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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

XDigo

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloading
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

XDigo is a Go-based espionage malware associated with the XDSpy threat cluster, also known as Silent Werewolf. It has been observed in campaigns from at least March 2025 targeting government and government-affiliated entities in Eastern Europe and the CIS, with reporting also indicating interest in diplomatic, defense-related, finance, insurance, and public-sector organizations. The malware is used as a stealth-focused implant for intelligence collection rather than disruption.

XDigo is typically deployed through a multi-stage Windows intrusion chain involving crafted shortcut files delivered inside archive files. In documented operations, the shortcut launches a sequence that abuses DLL sideloading through a legitimate signed Microsoft executable to run a first-stage downloader commonly referred to as ETDownloader. That downloader establishes persistence via the Windows Startup mechanism, opens a decoy document, and retrieves or deploys the XDigo implant.

Once active, XDigo performs host reconnaissance and data collection. Reported capabilities include gathering system and user information, enumerating directories, identifying and collecting documents and archives of interest, capturing clipboard contents, taking screenshots, and executing commands or binaries received from command-and-control infrastructure. Collected data is staged into encrypted archives using AES-256-GCM before exfiltration. Command-and-control communications use HTTPS, and tasking has been described as protected with asymmetric cryptography for command confidentiality and authenticity verification. Multiple versions have been observed across 2023 to 2025, suggesting ongoing development and operational use.

Attribution to XDSpy is supported by recurring infrastructure patterns, shared infection mechanics, command structure similarities, and consistent regional government-focused targeting. XDigo fits the long-running XDSpy tradecraft of selective victim validation, stealthy persistence, and sustained data exfiltration from Windows environments.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-9491via the hacker newsExploited in the wildMicrosoft Windows LNK Shortcut UI Misrepresentation Leading to Code Execution"...opening a bogus attachment that's designed to exploit ZDI-CAN-25373, a vulnerability that has been put to use by multiple threat actors... It's officially tracked as CVE-2025-9491 (CVSS score: 7.0)"View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
XDSpy

XDSpy (Silent Werewolf) Госучреждения СНГ Стилер XDigo

via codebycodeby.net
Silent Werewolf

XDSpy (Silent Werewolf) Госучреждения СНГ Стилер XDigo

via codebycodeby.net
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“A third party publication … indicated some of those ZIP archives at least were distributed via spearphishing emails containing links to the archives.”

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

"...leveraged a collection of Windows shortcut (LNK) files as part of a multi-stage procedure..."; "...chain of shortcut files..."

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The primary persistence mechanism targets the Windows Startup folder, located at: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ The Windows Explorer shell automatically enumerates and executes all items within these directories during the user logon process.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

T1547.009 Shortcut Modification is a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Persistence tactic. It involves the modification of shortcuts (typically .lnk files) in Windows to achieve persistence by ensuring that malicious programs or scripts are executed whenever the user interacts with the shortcut.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The primary persistence mechanism targets the Windows Startup folder, located at: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ The Windows Explorer shell automatically enumerates and executes all items within these directories during the user logon process.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

T1547.009 Shortcut Modification is a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Persistence tactic. It involves the modification of shortcuts (typically .lnk files) in Windows to achieve persistence by ensuring that malicious programs or scripts are executed whenever the user interacts with the shortcut.

Stealth

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“runs several ‘anti-analysis’ checks… stops if hardware characteristics … hostname or current user name … match predefined values… halts if any of 18 files exist”

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

“sksatgmf.exe has additional information stealing capabilities allowing it to retrieve credentials that may have been saved … from web browsers and email clients”

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

“scanning the current user’s home directory for files with … extensions … [and] scanning volumes other than C:”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

“runs several ‘anti-analysis’ checks… stops if hardware characteristics … hostname or current user name … match predefined values… halts if any of 18 files exist”

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

“collects information about the compromised host … getting the current user name and listing the directories located in C:\Program Files*\*”

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

“capturing a screenshot”

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

“retrieving the content of the clipboard”

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

“it creates a ZIP archive (using the “Store” method …) … finally, it encrypts the ZIP archive”

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“communicates with its C2 server by sending GET and POST requests through HTTPS … hxxps://quan-miami[.]com/wevjhnyh/”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“downloads the next stage payload from a hardcoded URL … the downloaded payload is … saved under … ytoqovbxx.exe , [and] executed”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.