2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
47 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Network IOCs ... 211.234.111.116 Used by the attacker for scanning and exploiting external services
This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.
It also exploits exposed Portainer agents ... It may backdoor existing account on the server to enable SSH access
After exploiting a vulnerability (as in our case) or a misconfiguration, the main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker.
use services and cron job for persistence ... /etc/cron.d/perfclean used in main.CronSystemWideCrond
IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd timer persistence file
The initial access was gained via this vulnerability (CVE-2023-33246), led to download and execution of the shell script rconf.
led to download and execution of the shell script rconf
the now relatively documented perfctl malware ... is able to hide many of its actions via a LD_PRELOAD library injection
The rootkit is using LD_PRELOAD to load itself before other libraries.
the endpoint https://TARGET:9001/containers/NAME/exec could be used to exec commands and so on
This containerd service is then used to launch several ProxyJacking containers such as: bitping/bitpingd repocket/repocket earnfm/earnfm-client iproyal/pawns-cli
The attacker modifies the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment during user login. This script is designed to execute the malware first, followed by the legitimate workload expected to run on the server.
use services and cron job for persistence ... /etc/cron.d/perfclean used in main.CronSystemWideCrond
IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd timer persistence file
This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.
By placing their public keys in the authorized_keys file, attackers can gain access without requiring further authentication if the private key is in their possession.
It also exploits exposed Portainer agents ... It may backdoor existing account on the server to enable SSH access
If you try downloading the .php file without a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. But if you use the correct user agent it will drop the malware.
The binary wizlmsh is dropped to /usr/bin ... It is a very small binary (12kb), that runs as a service in the background.
IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd service persistence file
The attacker also installs a docker service in order to run ProxyJacking containers ... launching a script for installing a custom containerd service
/.config/cron/perfcc used in main.AddToProfile
It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols. Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate.
The attacker modifies the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment during user login. This script is designed to execute the malware first, followed by the legitimate workload expected to run on the server.
use services and cron job for persistence ... /etc/cron.d/perfclean used in main.CronSystemWideCrond
IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd timer persistence file
The ability to evade detection through stealthy techniques — like kernel-level exploitation — adds to the challenge.
This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.
By placing their public keys in the authorized_keys file, attackers can gain access without requiring further authentication if the private key is in their possession.
The binary wizlmsh is dropped to /usr/bin ... It is a very small binary (12kb), that runs as a service in the background.
IOC Hashes ... Text file Systemd service persistence file
The attacker also installs a docker service in order to run ProxyJacking containers ... launching a script for installing a custom containerd service
/.config/cron/perfcc used in main.AddToProfile
It attempts to exploit the Polkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) to escalate privileges.
ATT&CK Techniques used ... Privilege escalation Escape to Host T1611
It utilizes rootkits to hide its presence.
This technique is called ‘process masquerading’ or ‘process replacement’ ... The new Httpd binary is now saved in the /tmp directory under the name of the process that executed it sh in our case.
Make a copy of /bin/dash as /usr/sbin/nologin (with a trailing space) ... Add a space at the end of news line in /etc/passwd
After execution, it deletes its binary and continues to run quietly in the background as a service.
This allows SSH access while appearing to have a “nologin” shell at first glance.
If you try downloading the .php file without a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. But if you use the correct user agent it will drop the malware.
They drop a few legitimate utilities such as ldd. These utilities were modified to hide specific attack elements.
the script continues with a simple if condition, that will ensure that the targeted attacked server OS architecture is x86_64.
The rootkit has several purposes. One of the main purposes is to hook various functions and modify their functionality.
it blocks the listing and reading of any folder / filename containing one of the following terms: .xdiag;.perf.c;.dmesg;perfctl;perfcc;libgcwrap.so
The rootkit is using LD_PRELOAD to load itself before other libraries.
It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols. Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate.
The malware is also running various operations such as shutting down security controls
The attacker collected shell histories, configuration files and command lines possibly containing sensitive information
The attacker collected shell histories
the secrets of the docker swarm may be retrieved by the following query ... https://TARGET:9001/secrets
It does various interesting manipulations, including hooking to Libpam symbols. Specifically, to the function pam_authenticate.
The machine is fingerprinted by various commands such as uname -a
we identified a very long list of almost 20K directory traversal fuzzing list, seeking for mistakenly exposed configuration files and secrets.
the script continues with a simple if condition, that will ensure that the targeted attacked server OS architecture is x86_64.
The attacker collected shell histories, configuration files and command lines possibly containing sensitive information
ATT&CK Techniques used ... Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001
the main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker.
It utilizes Unix socket for internal communication and TOR for external communication.
As part of its command-and-control operation, the malware opens a Unix socket
After exploiting a vulnerability ... the main payload is downloaded from an HTTP server controlled by the attacker.
If you try downloading the .php file without a specific user agent, you will receive a file with the integer 1. But if you use the correct user agent it will drop the malware.
It opens a backdoor on the server and listens for TOR communications.
The main impact of the attack is resource hijacking. In all cases we observed a monero cryptominer (XMRIG) executed and exhausting the server’s CPU resources.
It is a Linux Malware used for monetization of compromised computers by CryptoJacking
It is a Linux Malware used for monetization of compromised computers by CryptoJacking and ProxyJacking
65 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.