GSocket, also known as Global Socket, is an open-source networking and remote-access framework that threat actors abuse as a backdoor. Designed to traverse NAT and firewall boundaries, it establishes outbound connections to public relay infrastructure, enabling encrypted remote access and reverse shells without requiring inbound connectivity. Malicious deployments are documented on Linux servers and macOS systems; GSocket itself is a legitimate dual-use tool rather than an exclusively malicious malware family.
Attackers deploy GSocket after compromising internet-facing applications, web servers, and containers. Observed persistence mechanisms include shell startup modifications, scheduled cron execution, and macOS LaunchAgents. Deployments conceal activity through kernel-thread-like process names, hidden storage locations, timestamp manipulation, and suppression of command history. Some operators additionally use modified system utilities to hide GSocket-related processes and connections.
GSocket has been used in LABRAT, ExCobalt-associated intrusions, Feral Wolf attacks, and the REF6138 Linux campaign. A modified version is also installed by ClickLock Stealer following ClickFix-style phishing against macOS users. That component masquerades as Apple-related software and preserves reverse-shell access after the information-stealing modules remove themselves. Credential and wallet theft in those infections belongs to ClickLock's other components, not to an established native GSocket capability.
5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
SHA-256 d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa GSocket reverse shell
A malicious downloaded payload installed gsocket as /usr/bin/gs-dbus; another installation copied gs-netcat from /dev/shm.
Modified ps and htop hide an active core process of the gsocket module and related processes in terminal output.
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The attackers deployed or downloaded GSOCKET, pspy64, whatserver.sh, and likely Ligolo-ng.
The third backdoor is by using a webshell of tmate[.]io... TeamTNT is utilizing this tool as a backdoor. The fourth backdoor is by utilizing a socket connected over HTTP service with Ngrok product.
Этот компонент предоставляет атакующим реверс-шелл и закрепляется через LaunchAgent, cron и конфигурационные шелл-файлы.
With command execution via PostgreSQL, Feral Wolf installed GSocket and configured it to start automatically ... var\spool\cron\postgres, a job added to crontab.
Feral Wolf used command execution within the compromised Confluence Docker container to deploy the GSocket utility.
The attacker used the www-data account to download a script named 00.sh; subsequent payloads were executed with sh -c, wget, chmod, and bash.
Этот компонент предоставляет атакующим реверс-шелл и закрепляется через LaunchAgent, cron и конфигурационные шелл-файлы.
With command execution via PostgreSQL, Feral Wolf installed GSocket and configured it to start automatically ... var\spool\cron\postgres, a job added to crontab.
The third backdoor is by using a webshell of tmate[.]io... TeamTNT is utilizing this tool as a backdoor. The fourth backdoor is by utilizing a socket connected over HTTP service with Ngrok product.
To ensure their access survived server reboots, file deletions, or malware cleanups, they established an hourly cron job
If the user cancels, the script writes two LaunchAgents and quits quietly. On the next login, one module kills every visible app every 210 milliseconds.
To ensure that GSocket starts automatically, the threat actor modified .profile.
Этот компонент предоставляет атакующим реверс-шелл и закрепляется через LaunchAgent, cron и конфигурационные шелл-файлы.
With command execution via PostgreSQL, Feral Wolf installed GSocket and configured it to start automatically ... var\spool\cron\postgres, a job added to crontab.
If the user cancels, the script writes two LaunchAgents and quits quietly. On the next login, one module kills every visible app every 210 milliseconds.
To ensure that GSocket starts automatically, the threat actor modified .profile.
RUDEDEVIL configuration blobs and custom apache2 strings are XOR-encoded; the GSOCKET cron payload is Base64-encoded.
The attackers used exec -a to modify the displayed process name, disguising it as a Linux kernel thread.
GSOCKET executes with exec -a [process_name], masquerading as kernel processes including [raid5wq] and [mm_percpu_wq].
On macOS, the binary is disguised as iCloud within ~/Library/Application Support/iCloudsync, with the process masquerading as SystemUIServerl.
00.sh deletes log files and execution traces; downloaded l64 and l86 payloads are removed after execution.
After installation, GSOCKET ensures that all files created or modified are timestomped to erase traces of installation.
RUDEDEVIL decrypts its configuration blobs during execution, and GSOCKET's Base64 command is decoded before persistence execution.
GSOCKET creates /dev/shm/.gs-1000; KAIJI creates hidden artifacts such as /dev/.img, /dev/.old, and /.img.
public IP (via ifconfig.me)
The script collects a system fingerprint including username
The script collects a system fingerprint including username, macOS version, CPU, RAM, disk size, and public IP
SSH from Workstation B to Workstation A through any firewall/NAT $ gsocket /usr/sbin/sshd # Workstation A $ gsocket ssh root@gsocket # Workstation B
Talos is also aware of the widespread in-the-wild active exploitation of three vulnerabilities in unpatched Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager infrastructure (CVE-2026-20133, CVE-2026-20128, and CVE-2026-20122) that, when chained together, can allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to gain access to the device.
allowing attackers to gain persistent remote access to compromised devices by compressing collected data into ZIP archives and exfiltrating it through the Telegram Bot API.
Numerous new tools have been used to support command and control (C2) and stealth. These include publicly available tools like Nezha... and GSocket, which allows workstations on different private networks to connect and bypass firewalls.
Payloads are transferred through HTTP wget/curl requests; the gambling automation script uses HTTP GET and POST requests; Telegram communication uses POST requests.
Access entirety of Workstation A's private LAN (Sock4/4a/5 proxy) $ gs-netcat -l -S # Workstation A (EXIT) $ gs-netcat -p 1080 # Workstation B
Uses the Global Socket Relay Network to connect TCP pipes... Once connected the library then negotiates a secure TLS connection(End-2-End).
GSOCKET supports Telegram webhooks, and a second-stage script sends command output to a Telegram chat bot.
The actors repeatedly downloaded scripts and binaries with wget and curl, including KAIJI, RUDEDEVIL, GSOCKET, XMRIG, pspy64, and custom payloads.
The fourth installed GSocket, an open-source reverse-shell tool reused with roughly 80% of its original code, disguised on macOS as an iCloud process.
GSOCKET was used to establish covert channels back to C2 servers and supports encrypted communications through its relay network.
The attackers utilized GSOCKET for encrypted communication, disguised as kernel processes.
GSOCKET creates secure persistent connections through the Global Socket Relay Network and includes AES-256 encryption.
This makes it look exactly like a native, essential Linux kernel thread, tricking system administrators into ignoring it while it keeps an encrypted outbound data tunnel open to the hacker's command center.
immediately sends them to the attackers through Telegram... exfiltrating it through the Telegram Bot API.
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
30 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.