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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

Ransom Cartel

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 8 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningExtortion
Platforms
WindowsLinuxEsxi

Ransom Cartel is a ransomware family and ransomware-as-a-service operation developed in 2021 and publicly launched in December of that year. It targets Windows systems and Linux-based VMware ESXi environments. Its affiliates conduct double-extortion attacks, stealing sensitive information before encrypting systems and demanding payment for decryption or non-publication of stolen data. Extortion tactics include threats to distribute information directly to victims’ partners, competitors, and news outlets. Victims have included organizations in education, manufacturing, utilities, energy, legal services, and medical technology in the United States and other countries.

Affiliates obtain initial access through compromised credentials for internet-facing RDP, SSH, and VPN services, including access purchased from initial access brokers. Observed intrusions use DonPAPI, Mimikatz, and LaZagne for credential theft; inventory and scanning utilities for discovery; SSH and RDP for lateral movement; Cobalt Strike and legitimate remote-access software for remote control; and Rclone for exfiltration. Attackers have exploited PrintNightmare vulnerabilities for privilege escalation. In ESXi environments, they enable SSH, establish root-equivalent accounts for persistence, and shut down virtual machines before encrypting virtual disks and related data.

The ransomware uses Salsa20 for file encryption with Curve25519-based key exchange. Its encrypted configuration specifies encryption exclusions, ransom-note content, and processes and services to terminate, including backup, database, and security software. Windows variants support Safe Boot execution, and observed intrusions include event-log clearing. Ransom Cartel shares substantial technical similarities with REvil in configuration structures, encryption routines, session-secret generation, and early ransom notes, but a direct organizational succession has not been established.

The operation was created and administered by Maksim Silnikau, who supplied affiliates with stolen credentials and encryption tools and maintained infrastructure for attack management, victim negotiations, and revenue distribution. Ransom Cartel was linked to attacks against at least 18 companies between 2021 and 2023. Silnikau subsequently received a 16-year U.S. prison sentence.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-34527via cso onlineExploited in the wildPrintNightmareThe PrintNightmare exploit (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527 and CVE-2021-34481) was used for privilege escalation.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-34481via cso onlineExploited in the wildWindows Print Spooler privileged file operations vulnerabilityThe PrintNightmare exploit (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527 and CVE-2021-34481) was used for privilege escalation.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Ransom Cartel

In August, the creator and lead administrator of the Ransom Cartel ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation was sentenced to 16 years in prison.

via malware newsmalware.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence2

Silnikau, along with alleged co-conspirators ... are charged with cybercrime offenses associated with a scheme to transmit the Angler Exploit Kit, other malware, and online scams to the computers of millions of unsuspecting victim internet users through online advertisements — so-called “malvertising” — and other means

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

Он активно вербовал других киберпреступников на русскоязычных хак-форумах для участия в атаках и партнерской RaaS-программе ..., снабжал их инструментами и украденными учетными данными для доступа к корпоративным системам.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

...снабжал их инструментами и украденными учетными данными для доступа к корпоративным системам.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

Он активно вербовал других киберпреступников на русскоязычных хак-форумах для участия в атаках и партнерской RaaS-программе ..., снабжал их инструментами и украденными учетными данными для доступа к корпоративным системам.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

T1112. Modify Registry Modifies the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence3

...снабжал их инструментами и украденными учетными данными для доступа к корпоративным системам.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

Он активно вербовал других киберпреступников на русскоязычных хак-форумах для участия в атаках и партнерской RaaS-программе ..., снабжал их инструментами и украденными учетными данными для доступа к корпоративным системам.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Ransom Cartel launched publicly in December 2021 and shared code similarities with the REvil ransomware encryptor. However, the lack of some of REvil's obfuscation features led researchers to believe that it may have been created by a former core member of the operation...

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence8

Он активно вербовал других киберпреступников на русскоязычных хак-форумах для участия в атаках и партнерской RaaS-программе ..., снабжал их инструментами и украденными учетными данными для доступа к корпоративным системам.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

If this value is anything other than 0, the ransomware will proceed to spawn another instance of itself via rundll32.exe, specifying the Rathbuige export.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

T1112. Modify Registry Modifies the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.

T1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsEvidence1

T1222.002. File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Uses the chmod +x command to grant executable permissions to the ransomware.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Silnikau allegedly distributed information and tools to Ransom Cartel participants, including information about compromised computers, such as stolen credentials

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

T1083. File and Directory Discovery Searches for specific files prior to encryption.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The hackers stole data and demanded monetary payments in exchange for the key to unlock the stolen data, or in exchange for a promise not to publish the victim’s data.

Exfiltration

5 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

T1020 — Automated Exfiltration (Exfiltration)

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (Exfiltration)

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The hackers removed confidential data without authorization and demanded a monetary payment to refrain from releasing the victim’s data.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence4

Хакеры похищали корпоративные данные, шифровали системы и требовали выкуп за расшифровку данных или обещание не публиковать украденную информацию.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service (Exfiltration)

Impact

5 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence11

Хакеры похищали корпоративные данные, шифровали системы и требовали выкуп за расшифровку данных или обещание не публиковать украденную информацию.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

T1489 — Service Stop (Impact)

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

T1496 — Resource Hijacking (Impact)

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence2

T1565 — Data Manipulation (Impact)

T1657Financial TheftEvidence2

T1657 — Financial Theft (Impact)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

25 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.