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UAC-0063, also tracked as TAG-110, is a Russia-aligned cyber-espionage intrusion set active since at least 2021. CERT-UA has assessed a medium-confidence overlap between UAC-0063 and APT28 (also known as BlueDelta, Fancy Bear, and UAC-0001), a Russian GRU-linked group; the relationship has not been conclusively established. UAC-0063 targets government bodies, diplomatic missions, research institutions, and educational organizations across Central Asia and Europe, including Ukrainian state and research entities. The group primarily obtains access through spear-phishing, including compromised email accounts used to resend legitimate-looking correspondence with substituted malicious Office attachments. It weaponizes stolen documents from previously compromised victims as lures. Campaigns have used macro-enabled Word documents to deploy the HATVIBE HTA-based loader, and later used macro-enabled Word templates that persist through the Microsoft Word startup folder. UAC-0063 has also been associated with exploitation of CVE-2024-23692 affecting HFS HTTP File Server. Its malware ecosystem includes HATVIBE, CHERRYSPY/DownExPyer, DownEx/STILLARCH, LOGPIE, and PyPlunderPlug. These tools support remote command execution, host and file-system discovery, file collection and exfiltration, screenshot capture, removable-media collection, and keylogging. The actor establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and malicious global Word templates, and maintains command-and-control infrastructure over extended periods. Its operations are consistent with intelligence collection against regional political, diplomatic, security, and research interests.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
2 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 2 of them exploited in the wild.
Threat Actors (TAs) leveraging a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2023-38831, to deliver their payload on compromised systems... The aforementioned vulnerability allows the WinRAR application to extract and execute the malicious script when a user tries to open a benign file within the archive.
Слід додати, що в червні 2024 року зафіксовано численні випадки встановлення бекдору HATVIBE шляхом експлуатації вразливості (вірогідно, CVE-2024-23692) в програмному продукті HFS HTTP File Server
85 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned as another threat actor previously active against Central Asia for comparison/background only.
A previously documented cyberespionage campaign targeting government and diplomatic organizations in Central Asia and Europe; cited as geopolitical background for SilkParasite.
Referenced as a separate Russia-linked cyber-espionage operation previously documented by Bitdefender as expanding from Central Asia into Europe.
Espionage-focused activity expanding to European embassies; uses stolen legitimate documents for follow-on targeting and delivers HATVIBE malware; also assessed in reporting as Russia-linked and potentially overlapping with APT28.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.