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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

ETDownloader

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs3Tracked

ETDownloader is a C#/.NET first-stage downloader used in a March 2025 onward cyber-espionage campaign attributed to XDSpy. It is delivered through a multi-stage Windows LNK-based infection chain in which specially crafted shortcut files distributed inside ZIP archives ultimately launch a legitimate signed Microsoft binary, DeviceMetadataWizard.exe, to sideload a malicious d3d9.dll identified as ETDownloader. The malware has been associated with targeting governmental entities in Eastern Europe and Russia, with a confirmed victim in Belarus.

Observed delivery artifacts included ZIP archives such as dokazatelstva.zip and proyekt.zip containing malicious LNK lures, a second ZIP disguised with an .ini extension, DeviceMetadataWizard.exe, the malicious d3d9.dll, and decoy PDF files. The LNK execution chain used jsc.exe to compile JScript.NET into a temporary unzip utility and used forfiles.exe as part of execution. ETDownloader opens a decoy PDF by moving test.cfg into the user Documents folder and launching it via Explorer.

ETDownloader establishes persistence by creating startapp.bat in the user Startup folder at C:\Users<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup, causing execution at logon. The batch file launches %AppData%\2A5S2FQJSU9B\YEZYZO107H.exe with the /startup argument. The malware attempts to download and execute an additional stage-2 payload, assessed with moderate to high confidence to be the Go-based XDigo implant. One reported hardcoded download URL was hxxps://vashazagruzka365[.]com/zagruzka/?pti=hlicbz&yay=G9CUTb3S8U4XHr8. The downloaded payload is decoded via base64, XORed with key 11PDL19R6LMRJPCQ, base64-decoded again, and saved as ytoqovbxx.exe under %AppData%\Roaming\2A5S2FQJSU9B.

The malware is obfuscated with ConfuserEx2 or a variant plus an additional XOR-based string encoding layer. Reported sample details include the sideloaded ETDownloader d3d9.dll with SHA-256 792c5a2628ec1be86e38b0a73a44c1a9247572453555e7996bb9d0a58e37b62b and reported compilation time 2025-03-05 13:18:57. High-confidence related artifacts in the infection chain include DeviceMetadataWizard.exe SHA-256 1793dae4d05cc7be9575f14ae7a73ffe3b8279a811c0db40f56f0e2c1ee8dd61. ETDownloader is consistently described as the stage-1 downloader in this XDSpy-linked intrusion set and as the component responsible for persistence and retrieval of the follow-on espionage implant.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-9491via the hacker newsExploited in the wildMicrosoft Windows LNK Shortcut UI Misrepresentation Leading to Code ExecutionHarfangLab said it observed the threat actor leveraging a remote code execution flaw in Microsoft Windows that's triggered when processing specially crafted LNK files. The vulnerability (ZDI-CAN-25373) was publicly disclosed by Trend Micro earlier this March. | The DLL is a first-stage downloader dubbed ETDownloader that, in turn, is likely meant to deploy a data collection implant referred to as XDigo...View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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XDSpy

The stage 1 downloader (ETDownloader) established persistence by creating `startapp.bat` in the Startup folder

via picus security blogpicussecurity.com
Silent Werewolf

The DLL is a first-stage downloader dubbed ETDownloader that, in turn, is likely meant to deploy a data collection implant referred to as XDigo...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“A third party publication … indicated some of those ZIP archives at least were distributed via spearphishing emails containing links to the archives.”

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The LNK file executed a complex Windows shell one-liner that: for /R "%USERPROFILE%" %f in (proyekt.zip) do ( echo [JavaScript .NET code] > %TEMP%\B5DUC80ULT7L.a %_jsc% /nologo /r:System.IO.Compression.FileSystem.dll /out:%TEMP%\unzip.exe %TEMP%\B5DUC80ULT7L.a %TEMP%\unzip.exe "%f" "%USERPROFILE%\L80OWGTGHWBX" start "" /MIN "%USERPROFILE%\L80OWGTGHWBX\YEZYZO107H.exe" )

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“The LNK file triggers the execution of an intricate Windows shell command one-liner…”

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

“stores a JavaScript .NET code snippet … compiles the latter to an assembly … using … jsc.exe … runs … unzip.exe”

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

“The execution chain initiates with the user unzipping the archive and opening the embedded LNK file…”

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“This executable in turn sideloads the malicious d3d9.dll.”

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The primary persistence mechanism targets the Windows Startup folder, located at: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ The Windows Explorer shell automatically enumerates and executes all items within these directories during the user logon process.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

T1547.009 Shortcut Modification is a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Persistence tactic. It involves the modification of shortcuts (typically .lnk files) in Windows to achieve persistence by ensuring that malicious programs or scripts are executed whenever the user interacts with the shortcut.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

The primary persistence mechanism targets the Windows Startup folder, located at: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ %PROGRAMDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ The Windows Explorer shell automatically enumerates and executes all items within these directories during the user logon process.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

T1547.009 Shortcut Modification is a technique in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Persistence tactic. It involves the modification of shortcuts (typically .lnk files) in Windows to achieve persistence by ensuring that malicious programs or scripts are executed whenever the user interacts with the shortcut.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“downloaded payload is decoded with base64, then using XOR … then base64 again”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

“another ZIP archive disguised with an .ini extension … a decoy PDF document, renamed as test.cfg”

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

“extract … a renamed, legitimate and signed Microsoft executable (… DeviceMetadataWizard.exe) … [which] sideloads the malicious d3d9.dll.”

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“This executable in turn sideloads the malicious d3d9.dll.”

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

“for /f %j in ('dir /b /s /a:-d /o:-n "%SystemRoot%\Microsoft.Net\Framework\*jsc.exe"') do @set "_jsc=%j"”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“downloads the next stage payload from a hardcoded URL … the downloaded payload is … saved under … ytoqovbxx.exe , [and] executed”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.