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Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

XDSpy

Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs2Associated
Malware11Families
ATT&CK31Techniques
IOCs56Tracked
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
BYRUMDRSUA
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloading
Also known asXDSpy

XDSpy is a long-running cyber-espionage threat actor active since at least 2011 that primarily targets government institutions in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the CIS, with repeated victimology in Belarus and additional activity affecting Russia, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine. The group has also been referred to as Silent Werewolf. Its targeting has included government agencies, ministries of foreign affairs, military-related entities, and selected private-sector organizations. XDSpy is known for spearphishing-led initial access using malicious attachments or links to archive files, and for selective payload delivery after validating the victim. Across campaigns, it has used Windows shortcut abuse, archive-based delivery chains, downloader malware, DLL sideloading, and staged espionage implants. In 2020 it was observed using a patched Internet Explorer vulnerability, CVE-2020-0968, in addition to phishing lures. In 2025, XDSpy was linked to exploitation of Windows LNK handling and display weaknesses, including CVE-2025-9491 and related parsing confusion, to conceal malicious execution within crafted shortcut files delivered in compressed archives. Its malware ecosystem has included XDDown, a downloader that establishes persistence and retrieves additional modules, and XDigo, a Go-based espionage implant associated with 2025 operations. Reported XDSpy tooling supports host reconnaissance, file and directory discovery, screenshot capture, clipboard collection, removable-media monitoring, password theft, geolocation via nearby Wi-Fi data, and encrypted exfiltration of collected documents. Recent XDigo activity has also used signed or encrypted tasking and HTTPS-based command-and-control, reflecting a mature espionage workflow focused on stealth and data theft rather than disruption. Observed tradecraft includes persistence through user logon mechanisms, defense evasion through obfuscation and deceptive shortcut presentation, and post-compromise collection of documents from targeted systems. Public reporting has described the actor as unusually stealthy and underdocumented for many years, with no high-confidence public linkage to another known APT based on malware code or infrastructure overlap. The dominant motivation is espionage.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Military

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Belarus
  • Moldova
  • Serbia
  • Russia
  • Ukraine
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

31 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

10 of 15 tactics44 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566Phishing
T1566.001×2Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1059.007JavaScript
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204User Execution
T1204.001Malicious Link
T1204.002×2Malicious File
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×3Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009Shortcut Modification
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×3Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009Shortcut Modification
TA0005Stealth6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036Masquerading
T1211Exploitation for Stealth
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001DLL
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007Discovery4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
T1082×2System Information Discovery
T1083×2File and Directory Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
TA0009Collection6 techniques
T1005×2Data from Local System
T1025Data from Removable Media
T1113×2Screen Capture
T1115Clipboard Data
T1119Automated Collection
T1560Archive Collected Data
T1560.001Archive via Utility
TA0011Command and Control3 techniques
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2Web Protocols
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1573Encrypted Channel
T1573.001Symmetric Cryptography
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1020Automated Exfiltration
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 2 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2025-94914 evidence · Mar 18, 2026Exploited in the wildMicrosoft Windows LNK Shortcut UI Misrepresentation Leading to Code Execution"...opening a bogus attachment that's designed to exploit ZDI-CAN-25373, a vulnerability that has been put to use by multiple threat actors... It's officially tracked as CVE-2025-9491 (CVSS score: 7.0)"View vulnerability →
CVE-2020-09681 evidence · May 31, 2026Exploited in the wildInternet Explorer Scripting Engine Memory Corruption RCEAt the end of June 2020, the operators stepped up their game by using a vulnerability in Internet Explorer, CVE-2020-0968, which had been patched in April 2020. Instead of delivering an archive with a LNK file, the C&C server was delivering an RTF file that, once opened, downloaded an HTML file exploiting the aforementioned vulnerability.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

56 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does XDSpy target?
XDSpy targets Government & Administration and Military in Belarus, Moldova, Serbia, Russia, and Ukraine.
What malware does XDSpy use?
XDSpy is associated with XDigo, ETDownloader, JobDrop, StepDrum, XDDown, and 6 more.
Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Are they targeting you?See whether this actor's campaigns touch your sector, your geography, or the products you run, and get alerted when that changes.
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping31MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware11Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs2CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables56Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.