XDigo
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloading
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
XDigo is a Go-based espionage malware associated with the XDSpy threat cluster, also known as Silent Werewolf. It has been observed in campaigns from at least March 2025 targeting government and government-affiliated entities in Eastern Europe and the CIS, with reporting also indicating interest in diplomatic, defense-related, finance, insurance, and public-sector organizations. The malware is used as a stealth-focused implant for intelligence collection rather than disruption.
XDigo is typically deployed through a multi-stage Windows intrusion chain involving crafted shortcut files delivered inside archive files. In documented operations, the shortcut launches a sequence that abuses DLL sideloading through a legitimate signed Microsoft executable to run a first-stage downloader commonly referred to as ETDownloader. That downloader establishes persistence via the Windows Startup mechanism, opens a decoy document, and retrieves or deploys the XDigo implant.
Once active, XDigo performs host reconnaissance and data collection. Reported capabilities include gathering system and user information, enumerating directories, identifying and collecting documents and archives of interest, capturing clipboard contents, taking screenshots, and executing commands or binaries received from command-and-control infrastructure. Collected data is staged into encrypted archives using AES-256-GCM before exfiltration. Command-and-control communications use HTTPS, and tasking has been described as protected with asymmetric cryptography for command confidentiality and authenticity verification. Multiple versions have been observed across 2023 to 2025, suggesting ongoing development and operational use.
Attribution to XDSpy is supported by recurring infrastructure patterns, shared infection mechanics, command structure similarities, and consistent regional government-focused targeting. XDigo fits the long-running XDSpy tradecraft of selective victim validation, stealthy persistence, and sustained data exfiltration from Windows environments.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Techniques & procedures
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
“A third party publication … indicated some of those ZIP archives at least were distributed via spearphishing emails containing links to the archives.”
Execution
1 technique
Execution
"...leveraged a collection of Windows shortcut (LNK) files as part of a multi-stage procedure..."; "...chain of shortcut files..."
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The primary persistence mechanism targets the Windows Startup folder, located at: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ The Windows Explorer shell automatically enumerates and executes all items within these directories during the user logon process.
T1547.009 Shortcut Modification is a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Persistence tactic. It involves the modification of shortcuts (typically .lnk files) in Windows to achieve persistence by ensuring that malicious programs or scripts are executed whenever the user interacts with the shortcut.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The primary persistence mechanism targets the Windows Startup folder, located at: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ The Windows Explorer shell automatically enumerates and executes all items within these directories during the user logon process.
T1547.009 Shortcut Modification is a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Persistence tactic. It involves the modification of shortcuts (typically .lnk files) in Windows to achieve persistence by ensuring that malicious programs or scripts are executed whenever the user interacts with the shortcut.
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
“runs several ‘anti-analysis’ checks… stops if hardware characteristics … hostname or current user name … match predefined values… halts if any of 18 files exist”
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
“sksatgmf.exe has additional information stealing capabilities allowing it to retrieve credentials that may have been saved … from web browsers and email clients”
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
“scanning the current user’s home directory for files with … extensions … [and] scanning volumes other than C:”
“runs several ‘anti-analysis’ checks… stops if hardware characteristics … hostname or current user name … match predefined values… halts if any of 18 files exist”
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
“collects information about the compromised host … getting the current user name and listing the directories located in C:\Program Files*\*”
“capturing a screenshot”
“retrieving the content of the clipboard”
“it creates a ZIP archive (using the “Store” method …) … finally, it encrypts the ZIP archive”
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
“communicates with its C2 server by sending GET and POST requests through HTTPS … hxxps://quan-miami[.]com/wevjhnyh/”
“downloads the next stage payload from a hardcoded URL … the downloaded payload is … saved under … ytoqovbxx.exe , [and] executed”
Observables
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.