GOST (Go Simple Tunnel) is an open-source proxy and tunneling utility written in Go. It is legitimate dual-use software rather than an inherently malicious malware family. Attackers deploy it after compromise to establish SOCKS5 proxies, reverse TCP tunnels, and alternative communication channels, exposing internal services and maintaining external access to compromised environments. Observed deployments include Windows servers, Linux systems, containerized workloads, and compromised Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls.
GOST has been used by Akira ransomware affiliates, UTA0218, Partisan Zmiy associated with Cyber Partisans, SHADOW-EARTH-053, and TeamPCP. Operators have combined it with tools such as 3proxy and FRP to provide redundant connectivity. Persistence has been implemented through external mechanisms including systemd services and a custom Windows service-based loader that launches GOST on a restricted schedule. Some deployments disguise its executable as a legitimate software component or place it within trusted application directories.
GOST is generally downloaded or staged after attackers obtain access; it is not itself the exploit or credential-stealing component in these intrusions. Its documented operational role is maintaining access and proxying traffic during post-exploitation activity.
5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“DNSCat2, PartisanDNS, and a GOST–3proxy chain provided alternative connectivity, preventing disruption of one channel from automatically removing access.”
“DNSCat2, PartisanDNS, and a GOST–3proxy chain provided alternative connectivity, preventing disruption of one channel from automatically removing access.”
This version attempts to download a Golang tunneling tool named GOST and execute it with two different command-line options to establish SOCKS5 and RTCP tunnels.
Observed tooling included IOX Proxy, GOST, Wstunnel, and multiple tunnel-core.exe variants. These tools established SOCKS5 proxies, HTTPS tunnels, and reverse communication channels to attacker infrastructure.
Tunneling tools: TeamPCP uses frps (fast reverse proxy) and gost for establishing persistent tunnels and proxying through compromised container environments
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Multiple groups “obtained and used” publicly available/open-source tools (e.g., APT28 used Koadic/Mimikatz/Responder; APT29 used Mimikatz/SDelete/Tor/meek/Cobalt Strike; many others acquired tools such as PsExec, Impacket, Metasploit, etc.).
Tunneling tools: TeamPCP uses frps (fast reverse proxy) and gost for establishing persistent tunnels and proxying through compromised container environments
The primary payload, tplink_stager.sh, was designed for post-exploitation of CVE-2024-21833, an OS command injection vulnerability affecting TP-Link Archer and Deco series routers.
“Locker and audit runs as SYSTEM tasks every 5-10 minutes”; persistence tasks include “AfricaSync, FinSoftSync*, SvcSync, NetAssist.”
“Locker and audit runs as SYSTEM tasks every 5-10 minutes”; persistence tasks include “AfricaSync, FinSoftSync*, SvcSync, NetAssist.”
Tunneling tools: TeamPCP uses frps (fast reverse proxy) and gost for establishing persistent tunnels and proxying through compromised container environments
Persistence was achieved via six systemd services... TeamPCP proxy.sh creates six systemd services with Restart=always.
They made Localtonet persistent with the help of Non-Sucking Service Manager (NSSM)... If the -p flag is specified... a service for the Gost tool will be installed... If -t key is passed... it installs and configures cloudflared in the system.
“Locker and audit runs as SYSTEM tasks every 5-10 minutes”; persistence tasks include “AfricaSync, FinSoftSync*, SvcSync, NetAssist.”
Persistence was achieved via six systemd services... TeamPCP proxy.sh creates six systemd services with Restart=always.
They made Localtonet persistent with the help of Non-Sucking Service Manager (NSSM)... If the -p flag is specified... a service for the Gost tool will be installed... If -t key is passed... it installs and configures cloudflared in the system.
Upon launch, it connected to the C2 server, allowing the operator to execute commands on the compromised host... Cloudflared tunnels traffic through the Cloudflare network.
Mandiant observed UNC5330 operating a server since Dec. 6, 2021, which the group used as a GOST proxy to help facilitate malicious tool deployment to endpoints.
The group uses reverse SSH tunnels with -R port forwarding and tools including GOST, rsocx, cloudflared, and localtonet to redirect traffic.
“Tor, SSH pivots, gost exits on compromised hosts, residential proxies.”
After exploiting the business automation platform server, attackers downloaded and installed the PhantomJitter backdoor... The backdoor was downloaded into the victims’ infrastructure from the following URLs...
ShadowLink on port 7443; TeamPCP staging on 666, FRP on 888.
TeamPCP FRP reverse tunnel from victim SOCKS5 to C2:890.
21 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.