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Malware1 associated actor

FACEFACE

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK3Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitation
Platforms
Windows

FACEFACE is a passive backdoor associated with the Iranian state-sponsored threat cluster UNC1860, which is assessed to be affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and active against government and telecommunications networks across the Middle East. It is part of a broader UNC1860 toolchain built to establish stealthy, long-term access after exploitation of internet-facing systems and deployment of intermediary web shells or droppers such as SASHEYAWAY and STAYSHANTE.

FACEFACE is described as a more substantial follow-on implant that can be deployed from UNC1860 staging components. Its documented functionality includes remote command execution, file transfer, and interaction with system services, placing it among the actor’s main post-compromise access mechanisms. UNC1860’s operational model emphasizes passive implants that minimize or avoid conventional outbound command-and-control traffic, a tradecraft pattern intended to reduce network-detection opportunities and support covert persistence in high-value environments.

FACEFACE appears in intrusion chains where UNC1860 first gains access by exploiting vulnerable public-facing servers, then installs web shells or droppers, and subsequently deploys passive backdoors for durable access and possible handoff to other operators. Reporting on UNC1860 indicates overlap and possible collaboration with other MOIS-linked groups, including APT34, and suggests the actor may function as an initial access provider within the Iranian cyber ecosystem. FACEFACE therefore fits into a broader espionage-oriented intrusion framework focused on persistence, stealth, and enabling downstream operations in strategically important regional networks.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ShroudedSnooper

These shells enable further persistence by deploying full passive backdoors, such as TEMPLEDOOR and FACEFACE, which can execute commands, transfer files, and interact with system services.

via contagiodump blogcontagiodump.blogspot.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595Active ScanningEvidence1

"Its job is merely to gain that initial foothold, primarily by scanning for vulnerabilities in public-facing assets at targeted organizations"

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

Web shells like STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY are frequently deployed after initial access is achieved. These shells enable further persistence by deploying full passive backdoors, such as TEMPLEDOOR and FACEFACE, which can execute commands, transfer files, and interact with system services.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

UNC1860 relies on custom-made passive backdoors like TOFULOAD and WINTAPIX, which leverage undocumented Input/Output Control (IOCTL) commands for communication, bypassing standard detection mechanisms used by EDR systems. These implants operate without initiating outbound traffic, making them difficult to detect through traditional network monitoring tools.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping3Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.