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Malware2 associated actors

DownEx

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 1 year ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs24Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

Since this appears to be a new malware family, we named it DownEx. ... We decided to call this malware family DownEx by combining the DOWN project name with its intended purpose (Exfiltration).

via bitdefender blogbitdefender.com
UAC-0063

Intensive monitoring has provided a more detailed understanding of the payloads delivered by DownEx (written in C++) and DownExPyer (written in Python, also known as CHERRYSPY) malware.

via bitdefender blogbitdefender.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

While the initial infection vector remains unclear, we expect that threat actors used social engineering techniques to deliver a spear-phishing email with a malicious payload.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The C2 can respond with specific tasks to perform on compromised machine... TSK_BODY – This is an encrypted Python code, representing a task to execute.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The second file log is extension-less HTA file (normally .hta) with embedded VBScript code.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

To establish communication loop with the C2 infrastructure, threat actors deployed Python-based backdoor help.py located in the folder C:\ProgramData\python\tools\scripts.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The script was protected by PyArmor, a Python obfuscation tool... This compiled module ... was protected by the Themida software protection tool, and multiple obfuscation techniques including opcode mixing have been used.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The attack used a simple technique of using an icon file associated with .docx files to masquerade an executable file as a Microsoft Word document.

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

The second file log is extension-less HTA file (normally .hta) with embedded VBScript code.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

This is a fileless attack – the DownEx script is executed in memory and never touches the disk.

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Directories D:\ and C:\Users are recursively parsed... After execution, DownEx starts recursively parsing both local and network drives and collects the files...

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence1

After execution, DownEx starts recursively parsing both local and network drives and collects the files...

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

After execution, DownEx starts recursively parsing both local and network drives and collects the files with the following extensions...

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Files are exfiltrated in zip archives limited to 16 MBs... After the files are collected, they are exfiltrated using a password-protected zip archive.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

After the files are collected, they are exfiltrated using a password-protected zip archive.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The public key is shared with the C2 server ( https[:]//net-certificate[.]services:443 ) using POST method... The archives are exfiltrated to the C2 server by making POST request to http[:]//84.32.188[.]123/hftqlbgtg.php.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The archives are exfiltrated to the C2 server by making POST request to http[:]//84.32.188[.]123/hftqlbgtg.php.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

24 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching24Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.