DoubleZero
- Type
- Wiper
- Capabilities
- PersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Lure
- Platforms
- Windows
DoubleZero is a destructive .NET wiper written in C# and used in attacks against Ukrainian organizations during the early phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It has been tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0088 and is widely documented as one of several wiper families deployed against Ukrainian targets in 2022.
The malware is heavily obfuscated and is designed to corrupt files, damage registry data, and render Windows systems unbootable. Its core wiping behavior relies on the NTFS FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA control path via NtFsControlFile to overwrite targeted content with null bytes. A commonly noted characteristic is that it can corrupt files by zeroing only the first 4096 bytes, a speed-optimized destructive technique sufficient to make many files unusable. It also includes a secondary file-wiping routine using standard .NET file operations. Beyond user data, DoubleZero targets boot-related components and registry structures associated with Windows startup, including boot configuration data, so that affected hosts may fail to boot after restart.
DoubleZero enumerates logical drives, traverses volumes for files matching targeted patterns, and interacts with file permissions and ownership to maximize destructive reach. Reported behavior includes attempts to obtain elevated privileges such as backup, restore, take-ownership, and shutdown rights, modification of access controls on targeted files and registry keys, recursive deletion of registry subkeys, and termination of the LSASS process before shutdown or reboot. Some reporting also notes logic to avoid execution on domain controllers or to alter behavior depending on privilege level, with reduced impact when administrative rights are unavailable.
The malware targets Windows environments and has been associated specifically with Ukrainian enterprises and critical infrastructure during wartime disruptive operations. Public reporting links it to broader Russian-aligned destructive activity in Ukraine, though high-confidence attribution at the malware-family level is generally limited to its tracking under UAC-0088 rather than a universally agreed named state actor. Delivery has been observed via ZIP archives using lure-themed filenames, and some assessments indicate the wiper may also have been manually executed after attackers had already obtained privileged access to victim systems.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Techniques & procedures
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
eSentire Threat Intelligence assesses with medium confidence that the threat actor(s) was able to gain access to the infected machine(s) and escalate, or use, the existing administrative privileges to manually execute the malware.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Platform Invoke (P/Invoke) enables the managed codes in .NET to call the unmanaged functions. Calling the lower level APIs directly is a well known anti-analysis technique to evade API hooking by sandbox.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
eSentire Threat Intelligence assesses with medium confidence that the threat actor(s) was able to gain access to the infected machine(s) and escalate, or use, the existing administrative privileges to manually execute the malware.
Malware then deletes the Windows registry tree subkeys in HKU, HKLM
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
eSentire Threat Intelligence assesses with medium confidence that the threat actor(s) was able to gain access to the infected machine(s) and escalate, or use, the existing administrative privileges to manually execute the malware.
To achieve the full-scale disruption, the threat actor(s) would need to escalate their privileges or bypass the user account control (UAC) to fully compromise the system.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
It also interleaves random code among actual operations, together with flattened control flow, to make the code harder to follow.
The executables need to be run as an Administrator for it to gain the full access to the system files and registry keys to proceed with deletion/wiping process.
eSentire Threat Intelligence assesses with medium confidence that the threat actor(s) was able to gain access to the infected machine(s) and escalate, or use, the existing administrative privileges to manually execute the malware.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Malware then deletes the Windows registry tree subkeys in HKU, HKLM
For each file that is deemed "safe" to destroy... the wiper will: Change the access control of files by giving the Local System Account (WellKnownSidType.LocalSystemSid) full control of the file.
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
The sample enumerates the HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_USERS, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE registry keys including HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\BCD00000000... to remove them later.
However, the wiper does kill any process named lsass.
The malware gets the root drive of the infected device and Operating System information using Environment.SystemDirectory and Environment.OSVersion properties.
The regular expression function imported by System.Text.RegularExpressions is used to locate certain files by patterns.
DoubleZero attempts to get all logical drives on the infected computers.
Impact
5 techniques
Impact
Many entries concern “CaddyWiper”, “new data wiper hits Ukraine”, “destructive wiper malware”, and Sandworm operations using CADDYWIPER alongside INDUSTROYER2.
However, the wiper does kill any process named lsass.
These privileges are used to ensure the wiper has the access right to destroy the target file and reboot the system after all the actions are done.
The corpus contains multiple technical analyses of wiper malware and “The Anatomy of Wiper Malware” focused on destructive techniques.
The DoubleZero wiper, for instance, only erases the first 4096 bytes of targeted files... The Azov wiper also implemented a somewhat more optimized wiping process. It does not remove all data in each file. Instead, it only targets 666 bytes in an alternating pattern...
Observables
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.