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Mallory
Malware2 associated CVEs

perfctl

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK47Techniques
IOCs65Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-4034via aquasec otherExploited in the wildPwnKitIt attempts to exploit the Polkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) to escalate privileges... The malware contains an exploit to CVE-2021-4034, which it is trying to run in order to gain root privilege on the server. | The community has widely referred to it as the “perfctl malware,” and we have adopted this name. ... It utilizes rootkits to hide its presence ... It opens a backdoor on the server and listens for TOR communications ... It attempts to exploit the Polkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) to escalate privileges.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-33246via aquasec otherExploited in the wildRemote Command Execution in Apache RocketMQ Update Configuration FunctionAppendix 1: Initial Access CVE-2023-33246 is a vulnerability found in RocketMQ... The initial access was gained via this vulnerability (CVE-2023-33246), led to download and execution of the shell script rconf. | The community has widely referred to it as the “perfctl malware,” and we have adopted this name. ... It utilizes rootkits to hide its presence ... It opens a backdoor on the server and listens for TOR communications ... It attempts to exploit the Polkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) to escalate privileges.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595Active ScanningEvidence1

Network IOCs ... 211.234.111.116 Used by the attacker for scanning and exploiting external services

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

It also exploits exposed Portainer agents ... It may backdoor existing account on the server to enable SSH access

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

After exploiting a vulnerability (as in our case) or a misconfiguration, the main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

use services and cron job for persistence ... /etc/cron.d/perfclean used in main.CronSystemWideCrond

T1053.006Systemd TimersEvidence1

IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd timer persistence file

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The initial access was gained via this vulnerability (CVE-2023-33246), led to download and execution of the shell script rconf.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

led to download and execution of the shell script rconf

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

the now relatively documented perfctl malware ... is able to hide many of its actions via a LD_PRELOAD library injection

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

The rootkit is using LD_PRELOAD to load itself before other libraries.

T1609Container Administration CommandEvidence1

the endpoint https://TARGET:9001/containers/NAME/exec could be used to exec commands and so on

T1610Deploy ContainerEvidence1

This containerd service is then used to launch several ProxyJacking containers such as: bitping/bitpingd repocket/repocket earnfm/earnfm-client iproyal/pawns-cli

Persistence

12 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

The attacker modifies the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment during user login. This script is designed to execute the malware first, followed by the legitimate workload expected to run on the server.

T1053.003CronEvidence1

use services and cron job for persistence ... /etc/cron.d/perfclean used in main.CronSystemWideCrond

T1053.006Systemd TimersEvidence1

IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd timer persistence file

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence3

By placing their public keys in the authorized_keys file, attackers can gain access without requiring further authentication if the private key is in their possession.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

It also exploits exposed Portainer agents ... It may backdoor existing account on the server to enable SSH access

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

If you try downloading the .php file without a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. But if you use the correct user agent it will drop the malware.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

The binary wizlmsh is dropped to /usr/bin ... It is a very small binary (12kb), that runs as a service in the background.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd service persistence file

T1543.005Container ServiceEvidence1

The attacker also installs a docker service in order to run ProxyJacking containers ... launching a script for installing a custom containerd service

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

/.config/cron/perfcc used in main.AddToProfile

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols. Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate.

Privilege Escalation

12 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

The attacker modifies the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment during user login. This script is designed to execute the malware first, followed by the legitimate workload expected to run on the server.

T1053.003CronEvidence1

use services and cron job for persistence ... /etc/cron.d/perfclean used in main.CronSystemWideCrond

T1053.006Systemd TimersEvidence1

IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd timer persistence file

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The ability to evade detection through stealthy techniques — like kernel-level exploitation — adds to the challenge.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.

T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysEvidence3

By placing their public keys in the authorized_keys file, attackers can gain access without requiring further authentication if the private key is in their possession.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

The binary wizlmsh is dropped to /usr/bin ... It is a very small binary (12kb), that runs as a service in the background.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd service persistence file

T1543.005Container ServiceEvidence1

The attacker also installs a docker service in order to run ProxyJacking containers ... launching a script for installing a custom containerd service

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence1

/.config/cron/perfcc used in main.AddToProfile

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

It attempts to exploit the Polkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) to escalate privileges.

T1611Escape to HostEvidence1

ATT&CK Techniques used ... Privilege escalation Escape to Host T1611

Stealth

11 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence2

It utilizes rootkits to hide its presence.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

This technique is called ‘process masquerading’ or ‘process replacement’ ... The new Httpd binary is now saved in the /tmp directory under the name of the process that executed it sh in our case.

T1036.006Space after FilenameEvidence1

Make a copy of /bin/dash as /usr/sbin/nologin (with a trailing space) ... Add a space at the end of news line in /etc/passwd

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After execution, it deletes its binary and continues to run quietly in the background as a service.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

If you try downloading the .php file without a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. But if you use the correct user agent it will drop the malware.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

They drop a few legitimate utilities such as ldd. These utilities were modified to hide specific attack elements.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the script continues with a simple if condition, that will ensure that the targeted attacked server OS architecture is x86_64.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The rootkit has several purposes. One of the main purposes is to hook various functions and modify their functionality.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

it blocks the listing and reading of any folder / filename containing one of the following terms: .xdiag;.perf.c;.dmesg;perfctl;perfcc;libgcwrap.so

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

The rootkit is using LD_PRELOAD to load itself before other libraries.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols. Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The malware is also running various operations such as shutting down security controls

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

The attacker collected shell histories, configuration files and command lines possibly containing sensitive information

T1552.003Shell HistoryEvidence1

The attacker collected shell histories

T1552.007Container APIEvidence1

the secrets of the docker swarm may be retrieved by the following query ... https://TARGET:9001/secrets

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols. Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The machine is fingerprinted by various commands such as uname -a

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

we identified a very long list of almost 20K directory traversal fuzzing list, seeking for mistakenly exposed configuration files and secrets.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the script continues with a simple if condition, that will ensure that the targeted attacked server OS architecture is x86_64.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The attacker collected shell histories, configuration files and command lines possibly containing sensitive information

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

ATT&CK Techniques used ... Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

the main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

It utilizes Unix socket for internal communication and TOR for external communication.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

As part of its command-and-control operation, the malware opens a Unix socket

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After exploiting a vulnerability ... the main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

If you try downloading the .php file without a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. But if you use the correct user agent it will drop the malware.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

It opens a backdoor on the server and listens for TOR communications.

Impact

3 techniques
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

The main impact of the attack is resource hijacking. In all cases we observed a monero cryptominer (XMRIG) executed and exhausting the server’s CPU resources.

T1496.001Compute HijackingEvidence1

It is a Linux Malware used for monetization of compromised computers by CryptoJacking

T1496.002Bandwidth HijackingEvidence1

It is a Linux Malware used for monetization of compromised computers by CryptoJacking and ProxyJacking

Indicators of compromise

Observables

65 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching65Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping47Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.