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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Kuiper

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-26855via stairwellProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerOn 1 December 2023, Stairwell researchers acquired a copy of a server believed to be operated by the developers of the Kuiper ransomware... The Kuiper ransomware was first observed in September 2023, the same month they launched their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-37085via microsoft security blogAuthentication Bypass in VMware ESXi Active Directory Integration"...others support or sell ESXi encryptors like Akira, Black Basta, Babuk, Lockbit, and Kuiper."View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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RobinHood

The Golang-based Kuiper ransomware is presented as an opportunity for other criminals to make money by ransoming one or more targets.

via trellix othertrellix.com
Storm-1175

"...others support or sell ESXi encryptors like Akira, Black Basta, Babuk, Lockbit, and Kuiper."

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
Storm-0506

"...others support or sell ESXi encryptors like Akira, Black Basta, Babuk, Lockbit, and Kuiper."

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
Scattered Spider

"...others support or sell ESXi encryptors like Akira, Black Basta, Babuk, Lockbit, and Kuiper."

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
INDRIK SPIDER

"...others support or sell ESXi encryptors like Akira, Black Basta, Babuk, Lockbit, and Kuiper."

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

2 techniques
T1590.005IP AddressesEvidence1

T1590.005 Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses Gets the current IP address from the list of network interfaces from the machine, using a minor blocklist to avoid selecting the wrong address

T1595.001Scanning IP BlocksEvidence1

T1595.001 Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks Iterates over the last octet of the current IP to see if the SMB share is open and writable, allowing the malware to spread itself

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

RobinHood stands out as a dual-role threat actor... operating the KUIPER RaaS program targeting Windows, Linux, ESXi, NAS, MacOS, and FreeBSD.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell Example command: - Starts with “powershell.exe -ep bypass -w hidden -enc” followed by a space and the encoded command

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell Example command: - Starts with “cmd.exe /c” followed by a space and the command to execute (i.e. “shutdown /r /t 8”)

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell Example command: - Starts with “/bin/bash -c” followed by a space and the command to execute (i.e. “reboot”)

T1106Native APIEvidence1

T1106 Native API Example command: - WDEnable

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Example command: - reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersionWinlogon" /t REG_SZ /v Shell /d "C:\Users\Public\safemode.exe" /f

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Example command: - reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersionWinlogon" /t REG_SZ /v Shell /d "C:\Users\Public\safemode.exe" /f

Stealth

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Tries to bypass using: - Iterating over an empty loop - Trying to read “C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe”

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

T1057 Process Discovery - Uses “taskkill” to loop and terminate targeted processes

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Tries to bypass using: - Iterating over an empty loop - Trying to read “C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe”

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

The most common access type was RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol), appearing in 59 listings... By late 2023, VPN access listings had grown significantly, reflecting a shift in attack methodology.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Example command: - “wmic /node: process call create”

T1021.004SSHEvidence1

SSH access, virtually absent in 2022, appeared in nine listings during Q2-Q3 2023 — mostly from sellers “xss_0x2” (12 SSH listings total) and “dayone31337_blardo” (4 SSH listings for Chinese and Korean targets).

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

T1489Service StopEvidence1

T1489 Service Stop Example command: - “net stop” followed by the service name

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Example commands: - bcdedit /set {default} BootStatusPolicy IgnoreAllFailures - bcdedit /set {default} RecoveryEnabled No - vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet - wbadmin delete catalog -quiet - wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot Example commands: - reboot - shutdown /r /t 8

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.