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Mallory
Malware

Joker

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 20 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs156Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Android
Also known asBread

Joker, also known as Bread, is an Android spyware and billing-fraud malware family active since at least 2017. It is distributed through seemingly legitimate applications, particularly on Google Play, including wallpaper tools, messaging apps, games, and other utilities. Infected applications may retain their advertised functionality while covertly subscribing users to premium services or sending premium-rate SMS messages. Joker also collects and exfiltrates SMS messages, contacts, and device information.

Joker automates premium subscription workflows through background web interactions, JavaScript injection, form submission, and interception of SMS authorization codes. Variants abuse notification-listener access to extract verification codes without directly requesting SMS-reading permission and can suppress notifications to conceal fraudulent activity. Command-and-control servers supply subscription instructions and dynamically executed code over HTTP. Activation commonly depends on SIM mobile country codes or operator information, allowing campaigns to selectively target subscribers across multiple countries.

The family uses multistage payload delivery and dynamic loading of DEX and JAR components. Evasion techniques include encrypted configuration data, string obfuscation, commercial Android packers, native code, reflection, and Base64-encoded payloads embedded within application metadata or classes. Some variants retrieve malicious components only after receiving server-side activation instructions, limiting exposure during application review. Joker's code and delivery mechanisms have changed repeatedly across campaigns.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malware also receives dynamic code and commands over HTTP and runs that code via JavaScript-to-Java callbacks.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Because it implements a JS bridge with JavascriptInterface, it has the ability to run JS code. The commands are passed from the C&C.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

To realize the ability of subscribing app users to premium services without their knowledge or consent, the Joker utilized two main components – the Notification Listener service that is part of the original application...

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

It continues to find new tricks and tactics to stay undetected by doing small changes in its code or changing the payload download techniques.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

we recently noticed a new Joker malware sample on Google Play Store, which utilizes Android packers like “Tencent’s Legu” and “ijiami” packers to evade detection

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Users may be unaware of any compromise at first glance because the Joker malware sample is contained in a functioning app. The app promises wallpapers and delivers on that promise — the malware is an unfortunate add-on.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

GolayEngine.lay() decrypts the 308KB payload via ChaCha20 -> GolayEngine.vcg() executes it

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware only attacks targeted countries... the victim has to be using a SIM card from one of these countries in order to receive the second stage payload... most of the discovered apps have an additional check, which will make sure that the payload won’t execute when running within the US or Canada.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

the actors seem to be seeking a new and effective method to hide the malware’s payload... Another notable change is that the malware now hides everything valuable, such as the fraud URL, on C&C servers.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

In this case, all that was needed for the malicious code to run was to read the strings, decode them from Base64, and load it with reflection.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

it subscribes users to a WAP service without their knowledge

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

and android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE to get the SIM mobile country code. Joker is known to only run on devices with a SIM card (and only for specific SIM country codes).

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware only attacks targeted countries... the victim has to be using a SIM card from one of these countries in order to receive the second stage payload... most of the discovered apps have an additional check, which will make sure that the payload won’t execute when running within the US or Canada.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

This malware attempts to steal SMS messages, contacts from the victim’s device

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

it subscribes users to a WAP service without their knowledge

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

The final important thing worth mentioning about the Joker is the phone book contact list theft. The core component collects all numbers in the contact list and sends them over to the C&C in an encrypted form.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

The commands are passed from the C&C. Some of the possible commands: ... get – Send a GET request ... post – Send a POST request

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

AbstractEmu can use HTTP to communicate with the C2 server; AhRat can communicate with the C2 using HTTPS requests; BRATA can use both HTTP and WebSockets to communicate with the C2 server; LightSpy has used both HTTPS and Websockets to communicate with the C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Originally, the code that was responsible for communicating with the C&C and downloading the dynamic dex file was located inside the main classes.dex file, but now the functionality of the original classes.dex file includes loading the new payload.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

submitForm - Submit form data via post request to C&C

Indicators of compromise

Observables

156 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

40 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching156Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.