating them through its command-and-control channel. Its communications use a custom JSON-based protocol with TLS encryption. MacMa establishes persistence through LaunchAgents configured to execute at login and can modify file timestamps for defense evasion. Some variants restrict execution to graphical user sessions.

MacMa has been deployed through watering-hole attacks involving pro-democracy websites in China. These infection chains exploited CVE-2021-1789 in WebKit for initial code execution and CVE-2021-30869 for elevation to root privileges. In mid-2023, StormBamboo, also known as Evasive Panda, delivered MacMa to macOS systems at organizations in Asia by compromising an internet service provider and poisoning DNS responses. This redirected insecure HTTP software-update requests to malicious installers, exploiting update mechanisms that did not validate installer signatures and requiring no user interaction. Despite overlapping targeting and exploitation techniques, MacMa and DazzleSpy are distinct malware families with different codebases and payload structures.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-30869via symantec blogExploited in the wildApple XNU Type Confusion Local Privilege EscalationUsers of macOS devices were targeted with a privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2021-30869), which allowed the attackers to install Macma on vulnerable systems.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-1789via malwarebytes labsExploited in the wildWebKit JavaScriptCore Type Confusion Leading to Arbitrary Code ExecutionDazzleSpy, a piece of malware that attacks macOS, was discovered last fall by researchers at ESET... The new malware got a foothold via CVE-2021-1789... exploits CVE-2021-30869 to gain root privileges... That payload is a very full-featured backdoor, providing the attacker the capability to run any arbitrary command on the infected Mac, start a remote screen viewing session, download files from the Mac, steal the keychain, send synthetic mouse clicks, etc. | The new malware got a foothold via CVE-2021-1789, exploited via a JavaScript file named mac.js loaded by the malicious site. This led to the in-memory execution of native Mac code, which exploits CVE-2021-30869 to gain root privileges.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-8526via eset welivesecurity blogExploited in the wildUse-after-free privilege escalation in macOSkeychain: Dumps the keychain using a CVE-2019-8526 exploit if the macOS version is lower than 10.14.4. The public KeySteal implementation is used.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Daggerfly

MACMA is able to perform device fingerprinting, keylogging, executing commands, screen and audio capture, and uploading/downloading files.

via imda singaporeimda.gov.sg
APT (unnamed; reported by Google TAG)

Google labelled the backdoor “Macma”… Objective-See (under the name “OSX.CDDS”)… we take a deeper dive into macOS.Macma…

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

45 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

It infected machines using a combination of two vulnerabilities, one in WebKit (the framework that powers Safari) and one in macOS (a privilege escalation vulnerability). | DazzleSpy, according to the researchers at ESET, was being spread via watering hole attacks via pro-democracy websites in China.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

StormBamboo targets software updates via HTTP that do not validate digital signatures of installers.

T1659Content InjectionEvidence1

StormBamboo controlled DNS responses and redirected HTTP software-update requests to an attacker-controlled server hosting a forged text file and malicious installer.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

That payload is a very full-featured backdoor, providing the attacker the capability to run any arbitrary command on the infected Mac.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can execute supplied shell commands and uses bash scripts to perform additional actions.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has used macOS API functions to perform tasks.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3

The advisory maps StormBamboo's compromise of insecure automatic update mechanisms to T1203.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence6

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) installs a `com.apple.softwareupdate.plist` file in the `/LaunchAgents` folder with the `RunAtLoad` value set to `true`. Upon user login, [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is executed from `/var/root/.local/softwareupdate` with root privileges. Some variations also include the `LimitLoadToSessionType` key with the value `Aqua`, ensuring the [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) only runs when there is a logged in GUI user.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1546.016Installer PackagesEvidence1

The attacker-controlled server hosted a malicious installer, and the installer eventually downloaded either MGBot malware for Windows or MACMA for macOS.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The items you’re most likely to see are: /var/root/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist ... However, it’s also possible the malware could get dropped into the user folder, in which case you’ll see these paths instead: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

This led to the in-memory execution of native Mac code, which exploits CVE-2021-30869 to gain root privileges.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence6

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) installs a `com.apple.softwareupdate.plist` file in the `/LaunchAgents` folder with the `RunAtLoad` value set to `true`. Upon user login, [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) is executed from `/var/root/.local/softwareupdate` with root privileges. Some variations also include the `LimitLoadToSessionType` key with the value `Aqua`, ensuring the [MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) only runs when there is a logged in GUI user.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1546.016Installer PackagesEvidence1

The attacker-controlled server hosted a malicious installer, and the installer eventually downloaded either MGBot malware for Windows or MACMA for macOS.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The items you’re most likely to see are: /var/root/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist ... However, it’s also possible the malware could get dropped into the user folder, in which case you’ll see these paths instead: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.softwareupdate.plist

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the RunAtLoad key-value pair set to true, ensuring the com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist file runs every time a user logs in. Komplex creates a persistent launch agent called ... com.apple.updates.plist. MacMa installs a com.apple.softwareupdate.plist file in the /LaunchAgents folder.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can delete itself from the compromised computer.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence5

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has the capability to create and modify file timestamps.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) decrypts a downloaded file using AES-128-EBC with a custom delta.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1553.001Gatekeeper BypassEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has removed the `com.apple.quarantineattribute` from the dropped file, `$TMPDIR/airportpaird`.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence5

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has been delivered using ad hoc Apple Developer code signing certificates.(Citation: SentinelOne Macma 2021)

T1685.006Clear Linux or Mac System LogsEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can clear possible malware traces such as application logs.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

That payload is a very full-featured backdoor, providing the attacker the capability to... send synthetic mouse clicks...

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can use Core Graphics Event Taps to intercept user keystrokes from any text input field and saves them to text files. Text input fields include Spotlight, Finder, Safari, Mail, Messages, and other apps that have text fields for passwords.(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne MacMa Nov 2021)

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Browser cookies and data are encoded with base64 and exfiltrated to a Google Drive using AES encryption.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

That payload is a very full-featured backdoor, providing the attacker the capability to... steal the keychain...

T1555.001KeychainEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can dump credentials from the macOS keychain.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

malware authors are known to target exfiltrating the keychain database. Recent examples include DazzleSpy and ... KeySteal.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can collect IP addresses from a compromised host.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence8

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can collect the username from the compromised machine.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can enumerate running processes.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence11

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can collect information about a compromised computer, including: Hardware UUID, Mac serial number, and macOS version.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can search for a specific file on the compromised computer and can enumerate files in Desktop, Downloads, and Documents folders.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can collect information about a compromised computer's disk sizes.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can manage remote screen sessions.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence7

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can collect then exfiltrate files from the compromised system.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

That payload is a very full-featured backdoor, providing the attacker the capability to... send synthetic mouse clicks...

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) can use Core Graphics Event Taps to intercept user keystrokes from any text input field and saves them to text files. Text input fields include Spotlight, Finder, Safari, Mail, Messages, and other apps that have text fields for passwords.(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne MacMa Nov 2021)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence5

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has used Apple’s Core Graphic APIs, such as `CGWindowListCreateImageFromArray`, to capture the user's screen and open windows.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has the ability to record audio.(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

"UserAgent 2021... along with some added AV capture capabilities."

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The attacker redirects the HTTP request to a Command and Control (C2) server they control hosting a forged text file and a malicious installer.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has used a custom JSON-based protocol for its C&C communications.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has downloaded additional files, including an exploit for used privilege escalation.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)(Citation: Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

That payload is a very full-featured backdoor, providing the attacker the capability to run any arbitrary command on the infected Mac, start a remote screen viewing session...

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence4

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has used TCP port 5633 for C2 Communication.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence6

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) has used TLS encryption to initialize a custom protocol for C2 communications.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“KV Botnet Activity… subsequent negotiation stages that represent a form of handshake similar to TLS negotiation… MacMa has used TLS encryption to initialize a custom protocol for C2 communications.”

T1659Content InjectionEvidence1

StormBamboo controlled DNS responses and redirected HTTP software-update requests to an attacker-controlled server hosting a forged text file and malicious installer.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

[MacMa](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1016) exfiltrates data from a supplied path over its C2 channel.(Citation: ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

32 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching32Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping45Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.