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Mallory
Malware4 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Lemurloot

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs116Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
Windows

LEMURLOOT is a C# ASP.NET web shell purpose-built for compromising Progress MOVEit Transfer managed file transfer applications on Windows servers. It was deployed during the widespread exploitation of the previously unknown SQL injection vulnerability CVE-2023-34362 beginning in May 2023. The campaign was associated with the financially motivated Clop extortion operation and attributed by Mandiant to FIN11, affecting public- and private-sector organizations across multiple industries and countries.

LEMURLOOT imports MOVEit libraries to interact with the application's databases, configuration, users, and stored files. It can enumerate file and folder metadata, retrieve and exfiltrate files, extract Azure Blob Storage configuration and credentials, and use MOVEit's native key-management functionality to decrypt stored files. It can also create and delete privileged application accounts, enabling persistent access that may survive a web-server rebuild if the compromised database remains intact. Operator requests are authenticated through a password supplied in an HTTP header, commands are conveyed through additional headers, and returned data is gzip-compressed. The web shell masquerades as a legitimate MOVEit component and returns an HTTP not-found response to unauthenticated requests to conceal its presence. Its primary operational role is rapid data theft supporting extortion rather than file encryption.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-34362via symantec blogExploited in the wildUnauthenticated SQL Injection in Progress MOVEit TransferSnakefly had been exploiting the vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362), an SQL injection vulnerability that permits an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to MOVEit Transfer's database, as a zero-day vulnerability prior to its discovery.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-35036via fourcore blogUnauthenticated SQL Injection in Progress MOVEit TransferThey exploited this vulnerability by installing a webshell known as LEMURLOOT.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL0P

Internet-facing MOVEit Transfer web applications were infected with a web shell named LEMURLOOT, which was then used to steal data from underlying MOVEit Transfer databases.

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
FIN11

According to a joint advisory issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the attackers exploited the vulnerability to install a web shell called Lemurloot (JS.Malscript!g1) on affected systems. This was then used to steal data from underlying databases.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
Snakefly

According to a joint advisory issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the attackers exploited the vulnerability to install a web shell called Lemurloot (JS.Malscript!g1) on affected systems. This was then used to steal data from underlying databases.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
UNC4857

Following exploitation of the vulnerability, the threat actors are deploying a newly discovered LEMURLOOT web shell with filenames that masquerade as human.aspx... LEMURLOOT provides functionality tailored to execute on a system running MOVEit Transfer software...

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Lemurloot was designed specifically to target the MOVEit Transfer platform... and can create, insert, or delete a particular user.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence10

CL0P ransomware group exploited the zero-day vulnerability CVE-2023-34362 affecting MOVEit Transfer software; begins with a SQL injection to infiltrate the MOVEit Transfer web application.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

"The nature of the software affected means that attackers can exploit unpatched systems to mount a supply chain attack against multiple organizations."

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This web shell enabled persistent access, command execution, and facilitated further data exfiltration.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Lemurloot was designed specifically to target the MOVEit Transfer platform... and can create, insert, or delete a particular user.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence2

"and can create, insert, or delete a particular user."

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

"...otherwise it creates a new account with a randomly generated username and with LoginName and RealName values set to 'Health Check Service' This account is inserted it into an active MOVEit application session."

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence13

Lemurloot was used as a method of persistence, information gathering and data stealing in CVE-2023-34362.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Lemurloot was designed specifically to target the MOVEit Transfer platform... and can create, insert, or delete a particular user.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence2

"and can create, insert, or delete a particular user."

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The webshell is disguised with filenames such as “human2.aspx” and “human2.aspx.lnk” in an attempt to masquerade as human.aspx, a legitimate component of the MOVEit Transfer service.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

CL0P actors delete traces of Truebot malware after it is used.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Lemurloot was designed specifically to target the MOVEit Transfer platform... and can create, insert, or delete a particular user.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

"It authenticates incoming HTTPS requests via a hard-coded password"

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"LEMURLOOT can also steal Azure Storage Blob information, including credentials, from the MOVEit Transfer application settings... including the configured Azure Blog storage account, and its associated key and container."

Discovery

1 technique
T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence1

"extracts its Azure system settings"

Collection

2 techniques
T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence3

SQL injection attacks allow attackers to ... allow the complete disclosure of all data on the system...

T1530Data from Cloud StorageEvidence1

LEMURLOOT can also steal Azure Storage Blob information, including credentials, from the MOVEit Transfer application settings, suggesting that actors exploiting this vulnerability may be stealing files from Azure in cases where victims are storing appliance data in Azure Blob storage.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

FlawedAmmyy / FlawedGrace remote access trojan (RAT) collects information and attempts to communicate with the Command and Control (C2) server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

"It authenticates incoming HTTPS requests via a hard-coded password; runs commands that will download files from the MOVEit Transfer database..."

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

CL0P actors exfiltrate data for C2 channels.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Attackers used the web shell to steal sensitive files, database contents, and Azure storage keys. Exfiltrated data was leveraged for extortion, with victims threatened via the Clop leak site.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

116 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching116Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.